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ABSTRACT 
PROSTHETIZING THE SOUL: READING, SEEING, AND FEELING  
IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DEVOTION 
 
MAY 2016 
 
KATEY E. RODEN, B.A., COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Co-Directed by: Professor Joseph L. Black and Professor Jane Hwang Degenhardt 
 
 
My dissertation proposes a new context for reading early modern devotional writing’s 
rich engagement with the language of the body in its focus on the relationship between 
gendered representations of devotional desire and spiritual ability in the religious poetry 
of seventeenth-century England. By tracing how somatic speech and bodily conditions 
are portrayed in the devotional poetry of John Milton, Richard Crashaw, Thomas 
Traherne, and An Collins, this project examines how these writers fashion spiritual states 
through the language of a sometime sorrowful and sometime ecstatic, but always desiring 
body. My project reveals how early modern authors manipulate or respond to gendered 
and bodily hierarchies to craft liturgically rich devotional scenes that exceed and 
overwhelm sensations of spiritual lack written on and within the bodies of the devotional 
figures presented therein. Through my focus on the body of the text and also the ways in 
which bodies are represented within devotional texts, I posit a new way of looking at 
early modern devotional writing: as prosthetics. The term prosthesis is most often 
associated with a medical appendage supplementing a bodily lack, but my project takes 
seriously the animating capacity of language as I demonstrate the ways in which early 
	  vii	  
modern devotional writing exhibits a “prosthetic impulse” that blurs mind-body divides 
via the amplified register of highly affective somatic speech. Far from mere metaphor, 
this dissertation shows how the prosthetized devotional text materializes and makes 
known the spiritual abilities of authors who actively frame divine desire around bodies in 
opposition to the normative cisgendered and ableist body so widely celebrated in 
religious discourses of the period. Reading devotional texts as prosthetics that supplement 
the spiritual lack experienced by early modern believers struggling to articulate their 
relationship with the divine reveals the problematic interplay between self and society in 
its blurring of the boundaries between immaterial soul, the material body, and the literal 
pages before us. My project thus demonstrates how the prosthetized text actively 
reframes dualist constructions of the body and soul, men and women, and also spiritual 
health and ability. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
DESIRING BODIES AND THE PROSTHETIC  
POWER OF DEVOTIONAL VERSE 
 
With every tool, man is perfecting his own organs…by means of spectacles he corrects 
defects in the lens of his own eye; by means of the telescope he sees into the far 
distance…. With the telephone he can hear at distance which would be unattainable… 
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God.  When he puts on all of his 
auxiliary organs, he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and 
they still give him much trouble at times. 
      —Freud, Civilization and its Discontents1 
 
 
In the epigraph above, Sigmund Freud suggests that technological innovation is 
tantamount to godliness.  Our technologies allow us to conquer time, space, and also 
extend the range of our bodily abilities beyond what was previously thought possible.  As 
each piece of adaptive technology allows us to more fully master our bodies and the 
material world that surrounds us, human beings become less creatures of the earth and 
increasingly godlike.  The psychic unity and sense of autonomous agency Freud alludes 
to in the claim that mankind is “a kind of prosthetic God” rests entirely on the plethora of 
auxiliary devices that supplement humanity’s shortcomings and emphasize our lack of 
wholeness.  Freud’s provocative image thus reveals something about the desire to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated and edited by James 
Strachey (1961; New York: Norton, 1989), 43-4. 
2 Burkhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, ed. 
Peter Burke (1860; New York: Penguin, 1990).  
3 Will Fisher notes that the OED first records individual as referring to “A single human 
being, as opposed to Society, the Family, etc.” in 1626.  See Materializing Gender in 
Early Modern English Literature and Culture (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 201 
n.2. 
4 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (1980; Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 2005).  
5 I borrow the term “prosthetic impulse” from Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra, who 
use it to describe the relationship between the modern Western subject and an 
increasingly technologized word. See Smith and Morra, eds., The Prosthetic Impulse: 
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recognize in the self a sense of unfractured subjectivity, but it also acknowledges the 
reality that we most often come up wanting.  His description of mankind as inching our 
way closer to the type of ontological wholeness envisioned in a divine Other like the 
Christian God, one prosthetized device at a time, is in many ways a reflection of the ideal 
modern subject.  According to Jacob Burkhardt’s influential claim, the concept of a 
modern individual as marked by consciousness of personal subjectivity and selfhood first 
appeared in the early modern period.2  Indeed, it is true that the word individual, with all 
of its modern implications of wholeness and singularity, first formally entered the 
English language in the seventeenth century.3  Steven Greenblatt, of course, picked up 
this idea and ran with it, boldly affirming that early modern writing exhibits both “selves 
and a sense that they could be fashioned” (1).4  Like Burkhardt before him, Greenblatt’s 
thesis spawned a host of critical inquiries into precisely how, and against what external 
pressures, early modern individuals saw themselves as just that: individuals.  
 It is equally true that the term prosthesis found its way into English vocabularies 
in the early modern period.  At first glance, the concept of the self seems to have very 
little to do with prostheses, which are most often imagined as an artificial additive meant 
to supplement bodily lack through extension, augmentation, or enhancement of some 
kind.  Prostheses have to do with the body, whereas modern subjectivity has to do with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Burkhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, ed. 
Peter Burke (1860; New York: Penguin, 1990).  
3 Will Fisher notes that the OED first records individual as referring to “A single human 
being, as opposed to Society, the Family, etc.” in 1626.  See Materializing Gender in 
Early Modern English Literature and Culture (New York: Cambridge UP, 2006), 201 
n.2. 
4 Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare (1980; Chicago: 
U of Chicago P, 2005).  
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the experience of a fixed, immaterial internal self.  Insofar as the prosthesis occupies a 
liminal space of being part of the body, but not the body, addable, removable, and also 
indispensable to personal autonomy and agency, the prosthesis disturbs almost all of the 
binaries we use to consider formation of selfhood.  In short, the prosthesis compels us to 
consider the bounds between the body and self, because when we confront the prosthesis 
we are forced to contemplate where the edges might lie between our largely immaterial 
sense of self and the material things we create to enhance or make visible that very 
selfhood. 
 This project takes as its focus the “prosthetic impulse” of early modern devotional 
verse to expose the often-fraught relationships between bodies, belief, and the 
construction of devotional subjectivity in seventeenth-century England.5  Given the ways 
the prosthesis mediates between the realm of the body and also the realm of the self, I 
argue that the prosthetized devotional text accomplishes the ontologically tricky work of 
representing divine desire, bringing it into being, and making its presence apparent to 
authors and readers alike.  In this specific context, the devotional text stages a merger 
between the spiritual and material by embodying both the wants and desires of the self.  
My project thus takes seriously the animating capacity of language, especially poetic 
utterance, to manifest desire for divine presence and construct a devotional subjectivity in 
direct relation to a divine Other who is made immanently present through the prosthetic 
power of the devotional text.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I borrow the term “prosthetic impulse” from Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra, who 
use it to describe the relationship between the modern Western subject and an 
increasingly technologized word. See Smith and Morra, eds., The Prosthetic Impulse: 
From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
2006). 
	  4 
 The poetic expression employed to achieve Real Presence in early modern 
religious verse is, I argue, prosthetic in nature precisely because both devotional texts and 
prostheses bring into being that which lacks body, whether that is devotional desire, the 
soul, or divine presence itself.  Recent critical work on early modern devotional writing 
has largely focused on the interrelation between sacramental theology and the 
representational strategies of devotional poetry to develop what has variously been 
described as “eucharistic poetics,” “sacramental poetics,” “incarnational poetics,” and the 
“poetry of immanence.”6  This brand of sacramental poetry is interested in crafting rich 
devotional scenes that exceed and overwhelm sensations of spiritual lack written on and 
within the bodies of the devotional figures presented therein.  In its ambition to 
supplement sensations of spiritual lack by manifesting the devotional desire necessary to 
achieve Real Presence, incarnational or sacramental poetry reminds us of poetry’s 
corporeal qualities and also religious language’s ability to shape our sense of the self.  
Prosthesis accomplishes a similar aim in that it  
  is not a simple form of modification since it reconstitutes the entity to  
  which it is added.  As a result, it makes more sense to see it as a   
  materialization of that entity – one that quite literally brings it into being.  
  (Fisher 27) 
Just as bread and wine are remade into body and blood in the Lord’s Supper, or an 
individual is created anew through the cleansing waters of baptism, sacramental poetry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gary Kuchar, Divine Subjection: The Rhetoric of Sacramental Devotion in Early 
Modern England (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 2005); Paul Cefalu, English Renaissance 
Literature and Contemporary Theory: Sublime Objects of Theology (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007); Kuchar, The Poetry of Religious Sorrow in Early Modern England  
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 2008); Ryan Netzly, Reading Desire and the 
Eucharist in Early Modern Religious Poetry (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2011); Kimberly 
Johnson, Made Flesh: Sacrament and Poetics in Post-Reformation England 
(Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2014).   
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shares with prostheses an investment in reconstitution and bringing forth.  In this 
intrusion of the corporeal into the immaterial realm of divine desire and subjective self-
fashioning, the prosthetized devotional text takes shape.  At its heart, sacramental poetry 
deploys highly affective somatic speech to construct and maintain devotional desire. 
Devotional texts thus actively work to blur the lines between Word and flesh, Self and 
Other, soul and body.  By rendering the boundaries between immaterial self and material 
body indistinguishable, the devotional text provides a space, much like the prosthesis 
itself, where these essential elements of self mingle and merge.  In this respect, both 
religious verse and material prostheses invite contemplation over real and imagined 
boundaries between our largely immaterial sense of self and the material things we 
embody this self through.  
  The relation between literary texts and prostheses is long-standing, with the term 
prosthesis formally entering the English language in Thomas Wilson’s popular treatise 
The Arte of Rhetorique in 1553.  As David Wills points out in his groundbreaking study 
Prosthesis, Wilson describes prosthesis in a purely grammatical sense, as an artificial and 
thus unnatural addition to the beginning of a word (Wills 218).7  Noting the pejorative 
nature of this representation, Wills asserts that Wilson’s Rhetorique suggests an “unholy 
alliance” in its treatment of prosthesis, where such orthographic adjustments are 
represented as “the prostitution of language and rhetoric as its prosthetization, the putting 
forth or setting out by means of which the plain or lifeless inanimate becomes lively” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For more on the interconnection between “prosthesis” as a medical and rhetorical term 
in the early modern period, see David Wills, Prosthesis (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
1995), pp. 214-49.  Particularly, Wills notes that the term was not recorded in English in 
a medical context until 1704, but this is not to say that it had not been in popular 
circulation previously. 
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(Wills 228).8  Thomas Wilson’s discomfort with rhetorical prostheses gestures to the 
power of language to alter and adapt our reality through its supplementation.  In this 
sense, both Wilson and Wills speak to the interplay between the material and immaterial 
that enabled early moderns to view mental processes, emotions, language, and insights as 
potentially registering in material ways.   
 In considering the early modern devotional text as an actual rather than 
metaphoric prosthesis, a tool capable of materializing the state of the soul through the 
production of sacred affect, I seek to emphasize the vigorous exchange between the self, 
the spirit, the body, and a godly community intent on policing these very relations.  In 
addition to bringing about a sense of immanence, one of the primary objectives of 
devotional poetry was to situate both readers and authors within systems of authority 
supported by church and state, and in doing so shape readers and writers of devotional 
literature into what Gary Kuchar has called “properly desiring subject[s]” (Divine 
Subjection 2).  As I demonstrate in my first chapter, for instance, the prosthetized 
devotional text allows the disabled poet An Collins to quite literally embody otherwise 
internal sensations of joyful suffering in the face of physical hardships that could exclude 
her from the able-bodied community of the godly in post-Reformation England.  Despite 
cultural constructions of the godly body as the normative body, through the 
supplementary power of her verse, Collins demonstrates that physical disability does not 
equate to spiritual inability.  I thus invoke the concept of the prosthesis to highlight how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Specifically, Wills notes the etymological relation between rhetoric as the art of “setting 
forth” and prostitution as “putting oneself forth” in direct relation to the prosthetic as a 
“putting forth” that comes with the breakup of the medieval trivium, wherein rhetoric 
becomes corrupted, prostituted, the “means by which the human is subjected to an 
intimate relation with the inanimate” through rhetorical figures of unnecessary and 
unnatural addition. See pp. 214-15. 
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devotional texts are at once separate from the self, detachable and auxiliary, but also an 
important tool by which early modern individuals could cultivate a sense of self in 
response to larger cultural constructions of the godly subject.   
 David Wills has previously described the prosthesis as “the awkward conjunction 
of two discourses,” a collision that has made prosthesis a particularly rich concept 
through which scholars have explored a host of ontological questions (Wills 11).  As a 
result, critical conversations surrounding prostheses and the very idea of the prosthetic 
are often interdisciplinary in nature.  Prosthesis has become a seemingly indispensable 
trope to describe the extension and enhancement of the modern self chiefly as a result of 
increasing technological innovation.  Disciplines ranging from science and technology to 
disability studies and anthropology have honed in on the prosthesis as “a tempting 
theoretical gadget with which to examine the porous places of bodies and tools” (Jain 
49).9  Disability theorists David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder have responded to the 
popularity of poststructuralist approaches to prosthesis as a theoretical tool to break down 
binary constructions by labeling such work “metaphorical opportunism” (Body 8).10  
Mitchell and Snyder dub purely metaphoric work with prosthesis as opportunistic 
specifically in that such approaches deploy disabled bodies to examine questions about 
subjectivity, technology, and even posthumanism, but without attending in the least to 
disability as a lived reality.  This critique is expanded even further in their influential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sarah Jain, “The Prosthetic Imagination: Enabling and Disabling the Prosthesis Trope,” 
Science, Technology, and Human Values 24.1 (1999): 31-54. 
10 Mitchell and Snyder, eds., The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability 
(Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1997).  In many respects, Mitchell and Snyder are 
responding to the extensive critical interest in cyborgs following Donna Haraway’s 
landmark essay “The Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in 
the 1980’s,” Socialist Review 15.2 (1985): 65-107. 
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treatise Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse, which calls 
attention to the pervasive presence of disabled characters and figures of disability 
throughout western literature.  For Mitchell and Snyder, individuals who bear the marks 
of physical or cognitive disability catalyze the stories they appear in by initiating “a 
process of explanatory compensation” (Narrative 53).11  In literary representation, the 
disabled person often embodies a figure of social difference and deviance, and their 
widespread representation reveals a deep-seated interest in reestablishing the socially 
accepted norms they themselves defy.  Following in the vein of a literal and material 
prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder demonstrate how the literary text not only supplements 
but also reaffirms the cultural norm, and in doing so, reveals much more about cultural 
expectations of normative bodies than disability itself.   
 My project is deeply indebted to David Mitchell’s and Sharon Snyder’s work on 
“narrative prosthesis” and their attention to the relation between literary representation 
and the lived reality of disabled persons.  However, where Mitchell and Snyder frame 
their concept of narrative prosthesis entirely around representations of disability across 
many genres and literary periods, I focus exclusively on religious verse of the 
seventeenth century and the relationship between gendered representations of devotional 
desire and spiritual ability.  The association between conceptions of spiritual ability and 
contemporary gender constructs abound in early modern devotional verse and were 
reinforced by popular views that able-bodied and patriarchal hierarchies were established 
by God.  My project reveals how early modern authors manipulate or respond to such 
hierarchies by composing devotional texts that actively represent non-normative bodies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mitchell and Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of 
Discourse (2003; Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2000). 
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as both desiring and desired by God.  For example, when the then blind John Milton 
begins “19” (c. 1652) with a consideration of how his “light [has been] spent” (line 1) 
and then later alludes to the biblical parable of the day-laborers (l. 7), which concludes 
with Jesus curing two blind men, he invites consideration of the relationship between his 
own non-normative body and the sacred insight provided to readers through the power of 
his poetry.12  In this example, Milton certainly engages in “narrative prosthesis” by 
presenting his blindness as necessitating the explanatory compensation the sonnet 
provides.  In Milton’s great epic Paradise Lost, however, the author’s blindness is just as 
insistently present, but the prosthetic capacities of this devotional text narrating the 
greatest biblical story operate differently than the images of blindness in Milton’s sonnet 
sequence.  By gesturing to the parable of the day-laborers wherein two blind men beg 
Jesus to help them see and are subsequently rewarded for their faith in Christ with 
physical sight, Milton reaffirms ableist perspectives that the normative body is the ideal 
Christian body.  In Paradise Lost, however, Milton’s blindness, and the pain that comes 
with it, intrudes upon and destabilizes the time-space of the poem; in constructing 
blindness in this manner, Milton demands that readers both become aware of their own 
embodied interpretive practices and also acknowledge the reality of disabled persons as 
members of the godly community.  Far from endorsing the able body as the godly norm, 
Milton instead reveals a disability subjectivity invested in placing his disabled body 
squarely at the heart of his sacred vision.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The parable of the day-laborers who express dissatisfaction with their agreed-upon 
wage to labor in a vineyard can be found in Matthew 20:1-16.  Jesus’s curing of two 
blind men occurs in Matthew 20:30-4, which concludes the chapter.  
	  10 
 My consideration of “prosthetized” religious verse very genuinely seeks to engage 
the devotional text as a “prosthetic device” wherein the “intangible aspects of desire, 
identification, and social relations” play out (Gonzalez 134).13  Far from mere metaphor, 
the prosthetized text materializes and makes known the spiritual ability of authors who 
actively frame devotional desire around bodies that are in opposition to the normative 
cisgendered and ableist body so widely celebrated in religious discourses of the period.  
For example, I demonstrate how Richard Crashaw manipulates contemporary gender 
constructs to accommodate a range of embodied reading practices in “The Flaming 
Heart.”  When Crashaw instructs the fictitious painter to transpose the qualities of Saint 
Teresa and the Seraphim in his painting because “his the blushes be, and hers the fires” (l. 
38), he inverts the presumption that early modern women ought to embody a demure 
comportment and also the well-established belief that women’s bodies were physically 
cooler than men’s.  Through the prosthetized poem, however, Crashaw reimagines and 
gives body to the spiritual zeal essential to initiate the process of kenotic self-emptying at 
the heart of his sacramental verse.  Reading devotional texts as prosthetics that 
supplement the spiritual lack experienced by early modern believers struggling to 
articulate their relationship with the divine reveals the problematic interplay between self 
and society in its blurring of the boundaries between immaterial soul, the material body, 
and the literal pages of the text itself.  The amplified register of Crashaw’s most baroque 
verse, for instance, reveals the extent to which socially constructed notions about sex and 
spirituality shape an individual’s access to self-expression and the affective piety that was 
frequently gendered as excessively bodily and thus necessarily feminine.  The very idea 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jennifer A. Gonzalez, “Autotopographies,” in Prosthetic Territories, eds. Brahm and 
Driscoll (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
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of the prosthetized devotional text is thus grounded in the recognition that religious belief 
and devotional practices were integral components to the way early moderns saw 
themselves as individuals with a private interior sense of self.  The visible and public 
nature of prosthesis, however, also highlights how early modern individuals also lived in 
communities governed by a politico-religious state apparatus interested in actively 
demarcating the boundaries of appropriate bodies, desires, and spiritual states.   
By focusing on the ways in which prosthetized texts reveal devotional desire, I 
highlight the complexity of human-divine communication and the difficulty early modern 
believers faced when trying to find a language capable of spanning the divide between 
fallen earthly bodies and a remote, possibly even indifferent God.14  “Desire” itself has 
proven a locus for a great deal of critical work on early modern devotion, sacramental 
poetics in particular.  As such, my project directly engages with current critical 
approaches to the nature of “desire” in the devotional context of early modern England.  
Richard Rambuss’ provocative assertion that “religion and sex have done…each other’s 
affective work” clearly establishes the relationship between body and belief as it is 
demonstrated through the interrelation between sacred and sexual language in 
incarnational poetry.15  Rambuss thus foregrounds the problematic of “desire” for early 
moderns and the work required to generate, guide, and maintain appropriate desire. 
Spiritual desire expressed in a devotional context is particularly challenging in that it 
serves as the initial entry point to developing an intimate relationship with the divine.  
The relationship between bodies, texts, and devotional subjectivity thus also involves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Cynthia Garrett, “The Rhetoric of Supplication: Prayer Theory in Seventeenth-Century 
England,” Renaissance Quarterly 46.2 (1993): 328-57.   
15 Richard Rambuss, Closet Devotions (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1998), 101. 
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disrupting the division between spiritual and material as well as the desiring subject and 
the divine object of desire.   
As such, the Hegelian model of desire, which accounts for desire as a process, or 
work, suggests the types of devotional practices employed by early modern believers 
seeking a means not only to gain access to the divine but also to sustain human-divine 
intimacy.  Hegel makes the connection between work and desire quite clear when he 
writes, “work…is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work 
forms and shapes the [desired] thing.”16  For Hegel, it seems, that which is desired is 
fashioned by the continual action, or work, of desiring.  In a devotional context, desire 
that merely compensates for perceived spiritual lack is not enough; true devotional desire 
amplifies and extends godliness so much so that the fallen believer might experience Real 
Presence.  In this sense, devotional desire is confirmed through intensive and sustained 
work, which itself can be proven through the prosthetic capacity of the devotional text.   
Early modern devotional manuals thus encouraged pray-ers to get to work by 
generating religious zeal through meditation and self-exercise prior to prayer.  The result 
of these preparatory spiritual exercises was an intense state of spiritual affectivity that 
could transcend the carnal body and inspire the pray-er toward a heartfelt, emotive, and 
genuine conversation with God.  Seventeenth-century religious verse is particularly 
concerned with the construction and maintenance of a devotional subjectivity that not 
only offers a sense of wholeness to the individual, but also actively and authentically 
connects that individual with divine presence.  This challenging devotional work thus 
demands consideration of the boundary points between the soul and the body, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 118. 
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authentic devotional desire is as much a product of affective devotional work as it is 
tightly wound up in a sometime sorrowing and sometime ecstatic, but always desiring 
body.  
In order to draw attention to the ways in which bodies and texts interact in these 
devotional contexts, my first chapter treats An Collins’s Divine Songs and Meditacions 
(1653) and the text’s representation of her own infertility and failure to conform to the 
reproductive imperatives associated with the normative female body.  Collins’s 
reproductive disability takes center-stage in her poetics as I demonstrate how her 
devotional writing functions as the material supplement necessary to negotiate anxiety 
over exclusion from a godly community who might interpret her infertility as a sign of 
sinfulness.  Ultimately, Collins’s oscillation between expressions of spiritual joy, holy 
sorrow, and also bodily pain presents a distinct disability subjectivity that is 
accommodated by the prosthetic capacity of her devotional verse.  In this prosthetic 
function, Collins’s religious verse does more than normalize her disabled body; Divine 
Songs calls readers to recognize the diversity of bodies that exist in God’s creation. 
I turn next to the ways in which Thomas Traherne’s devotional verse reveals an 
intense desire to become the sole object of God’s gaze through the construction of a 
subject-speaker who actively disables all of his physical senses other than sight.  I argue 
that this state of desirable disability forms the foundation of Traherne’s ableist poetics, as 
his speaker transcends the body by drawing our attention to and then manipulating the 
gendered dynamics of contemporary ocular theories.  By tracking the ways in which 
Traherne figures the eye as both a penetrating masculine agent and also penetrable and 
feminized, I reveal how Traherne’s subject-speaker produces the lack necessary to 
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generate divine desire by crafting a hermaphroditic Christ figure who is at once present, 
accessible, and decidedly other.  In order to formulate an ideal devotional subject who 
exhibits such a startling gender transitivity, Traherne relies on a number of metaphoric 
prostheses, mirrors and wombs in particular, that shape a devotional subject who, like the 
prosthesis itself, occupies a disturbing middle ground between socially acceptable bodily 
norms and a subjectivity that is shaped by the interrelation between body and soul.  
Building off the prosthetic possibilities of the devotional text to occlude many of 
the binaries that undergird identity formation, my third chapter examines the devotional 
verse of Richard Crashaw.  In this chapter I examine the ways in which Richard Crashaw 
appeals to both grammatical and liturgical literacy in some of his most baroque 
devotional poetry.  By showing how Crashaw actively blurs the gendered divides 
associated with these overlapping modes of reading, I argue that Crashaw triangulates 
devotional desire between excessive female saints, readers, and the poet himself.  This 
devotional strategy, I argue, reveals an incarnational poetics that relies exclusively on an 
intersubjective model of devotional desire.  As a result, this intersubjective desire is made 
manifest by the material text and the reader’s embodied, affective response to the images 
portrayed therein.  
 Finally, I conclude my dissertation with an interrogation of the ways in which 
John Milton’s very public experience of blindness informs the depiction of mind-body 
relations in Paradise Lost.  While Milton’s monist belief in the indivisibility of body and 
spirit is well documented, I suggest that this hidden wholeness is dependent upon a 
staged encounter between sighted readers and an unsighted author who constantly 
portrays his blindness as sliding between metaphoric and material reality.  I argue that 
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Milton’s own autobiographical intrusions into the text proffer an embodied aesthetic of 
reading that ultimately encourages in readers a type of sacramental seeing that rejects the 
popular epistemological relation between physical sight and the acquisition of 
knowledge.  As a result of this reorientation, Milton reveals the prosthetic power of 
Paradise Lost to materialize a monist vision of immanent divine presence that infuses 
able and disabled bodies alike.   
 Ultimately this dissertation contends that early modern devotional texts operate as 
prosthetic devices, wherein the text itself spans the gap between mind-body and subject-
other relations just as a medical prosthesis would.  By tracing the ways in which somatic 
speech shapes devotional desire in the religious verse of poets as politically and 
confessionally distinct as John Milton, An Collins, Thomas Traherne, and Richard 
Crashaw, my project seeks to make visible the powerful interplay between bodily states 
and the affective language of desire.  The subject of mind-body relations in early modern 
devotion has generated a great deal of scholarship in recent years, but the field has not 
adequately addressed the relationship between devotional expression and contemporary 
constructions of bodily health and ability.  I address this critical lack by examining how 
the early modern devotional text operates as a very real prosthetic territory invested in 
materializing and bringing into being the divine desire necessary for the development of 
sacred affect.  Through the construction and maintenance of sacred affect, prosthetized 
devotional texts thus exhibit the essential role the body plays in both reading and writing 
devotional verse that is itself intended to compensate and supplement sensations of 
spiritual lack that manifest on and within the body. 
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 As such, this dissertation offers a recalibration of David Mitchell’s and Sharon 
Snyder’s influential concept of “narrative prosthesis” by demonstrating the ways in 
which devotional texts quite literally extend, supplement, and ultimately prosthetize the 
souls of early modern devotional writers.  By invoking literary prosthesis as more than 
mere metaphor, I invite a reimagining of early modern devotional verse that moves both 
spiritually and physically lacking, other, and transitive bodies from the margins to the 
center of their socio-cultural contexts.  In my attention to the religious model of 
disability, as well as to gendered constructions of affective piety in early modern 
devotional verse, I seek to interrogate the intersectional relation between largely 
phallocentric and ableist discourses of seventeenth-century literary production.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
DISABLED DESIRE: READING AND WRITING REDEMPTION ON THE 
BODY IN AN COLLINS’ DIVINE SONGS AND MEDITACIONS (1653)  
 
 
Your child is nourished by your own blood…rectified or marred by your exercise, 
idleness, sleep, or watching, & Nature sees and knows how you swerve from what is 
fitting. 
   — Nicholas Culpeper, A Directory for Midwives (1651)17 
 
 As a historical figure, An Collins is as “nearly anonymous” as any author whose 
name graces her title page can be.18  Her single, slim volume of devotional poetry and 
prose, Divine Songs and Meditacions (1653), is her only extant, or known, literary 
work.19  Fashioned in the vein of spiritual autobiography, but lacking in any personal 
details that might elucidate the author’s confessional and political alignment, An Collins 
has proven something of an enigma as her equally evocative and ambiguous language has 
made it nearly impossible to pin down her position on many of the major issues of the 
period (Berry 261, 263).  In keeping with this lack of biographical precision, An Collins 
has variously been labeled Quaker, Calvinist, anti-Calvinist, Roman Catholic, anti-
Puritanical, Particular Baptist, and Presbyterian.20  Her politics have similarly been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 page 156. 
18 Sidney Gottlieb, “Introduction,” An Collins Divine Songs and Meditacions, ed. Sidney 
Gottlieb (Tempe, AZ: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1996), vii. 
19 W. Carew Hazlitt lists a second 1658 edition in his Handbook to the Popular, Poetical, 
and Dramatic Literature of Great Britain (1867; repr. 1961); however, as Sidney Gottlieb 
notes, Hazlitt failed to mention a second edition in his earlier Second Series of 
Bibliographical Collections and Notes on Early English Literature 1474-1700 (1862; 
repr. 1961) and the existence of a second edition has yet to be confirmed (“Introduction” 
xiii).  
20 Collins has been labeled a Calvinist (Hurley 55; Bell, Parfitt, and Shepherd 53; Wilcox 
55), an anti-Calvinist (Norbook 881), a potential Roman Catholic (Greer 148), a Non-
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described in a number of ways: pro-Commonwealth, anti-Commonwealth, critical of 
sectaries and Independents, and also royalist.21  With potential textual evidence to support 
each of these claims, it is perhaps most safe to say that Divine Songs and Meditacions 
“celebrates the contemporary Independent establishment as the fulfillment of the vision 
of the English Reformation”, and as such would likely have appealed to a relatively broad 
range of political and religious affiliations available to the godly or would-be godly in the 
1650s (Clarke 82).22  Despite the tantalizing biographical questions surrounding An 
Collins the person, critics do unanimously agree that when Collins does choose to make 
personal references, she unfailingly describes herself as afflicted, confined, unfruitful, 
and unsuited for bodily employment.  Affliction is, undoubtedly, the focal point of Divine 
Songs and Meditacions.  As such, Collins has been treated as a perennial voice of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conformist with Quaker leanings (Gottlieb “Introduction” xvii-xviii; Price 250); an 
Anglican royalist whose Anglicanism is dominated by Calvinism (Comilang 83); and 
most recently a Presbyterian (Morissey 479).  
21 Her political stance is equally obscure.  Gottlieb argues that Elaine Hobby, Stanley 
Stewart, and Helen Wilcox “overstate or oversimplify her conservatism” (“Introduction” 
xviii), while Greer et al. argue that Collins’s attacks on theological innovation fall in line 
with John Milton’s brand of radicalism (151).  Elaine Hobby describes Collins’s 
emphasis on the necessity of a return to ecclesiastical and social order as “reactionary” 
(60), but Gottlieb stresses that this emphasis expresses a desire for continued reformation 
(“Introduction xviii) that does not necessarily imply Royalist politics (“Life” 224).  And 
Robert C. Evans stresses Berry’s point that Collins’s language in the poems makes it 
“extremely difficult to pin her down precisely on many major issues” (Evans x).  
22 Specifically, Elizabeth Clarke cites the close relationship between Collins’s 714-line 
poem “The Discourse” and the theological pronouncements of the Westminster 
Assembly’s Large Catechism of 1647 to support her claim that Collins “engages directly 
with mainstream Presbyterian and Independent thought” (82).  Likewise, in her analyses 
of Collins’s theological source texts for “The Discourse,” Mary Morissey draws attention 
to Collins’s use of key phrases from the Thirty-Nine Articles (1562) and the Westminster 
Confession of Faith (1646) in her treatment of the Trinity (470).  Morissey’s larger 
argument connects Collins’s theological underpinning with the works of the Elizabethan 
Puritan theologian William Perkins; for more on Collins’s indebtedness to Perkins see 
Morissey, 469-73. 
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affliction, but without biographical details to fill in the gaps, the exact nature of her 
affliction has left readers with much to speculate upon. 
 In her ODNB entry, Sidney Gottlieb describes Collins as giving “voice to the pains 
of her triple affliction—as a physically disabled person, one of the godly living ‘where 
profanenesse did abound’, and a woman traditionally constrained to silence and a limited 
range of activities.”  In this statement, Gottlieb describes three separate, but overlapping 
communities, of which he identifies An Collins as a member.  While there is ample 
evidence within Divine Songs and Meditacions to support both Collins’s sex and belief in 
her election, the nature of her “disability” is less definite.  Affliction was a popular topos 
in early modern devotional writing in that it enabled writers to both echo and place 
themselves within the spiritual tradition founded on Christ’s instruction “if any man will 
come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.”23 
Understanding affliction as spiritually empowering encouraged devotional writers to pair 
their experience of fallenness and affliction with metaphors of recovery and redemption 
they hoped to one-day experience literally, and as a result early modern devotional 
writing is rich with representations of affliction.  With this generic convention in mind, 
and especially given the gendered implications of her metaphoric portrayals of dry 
springs, unproductive gardens, and bloomless Springs, critics have wondered if Collins’s 
representation of her afflicted status is the product of real lived experience or simply a 
careful attunement to the form she writes within. 
 Most recently, Susannah Mintz has convincingly argued that it is most appropriate 
to consider An Collins’s sense of affliction through the lens of disability, and that Divine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Matthew 16:24.  Unless otherwise noted, this and subsequent biblical quotations are 
from the Authorized King James Version.  
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Songs and Meditacions offers a startlingly sophisticated anticipation of “a much later 
disability theology in taking bodily disrepair as a point of both commonality with Christ 
and poetic departure.  Hardly a mark of philosophical or artistic immaturity, Collins’s 
identification with the damaged body of Christ is precisely what leads to her provocative 
recalibration of a devotional poetics” (Mintz 60).  As Mintz so deftly points out, rather 
than presenting physical disability as an obstacle to be overcome, Collins instead 
develops a devotional practice that encourages readers to gaze directly at her disabled 
body and view it as a sight of spiritual purity worthy of celebration.  Given this type of 
self-fashioning, whether or not Collins’s afflictions are more metaphor than actual 
malady appears far less interesting than how she negotiates contemporary constructions 
of ability and disability as she draws repeated correspondence between her broken, 
disabled body and intense and abundant spiritual vigor.  
 While devotional writing of this period is certainly rich with moving tales of 
affliction, this chapter will take seriously Collins’s assertion of bodily suffering and 
physical impairment to fully consider what reading a devotional text authored by a 
disabled woman might mean for the subjective self-fashioning we’ve come to expect in 
seventeenth-century devotional poetry and prose.  Echoing Susannah Mintz’s claim that 
within the pages of Divine Songs and Meditacions we might locate an emergent disability 
subjectivity, I will consider how An Collins’s devotional text itself stages a prosthetic 
intervention meant to direct our readerly gaze toward her disabled body in a very 
particular fashion.  Rather than presenting her bodily condition as a status to be 
overcome, Collins instead positions her suffering body as functioning explicitly within 
the tradition of godly sorrow, a tradition that actively reframes disability or affliction as 
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spiritually empowering.  Functioning as a prosthetic, a supplement to or extension of the 
body, Divine Songs and Meditacions enables Collins to not only mediate the boundaries 
between the spirit and her disabled body, but also to lay claim to a disability subjectivity 
that positions the disabled body as more than just an obstacle that must be surmounted; 
instead, in the pages of her prosthetized text that comes to function as an extension of the 
self, An Collins asserts that her disabled body is evidence that she is a woman both 
desiring and desired of God. 
 
Devotion and Disability: Prosthetizing the Saint’s Body   
 
“Disability” has been, and continues to be, a vexed term used to describe complex 
circumstances and multidimensional concepts.  In its modern usage, “disability” has been 
described and defined in medical, economic, legal, and sociopolitical terms, but there is 
considerable disparity between the understanding of disability in these modern 
communities and their seventeenth-century counterparts.  In the modern sense, one’s 
status as disabled is dependent upon the adjoining of medical and administrative 
categories whereby “disability” is defined as “not purely a medical condition…but when 
his [the patient’s] actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or 
absent because of impairment which in turn may or may not be combined with other 
factors” (Albrecht, Seelman, and Bury 100).  In this model, disability is defined as a lack, 
which derives from both physical and “other” factors that result in impairment.   
 However, in this definition, the lack that causes impairment can be either actual or 
presumed, a condition which problematizes the term by offering the possibility of 
extending “disability” beyond the bounds of the person with impairment.  The 
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presumption of disability can thus be made by anyone with any variety of motives or 
prejudices, a fact that profoundly informs the social reality of disability.24  As such, the 
field of Disability Studies has largely critiqued a purely medical model of disability as it 
seeks to explain why disabled people “have been isolated, incarcerated, observed, written 
about, operated on, instructed, implanted, regulated, treated, institutionalized, and 
controlled to a degree probably unequal to that experienced by any other minority group” 
(Davis “Introduction” xv).25  Given the weight of such a term, there is no neutral 
language with which disability can be discussed, and as a result, those marked with the 
“disability” label have met with soaring claims regarding their condition throughout 
history.26  
 Aristotle’s categorization of any corporeal excess or deficiency under the term 
“monstrosity” did a great deal to escalate contemporary language surrounding disability 
and skew perceptions of the disabled toward the negative.  In Aristotle’s rendering, any 
body that deviates from the common course of nature (whether by birth, disease, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The dangers of such a situation are perhaps best confirmed by Aristotle’s infamous 
characterization of female birth as the most common form of deformity wherein the male 
seed fails to replicate itself and instead produces a deviation from the otherwise ‘normal’ 
male body. See Aristotle, De generatione animalium, trans. A. L. Peck (London: 
Heinemann, 1953) 728a 18; 737a 27. 
25 For a more detailed treatment of the various theoretical approaches in the field of 
Disability Studies see Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine Seelman, and Michael Bury, eds., The 
Handbook of Disability Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001), especially Chapter 5, 
“Theorizing Disability” 123-141.   
26 For scholars who have previously noted the lack of neutral language on the subject of 
disability see: Gareth Williams, “Representing Disability: Some Questions of 
Phenomenology and Politics” in Exploring the Divide: Illness and Disability, eds. C. 
Barnes and G. Merer (Leeds, U.K.: The Disability Press, 1995) 194-212; Irving K. Zola, 
“Self, Identity and the Naming Question: Reflections on the Language of Disability,” 
Social Science and Medicine 36.2 (1993): 167-173; and Simi Linton, Claiming 
Disability: Knowledge and Identity (New York: New York UP, 1998).  
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accident) ought to be considered monstrous, as “Monstrosities belong to the class of 
things contrary to nature, not any and every kind of nature, but Nature in her usual 
operations” (qtd. in Schildrick 11).27  In this summation, Aristotle applies the category of 
the monstrous to anything that deviates from the natural course, and in doing so clearly 
identifies the physically different as unnatural and improper.  This figuration of the 
disabled as monster is expanded upon in the Christian tradition, which also draws 
attention to the exceptional and uncommon nature of the disabled.  In this tradition, 
however, “disability denotes an unusual relationship with God” and the disabled are 
considered in binary terms where “the person with disabilities is either divinely blessed 
or damned” (Eiseland “Barriers” 218).  Biblical evidence for both of these interpretations 
abounds.  The holiness codes in Leviticus, for example, link physical disability with 
sinfulness and uncleanliness so much so that the disabled are barred access to the holiest 
spaces within the temple.28  This portrayal of the disabled within the godly community is 
revised in the New Testament as Christ’s healing of the sick and disabled is celebrated.  
In John 9:1-3, for example, when his disciples ask if a blind man’s disability is the result 
of his or his parents’ sins, Jesus replies: “Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents: 
but that the works of God should be made manifest in him.”  In this Gospel story, 
blindness is made admirable as it enables a demonstration of God’s power and suggests 
an association between disability, forgiveness, and healing.  However, in John 5:5-16, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For the original source see: Aristotle, Generatione Animalium, 767b, 5-10. 
28 Leviticus 21:17-26: “Whosoever he be of thy seed in their generations that hath any 
blemish, let him not approach to offer the bread of his God.  For whatsoever man he be 
that hath a blemish, he shall not approach: a blind man, or a lame, or he that hath a flat 
nose, or any thing superfluous.  Or a man that is brokenfooted, or brokenhanded.  Or 
crookbackt, or a dwarf, or that hath a blemish in his eye, or be scurvy, or scabbed, or hath 
his stones broken.” 
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Jesus heals a man unable to walk and later, when he encounters that same man in temple, 
tells him “Behold, thou art made whole: sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.” 
In this Gospel story, Christ seems to affirm a connection between disability and sin, even 
suggesting that disability is a just punishment for sin.  The relationship between 
suffering, sin, forgiveness, and healing is further complicated by St. Paul’s emphasis on 
virtuous acceptance of suffering as a crucial sign of internal grace.  In Paul’s model, and 
also through his own experience, the saint is purified through the crucible of physical 
impairment and affliction.  Such stark representations leave very little opportunity for 
consideration beyond the archetypes of saint or devil and inevitably leave disabled 
individuals with only peripheral access to the religious community.  
 Early modern communities inherited both the Aristotelian and Christian traditions, 
and in the flux of reformation and revolution early moderns actively read physically 
different bodies as supranatural signifiers of God’s social, political, or religious 
commentary (Shildrick 12).  For example, John Bulwer’s encyclopedic 
Anthropometamorphosis (published in 1653, the same year as Divine Songs) makes use 
of both these traditions as Bulwer identifies the meaning behind monstrous appearance: 
  these apparations that be contrarie to Nature, happen not without the   
  providence of Almighty God, but for the punishing and admonishing of Men,  
  these  things by just judgment are often permitted, not but Man hath a great  
  hand in these monstrosities; for inordinate Lust is drawn in as a Cause of  
  these Events, whereby  the seed of Man is made weak and unperfect.  
  (qtd. in Shildrick 12) 
 
Following the Aristotelian model, Bulwer first describes monstrous appearance as 
aberrant, but then immediately amends this judgment by placing such abnormal 
occurrences within God’s providence.  Aristotle’s categorization attends primarily to 
physical qualities, but when Bulwer attaches the physical appearance of monstrosity to 
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man’s “inordinate Lust” he draws a clear connection between the material and 
immaterial, and thus conjoins the Christian interpretation of the disabled with the 
monstrous.  In short, Bulwer argues that monstrous bodies reveal God’s intention to make 
mankind aware of sin through the understanding that disabled, or monstrous, bodies are 
the product of souls that lack the ability to accept God’s grace.   
 As a result of such vexed narratives, disability identities are often shaped by the 
individual’s choice or even ability to “pass”, or “conceal social markers of impairment to 
avoid the stigma of disability” by appearing “normal,” and thus effectively blurring the 
lines between a body that is socially conceived of as “normal” in that passing “expresses, 
reifies, and helps create concepts of normality” (Brune and Wilson 1-2).29  This desire to 
pass for normal, to visually identify as a “normal” member of the community is often 
accomplished through some sort of prosthesis.  
 Thus, in the following pages I will argue that Divine Songs and Meditacions reveals 
in An Collins what current Disability Studies scholars Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra 
have come to call a “prosthetic impulse”30 in that her devotional writing supplements her 
disabled body, ultimately materializing the confluence between a disabled body and an 
overtly able soul.  Collins’s textual representation of her physical lack and simultaneous 
spiritual abundance offers the opportunity to negotiate these dual conditions precisely 
because the prosthetic itself suggests a blurry exchange between the animate and 
inanimate, authentic and artificial, human and inhuman.  As a result, the prosthetized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Jeffrey A. Brune and Daniel J. Wilson, Disability and Passing: Blurring the Lines of 
Identity (Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2012). 
30 Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra, The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman 
Present to a Bioculutral Future (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2006). 
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devotional text obfuscates the boundaries between the author’s body, soul, and the text 
itself, as we are invited to view both her soul and body in a swirling exchange between 
disability and ability that could only be viewed through the extension of self made 
possible by the prosthetic possibilities of the page.  
 From the very beginning of Divine Songs and Meditacions, Collins’s literary 
persona and lived experience as a disabled woman are deeply intertwined.  In her brief 
prose address “To the Reader” Collins wastes little time engrafting both of these selves 
and also bringing her disability to the forefront of her reader’s mind, declaring in the first 
sentence: “by divine Providence, I have been restrained from bodily employments, suting 
with my disposicion, which enforced me to a retired Course of life” (1).31  This 
confession is expanded upon, albeit slightly, in “The Preface” when Collins declares that 
“through weakness” she has been “to the house confin’d” (line 1).  The phrasing suggests 
that her removal from the world was not by choice, but a product of her bodily condition, 
which she has little control over.  These highly suggestive remarks intimate that Collins’s 
literary persona is tied directly to the experience of affliction, and we are meant to read 
her as inseparable from this experience.  
 This representation is further supported in “The Discourse”, the first and longest 
poem in the collection, as Collins elaborates on the nature of her affliction: 
  Even in my Cradle did my Crosses breed, 
  And so grew up with me, unto this day, 
  Whereof variety of Cares proceed, 
  Which of my selfe, I never could alay, 
  Nor yet their multiplying brood destray, 
  For one distemper could no sooner dy, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Unless otherwise noted, this and all further citations and/or references to An Collins’s 
poetry and prose are from Gottlieb’s edition: Divine Songs and Meditacions, ed. Sidney 
Gottlieb (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1996). 
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  But many others would his roome supply. (ll. 57-63) 
 
Collins’s metaphoric description of her continual sufferings as “crosses”, which multiply 
rather than diminish, directly situates her affliction within two rich traditions: the 
tradition of godly sorrow stretching from patristic commentaries to Reformation 
exegeses, and also the poetic representation of “female fecundity run amok that ties into 
the literary line of Duessa and Sin” (Norcliffe 131).  In the latter framework, Collins 
positions herself as victim of rather than mother to this brood of woes, and so enables her 
meaningful participation in the tradition of Christian suffering.  However, following St. 
Paul’s directive that true disciples readily accept, even welcome, the burden of affliction, 
these crosses present Collins with an interpretive dilemma she alone can resolve.32 
Collins can choose to interpret her crosses as opportunities for greater unity with God, or, 
she can allow herself to become consumed by the physical and emotional hardship 
accompanying her affliction, and as such, reject the opportunity to begin the process of 
spiritual renewal that enables outward mortification to work within.33  In response to this 
dilemma, Collins constructs a complex relational framework where the lines between not 
only body and soul but also text and self are blurred through the supplemental power of 
the prosthetic, a space where Collins is free to unremittingly mine religious sorrow for 
the affective tools to refigure her disabled body as an object of divine desire.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 St. Paul first explicated the nature of godly sorrow in his powerful assertion of the 
reciprocal relationship between Christ’s suffering and the consolation Christians achieve 
through that suffering.  See 2 Corinthians, but particularly 2 Corinthians 1:3-11 on the 
relationship between Christ’s suffering and Christian salvation. 
33 The Bible is rich with scriptural patterns denoting the importance of godly believers 
passively accepting adversity as a means of killing off the old sinful nature and birthing a 
new nature more fully attuned to Christ and Christian living.  For example, see: Psalms 
44:22; Luke 9:23; Romans 8:35-36; 1 Corinthians 15:31; 2 Corinthians 4:8-11, 16-17; 
Colossians 1:24; and 1 Peter 4:13. 
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 Composing a book of devotional poetry and prose thus initiates the very 
prosthetic intervention Collins’s situation demands of her.  This blurry prosthetic work 
comes in the tension generated between sorrow and joy and also disability and ability 
within the text.  Summarizing Augustine’s influential interpretation of holy sorrow in 2 
Corinthians 7, Gary Kuchar explains that holy sorrow is “not simply an affect, but a way 
of making oneself available to oneself as an object of knowledge” (5).  This rendering 
suggests that meditating upon the experience of affliction provided ordinary men and 
women with the means to interrogate their lived experience within a larger Christian 
narrative, and in doing so draw meaning from their own lived experience.  The genre of 
spiritual autobiography, with its conventional representation of astounding fluctuations 
between spiritual highs and lows allows precisely this, as writers place their sense of 
personal affliction within the larger context of the politico-religious turmoil of 
seventeenth-century England and also the long tradition of Christian suffering itself.34 
When An Collins describes her affliction as “suting to my disposicion,” she thus 
intimates that the experience of affliction has enabled a very specific way of viewing both 
her condition and herself.  For Collins, then, the self is conditioned by the body just as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For works that discuss the prevalence of spiritual autobiography in the seventeenth 
century, as well as the codification of its generic conventions, see Paul Delany, British 
Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969); Owen 
C. Watkins, The Puritan Experience: Studies in Spiritual Autobiography (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1972); Leopold Damrosch, God’s Plot and Man’s Stories (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 1985); Patricia Caldwell, The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The 
Beginnings of American Expression (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1983); 
Michael Davies, Graceful Reading: Theology and Narrative in the Works of John Bunyan 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2002); D. Bruce Hindmarsh, The Evangelical 
Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography in Early Modern England (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford UP, 2005); Adam Smyth, Autobiography in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010); and most recently, Kathleen Lynch, Protestant 
Autobiography in the Seventeenth-Century Anglophone World (New York: Oxford UP, 
2012).   
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body is an essential condition for selfhood, as the term “disposition” could refer to her 
physical state, as in how her body is physically disposed; or perhaps, given the narrative 
of godly sorrow she is working within, how her body is indisposed.  However, the OED 
defines “disposition” as also referring to a “natural tendency or bent of the mind, 
especially in relation to moral or social qualities.”35  By positioning herself as inclined to 
or disposed to taking on the status of godly sorrower and bearer of crosses Collins 
appears acutely conscious of the genre in which she writes and its indebtedness to the 
biblical tradition of godly sorrow.36  
 This tradition finds expression in many seventeenth-century spiritual 
autobiographies whose narrative scaffold derives from the Calvinist ordo salutis, or order 
of salvation.37  Like Bunyan in Grace Abounding or Christian in Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 OED, 6.  Although, it is also worth noting that Collins might be referring to her social 
class or position when she makes this comment.  She is, after all, capable of living and 
writing in a “retired course of life”, and social status certainly disposes some to better 
pursue such a course. 
36 Both Catholic and Protestant traditions come to refer to holy sorrow as “compunction”, 
but subtle doctrinal differences emerge after the Council of Trent (1554-63) wherein 
Catholics argue that compunction must be passively accepted in order to provide 
salvation and Protestantism dictates that passive reception of compunction is conclusive 
proof of grace.  Gary Kuchar draws out this subtle distinction more thoroughly in his 
introductory discussion of English poets from both traditions in The Poetry of Religious 
Sorrow in Early Modern England (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 2008), 10-
25. 
37 For example, in John Bunyan’s Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners (1666), a text 
widely considered the apogee of seventeenth-century spiritual autobiography, Bunyan 
models his conversion narrative on the ordo salutis wherein the process of salvation is 
activated by acknowledgement of a deep sense of sinfulness in order to eventually 
recognize the salvific power of grace alone, a recognition that comes through 
considerable trial. For more on the ordo salutis, or order of salvation, see: Edmund S. 
Morgan, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (New York: New York UP, 1963), 
and Patricia Caldwell, The Puritan Conversion Narrative: The Beginners of American 
Expression (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1983).   
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Progress (1671; 1684), Collins’s initial recognition of her sorrowful disposition 
simultaneously signifies the inherent sinfulness of all postlapsarian peoples and also her 
participation within the tradition of Christian suffering, which itself provides a vehicle by 
which the action of grace within can be recognized.  As such, Collins endeavors to situate 
her experience of affliction within one of the most important aspects of this tradition, an 
element I argue has received inadequate consideration in relation to Collins’s 
representation of her affliction: the experience of joy in the midst of sorrow.   
 Joy in sorrow is commonly represented within both Catholic and Protestant 
traditions by saints and martyrs who neither despaired nor lost faith while suffering 
considerable physical hardship.38  In Calvin’s rendering, the experience of “bitterness 
which we naturally feel under the cross” (3.8.11) must be tempered by spiritual joy, 
which derives from the consoling knowledge that “our Father’s rod” (3.8.6) is meant to 
draw us closer to Him through sharing the experience of a joyful yet suffering incarnate 
Christ.  Collins thus situates the “seeming desolate condicion” (1) she describes in “To 
the Reader” as an act of divine providence, and as such no matter for complaint.  When 
viewed through the lens of joyful suffering, her multiplying crosses begin to produce 
“such inlargednesse of mind, and activity of spirit” that she comes to view her condition 
as anything but restraining; in fact, she finds it “most delightfull” (“To the Reader” 1). 
The seemingly contradictory experience of desolation and affliction generating delight 
thus marks Collins’s affliction as a sign of grace, a grace so overwhelming that she 
describes herself as enlarged, dilated, or even made pregnant with a spiritual zeal so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Paul offers a very succinct expression of the Christian marriage between joy and 
sorrow in 2 Corinthians 12:10: “ I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in 
necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ’s sake: for when I am weak, then am I 
strong” (2 Corinthians 12). 
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overwhelming it must burst forth.  These pointed gestures to affliction so early in the text 
not only fall along gendered lines, but also serve to illustrate the devotional text’s 
potential to stage a prosthetic intervention on Collins’s behalf.  As David T. Mitchll and 
Sharon L. Snyder define it, an effective prosthesis is both illusionary and compensatory, 
in that it compensates for “a body deemed lacking” by creating at least the illusion of 
wholeness, or normalcy (Mitchell and Snyder 6).39  In Collins’s case, the devotional text 
enables just such a reorientation, as her experience of lack reveals anxiety over how 
affliction is both written and read on her female body particularly. 
 The representation of spiritual joy as a product of physical affliction thus sets up an 
interdependence between Collins’s bodily status as the cause for her many sorrows and 
the spiritual expressions contained within her volume of devotional verse.  By drawing 
attention to her physically unproductive body and the sorrow it causes her, Collins frees 
her poetic persona to explore a range of spiritual desires in somatically charged language 
without risking accusations of lust and creatureliness precisely because her joy is 
constantly mediated, even produced, by the crosses she bears.  Collins thus frames the joy 
she finds in composing poetry through the lens of her affliction, a reframing 
accomplished explicitly through the text’s prosthetic intervention.  With her faculties 
“enflamed…to put forth themselvs, in a practise so pleasing,” the consoling joy that 
Collins so desperately seeks finds form in divine poetry intended “for those Christians 
who are of disconsolat Spirits, who may perceive herein, the Faithfullnesse, Love, & 
Tender Compassionatnesse of God to his people” (“To the Reader” 1).  Her poetry is 
directed toward those who seek spiritual consolation, which Collins claims to have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the 
Dependencies of Discourse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
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already achieved through the representation of her divine poetry as the very “image of her 
mind” (“Discourse” 53).  Collins’s spiritual health is thus confirmed through the pleasing 
fruits of an enflamed mind, but also fruits that are nurtured and cultivated through a 
broken, painful body, which we never lose sight of throughout the text.  Rather than 
obscuring and drawing our attention away from her own broken body, Collins 
conscientiously displays that body for our viewing, ever reminding us that disability is 
the norm, for her at least. 
 Given this initial representation, it might appear that Collins’s devotional verse will 
serve almost solely as a celebration of her sainthood, with Collins herself depicted as a 
beleaguered and afflicted saint suffering without a loss of faith.  However, far from 
reveling in confirmation of her election, Collins instead demonstrates considerable 
concern over how her readers might interpret both her affliction and her motivation for 
writing poetry, which manifests in a swift adjustment of the potentially sensual language 
she previously used to describe her literary excitement.  The provocative feeling of being 
enflamed by poetry is quickly reduced to a “satisfactory contentment” provided by the 
“manifestacion of Divine Truth, or rather the Truth it self, that reduced my mind to a 
peacefull temper, and spirituall calmnesse, taking my thoughts to Theologicall 
employments” (“To the Reader” 1).  This qualification of her emotional state serves dual 
purposes: it at once explains the motivation for her writing, but also makes it quite clear 
that her sensations of delight and joy are tied to the activity of her spirit.  The 
juxtaposition between her joy in poetry and experience of physical restraint enables 
Collins to demonstrate an acute consciousness of the interconnection between her 
physically unproductive bodily state and the mental productivity made visible by the 
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prosthetized text.  
 The production of spiritual calm, and the reduction of an enflamed, even ecstatic 
experience, however, could not be accomplished without Collins’s previous presentation 
of her bodily state.  In this attempt to remind us that she cannot escape her disabled 
body—that disability is her norm—the prosthetic function of the text becomes clear 
precisely because “to prostheticize…is to institute a notion of the body within a regime of 
tolerable deviance” (Mitchell and Snyder 6).  By ensuring that readers can neither ignore 
her experience of bodily lack nor fully separate it from her status as godly sorrower, 
Collins effectively stages her disabled body in the least objectionable manner, and in 
doing so provides the very type of prosthetic intervention David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder refer to when they declare that, “if disability falls too far from an acceptable 
norm, a prosthetic intervention seeks to accomplish an erasure of difference all together; 
yet, failing that, as is always the case with prosthesis, the minimal goal is to return one to 
an acceptable degree of difference” (7).  It is in this sense that Divine Songs and 
Meditacions is prosthetized, as readers are consistently reminded that Collins’s “norm” is 
quite far from that of her presumably able-bodied audience.  Through the lens of godly 
sorrow, however, her disability can come to be recognized as an acceptable, even 
admirable, degree of difference.  
 
Enabling Joy in Sorrow, the Prosthetic at Work 
Early on in the collection, Collins demonstrates a keen understanding of the various 
groups she is called to both identify with and also represent, as she grounds her cause to 
publish in terms that specifically meet with cultural expectations for a godly, female, and 
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disabled author.  In “The Discourse” Collins speaks somewhat prophetically of her own 
current critical condition as she projects forward to readers with no knowledge of her 
personage: “though to them the Auther bee unknown, / Yet seeing here, the image of her 
mind; / They may conjecture how she was inclin’d” (ll. 52-4).  Her contention that future 
readers might come to a true understanding of her inclinations through the “image of her 
mind” presented on the pages before them clarifies the supplemental or prosthetic 
relationship between Collins and her text, but she does not stop at simply declaring the 
text a direct representation of her mind.  Collins completes the stanza containing this 
assertion with the following addendum: “And further note, that God doth Grace bestow, / 
Vpon his servants, though hee keeps them low” (ll. 55-6).  This final couplet extends her 
earlier argument about the text’s ability to reflect her mind to firmly include her sense of 
affliction, perhaps even her physical state.  In such a claim, Collins seems deeply aware 
that while she struggles to interpret being “kept low” as a sign of God’s grace, others may 
read her affliction as a sign of God’s displeasure.  Given the fact that she dedicates the 
next five stanzas to a narration of the “multiplying brood” of crosses she has experienced 
from her infancy onward, it seems that the “image of her mind” cannot be properly 
considered without taking stock of her physical condition.  
 The crosses she bears appear fruitful, multiplying with no apparent end in sight, but 
Collins herself can claim no such fruition of her own without the aid of Divine Songs, a 
text that images both her mind and body.  While the practice of writing poetry might 
leave her enflamed, enlarged, and bordering on the ecstatic, Collins clarifies her poetic 
agenda early, announcing that she would “rather former workes to vindicate / Than any 
new concepcion to relate” (“The Preface” ll. 13-14).  This defense of her desire to write 
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poetry is thus grounded in the inherent productivity of her mind, which she assures us, 
offers no new “concepcion[s],” ⁠ but is rich with the same spiritual vigor that infused both 
early reformers and the apostles themselves.  However muted Collins’s joy might seem 
here, her phrasing does extend the gestational metaphors that concluded “To the Reader.” 
The term “conception”, of course, suggests the procreative powers of the human body, as 
well as the mind and imagination, and Collins plays on these multiple meanings as she 
grounds her poetry in a powerful assertion of her mind’s creative powers.  However, by 
qualifying this assertion with a campaign against religious novelty in the immediately 
following stanzas, Collins makes it quite clear that her poetry will support the spiritual 
truths found in previously judged texts of spiritual worth; she claims no new revelations 
for herself.40  The OED suggests that “concepcion” is used earliest in reference to the 
Immaculate Conception, a usage that underscores Collins’s assertions of poetic and 
spiritual purity.  Mary’s acceptance of the immaculate conception and her ability to 
physically bear Christ in her womb and birth him into the world are clear signs of her 
grace.   
 Through its portrayal in the text, An Collins’s body may be deemed lacking, 
disabled, and insufficient, but her mind is fertile and productive, a point made most 
clearly when Collins describes her poetry as “the ofspring of my mind” (l. 79).  Like their 
“mother,” these poetic offspring may appear in “homly dresse” (l. 80), but “with Truth 
agree[s]” (l. 84).  Just as George Herbert’s query “Is there in truth no beautie? (“Jordan I” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Specifically, Collins admonishes novelty in religion by stating that it is not the growth 
or augmentation of true religion that she takes issue with, but the ability of rhetorically 
sophisticated zealots to twist language with “extracted from old Heresies, / New form’d 
with Glosses to deceive the eyes / Of those who like to Children, do incline / To every 
new device that seems to shine” (ll. 60-63). 
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l. 2) asserts the value of plain speech in matters of faith, Collins argues that works of 
spiritual worth may take many shapes, even those that seem less attractive than others. 
Collins’s apparent humility might simply be a devotional topos, but by deploying it in 
such proximity to the assertion that her poems are her offspring, she demands 
acknowledgement of the relational framework she has constructed between herself and 
her text.  Given the prosthetic work the text performs, Collins’s reading audience must 
accept the premise that there is more to both her body and her book than what meets the 
eye alone: Collins intends to write poetry containing “right informacion” that “more 
plainly show[s] the path-way to Salvacion” (ll. 90-1).  Her prosthetic intervention might 
not be attractive or rhetorically sophisticated, but it effectively “tell[s] what God still for 
my Soule hath wrought” (l. 98).  Her poetry is thus figured as both a compulsion of her 
soul and also a reflection of her body.  As such, we cannot read her poems without also 
reading her disabled and decidedly female body.   
 This deeply gendered negotiation becomes the primary area of interest throughout 
her devotional verse, but Collins’s initial introduction of this tension in the closing 
stanzas of “The Discourse” feels far less “explicitly female” (Clarke 84) than previous 
portions of “The Discourse.”  While Collins may be deeply invested in articulating the 
relationship between her sex and disability, analyzing her deployment of such gendered 
metaphors reveals that she is just as deeply invested in formulating a relational model 
between the sorrow she feels as a product of her disability and the experience of joy 
necessary to affirm the workings of an inward grace capable of denoting her affliction as 
an indicator of a special relationship with the divine rather than a mark of reprobation.  
As a result, the body becomes both a site of self-knowledge and also a site of tension 
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between the self, the experience of embodiment, and also conflicting pictures of the 
human body found within the Christian tradition.  This is especially true for an individual 
like An Collins, who attaches the additional tension between reading her disabling 
affliction as a sign of election or a sign of reprobation to this already complicated 
interpretation of the broken body.  The result is a necessary intervention that manifests in 
Collins’s own formation of a “prosthetic territory,” or a “space of collision between 
human and machine, where technology and humanity fuse” (Brahm and Driscoll).41 
Through the technology of the text, which functions as an addition or supplement to her 
bodily lack, Collins materializes and makes visible the ability of her soul while 
continuing to highlight her body’s disability; in doing so the text itself provides not only 
evidence of “normality” but also the subsequent access to community that comes with the 
marker of either acceptable difference or able-bodiedness.  In this vein, Divine Songs 
becomes the space wherein Collins can confront the dilemma that even the most faithful 
believer must face “continuall combates” (“The Discourse” l. 666) between the physical 
and the spiritual aspects of self.  As she progresses throughout the collection, however, 
this dilemma is increasingly framed around an explicitly female, and deeply personal, 
experience of disability.  
 Collins introduces this vexed mind-body relationship in roughly the final 100 
lines of the lengthy “Discourse”, wherein she asserts the profoundly transformative 
power of faith by arguing that through faith “Corrupcion of our nature is thereby / 
Disabled so, as that inniquity / No longer rules, being by grace subdued, / Whereby the 
heart to goodnesse is renude” (ll. 620-23 emphasis added).  The renewal accommodated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Gabriel Brahm and Mark Driscoll, eds., Prosthetic Territories: Politics and 
Hypertechnologies, Politics and Culture 3 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
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by the transmuting action of internal grace becomes even more clearly expressed as 
Collins goes on to describe “Saving Faith applyed” (l. 626) as working in multiple ways. 
First, it serves as “a corrasive to mortifie / And kill the power of inniquity” (ll. 627-28). 
Secondly, “the other part of true Sanctification” (l. 631) is:  
  …life or quickenning to holinesse,  
  And may therefore be called renovacion,  
  Like a Restorative it doth redresse,  
  And him revive, that is dead in trespasse;  
  Tis by the power of Christs Resurrection,  
  That we are rais’d from sinne to such perfection” (ll. 632-37). 
 
Collins’s choice to describe the action of internal grace as a corrosive, eating away not 
only the temptation of sin but also the very presence of sin, suggests much more than 
simple removal.  The corrosive mortifies and ultimately decontaminates the previously 
sinful body, thus returning it to its original state of purity.  In Collins’s rendering, the 
experience of being disabled is profoundly powerful and positive, as her speaker is made 
incapable of sinning through the powerful work of internal grace.  While she certainly is 
not using disability in its modern sense, the claim that any experience of disability could 
be beneficial is startling in its inversion of contemporary constructs that present ability 
and being able-bodied as the preferred bodily state.  In Collins’s presentation, however, 
disability becomes enabling; it is a desired state that not only improves the saint but also 
demonstrates that God desires saints in such a disabled state.  This surprising 
reorientation could not be accomplished without Collins’s careful manipulation of her 
disabled body within the prosthetized text.  The prosthetic function of the text is further 
elucidated by Collins’s repeated usage of the prefix re-, which, in a rhetorical sense, 
functions prosthetically in its supplementation and alteration of her state through 
language, underscoring Collins’s interest in returning to a previous condition while also 
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indicating her desire to access a “renude” (l. 623) sense of belief.  This supplementation 
is achieved rhetorically, but it is also a product of diction choices that invert her sense of 
lack: her language choices quite literally disable the believer’s ability to sin in exchange 
for a life-altering experience of “renovacion” (l. 633) through the “Restorative” (l. 634) 
and “redresse[ing]” (l. 634) power of “Christs Resurrection” (l. 636).  
 Just as Christ’s body is resurrected and made whole, the speaker hopes for a re-
birth that will disable sin and make her body  
  Like as a Child new born without defect,  
  A perfect man he may be sayd to bee,  
  Because his body’s perfect, in respect  
  Of parts, though not in stature or degree  
  Of grouth, until or perfect age he bee;  
  So have the faithfull imperfections some,   
  Till to a perfect age in Christ they come. (ll. 645-51)   
 
In this explanation, Collins deftly juxtaposes spiritual age with natural, physical age, and 
in doing so suggests that while she may have never experienced bodily perfection, she 
finds comfort in the “graces of the Spirit” that “spring up in his heart thats Sanctifide” (ll. 
652-3).  Describing this internal movement in such transformational terms suggests that 
the status of a saint’s body, although often painful and distracting, is not a true 
representation of their relationship with God precisely because even the most faithful 
have “imperfections some.”  Collins’s figuration of the desirable body here is surprising 
in that she at once expresses desire to be re-made “without defect” but then swiftly 
abandons the perfectly able body as the absolute object of divine desire, ultimately 
arguing that the imperfect body signifies nothing more than the diversity of God’s 
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works.42  Rather than expressing the hope of bodily renovation or being made able-
bodied, Collins’s driving agenda thus appears to be a defense of disabled bodies and a 
desire for inclusion of disabled bodies within the community of saints. As such, her 
poems and meditations express both considerable anxieties over her personal election as 
well as judgment from a reading audience, a dilemma that reveals both the problematics 
of disability and also the reality of the prosthetic intervention as illusionary—only ever 
accomplishing the façade of able-bodiedness, wholeness, or normalcy.  As this passage 
reveals, the prosthetic can only function within a paradigm of ability, wherein full able-
bodiedness and full social acceptance are not granted wholly to An Collins as a disabled 
person by virtue of the disabled body she possesses.  Through the prosthetic function of 
devotional verse she can make visible the ability of her soul while simultaneously 
arguing for a reorientation of how the disabled body is interpreted, but in her lived 
experience, she can never escape her experience of lack. 
 The modern definition of disability echoes this emphasis on lack or inability, 
especially in its extension of disability beyond medical and physiognomic aspects to 
include “other factors.”  While the vagaries of this modern definition attempt to account 
for psychological and emotional factors as contributors to one’s status as disabled, the 
early modern notion of mind-body relations is much less vague regarding the association 
between the physical and non-physical.  For early moderns, mental processes, emotions, 
and insights were all believed to register in material ways.  The ease with which early 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In this assertion Collins echoes Michel de Montaigne, who similarly describes the 
existence of disabled persons as proof of Nature’s bounty and God’s interest in an 
“infinity of forms.” For more on Montaigne’s understanding of both the monstrous and 
disabled see David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis: Disability 
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moderns seem to accept such a fluid relationship reflects a pre-Cartesian understanding of 
mind-body relations where the body is understood as neither bounded nor fixed, but 
fluctuating within natural and cultural forces.43  Using Michel de Montaigne as an 
exemplar, Dalia Judovitz argues that the pre-Cartesian body was “fully embedded in the 
fabric of the world,” functioning “as the horizon of subjective being and becoming” 
(Judovitz 67).  In this model, the body becomes more than a “mere object of observation, 
the body disposes of forms of agency; it has the capacity to inform and transform the 
knowledge that the self seeks to attain” (Judovitz 68).  For Collins, the junction between 
the self, the body, the experience of embodiment, and the various narratives of the 
afflicted body at work within the seventeenth century contribute to an ever-growing node 
of anxiety which causes fluctuations between identifying her affliction as a sign of grace 
and interpreting it as a marker of reprobation or divine dissatisfaction.  Given this 
tension, An Collins’s disability cannot be categorized as wholly physical or 
psychological, but it seems safe to say that the term “disability” does an adequate job of 
expressing the intense feelings of inability and lack that Collins maps onto both material 
and immaterial aspects of her self.  
 Intervening upon and attempting to resolve this tension is the prosthetized text, 
presenting a space where Collins might work out the close coupling between her physical 
and spiritual conditions.  It is in this vein that Collins frequently foregrounds an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For more on the early modern body as unbounded and fluctuating see, Gail Kern 
Paster, Katherine Rowe, Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds., Reading the Early Modern Passions: 
Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2004); 
Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago and 
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incapable, disabled, or afflicted body when speaking of, or even to, her soul.  
“Meditacion Four” is perhaps the most powerful example of the reciprocity Collins 
envisions between these two elements of self as it addresses her soul, but is also deeply 
reliant on medical metaphors to aid Collins’s understanding of her affliction.  Beginning 
with a direct address to her soul, Collins laments the fact that she has often sought 
internal peace, but instead feels an increased sense of internal disorder.  Her soul, which 
is of a “froward disposicion, / Perceivest not thy mercyfull Physician” who “give[s] thee 
for thy health these strong purgacions / So may we call our daily molestacions” (ll. 3-6). 
The conceit of God as a physician drives the meditation with its powerful blending of 
medical and spiritual discourses.  The figure of a divine physician administering 
purgatives to the soul allows Collins to deftly layer spiritual and physical afflictions in 
that the multivalent term “purgative” could refer to ceremonial or religious cleansing 
(OED 1-2) or the medicinal practice of purging excess humors to balance the body’s 
internal chemistry (OED 3a).  In this portrayal, Collins’s experience with and knowledge 
of an afflicted body provides a language with which she can address, and potentially even 
alter, her “froward soul.”  She makes the coupling of afflicted body and ungovernable 
soul even more pronounced when she pointedly invokes humoral terms to teach her soul 
how to respond to affliction:  
  If Physick for our Bodies health be tane,  
  We hinder not the working of the same,  
  Strong Physick if it purge not, putrifies,  
  And more augments then heales our maladies, 
  And as is sayd, our manifold Temptacions,  
  Are nothing but thy scouring Purgacions. (ll. 21-6) 
  
Collins’s instructive tone suggests a tense relationship between patient and body during a 
time of illness, but it also suggests that this tension can be usefully explicated for spiritual 
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gain.  In such a summation of body and soul relations, Collins argues that her soul should 
interpret its affliction in the same manner a medical patient views treatments that are 
sometimes uncomfortable or distasteful.  She instructs her soul to trust  
  …so Skilfull a Physician  
  Who will not have their bitternesse abated,  
  Till thy humors be evacuated; 
  Then loose it down for thy Humilliacion, 
  And hinder not its kindly Opperacion, 
  As thou mayst by untimely voyding it 
  By vain contentments, which thou mayst admit. (ll. 28-34) 
 
Her soul, like a patient with imbalanced humors, must relinquish itself entirely to a 
physician skillful enough to cure the soul’s ailments, even if the remedy is both painful 
and humiliating.  The language of an afflicted and ill-balanced body is strikingly effective 
as Collins attempts to convince her wayward soul to conform to her desire for good 
spiritual health, a desire that is confirmed and manifested within the pages of the text she 
composes.  
 Just as an unruly patient might reject or even void a bitter, but useful, purgative and 
thereby prolong or even magnify the illness, the soul that does not accept the painful 
chastisements of God’s rod will only achieve false comfort: “like cold water, tane in 
fevers hot, / Which for the present, though it seem to ease, / Yet after it encreaseth the 
disease” (ll. 38-40).  By grafting spiritual and physical affliction together, Collins 
attempts to uniformly comfort the body and soul, and in doing so reduce the anxiety 
produced by her “froward soul.”  However, her tone quickly shifts from instructive and 
informative to accusatory as she admonishes her soul:  
  But thou dost rather unto Grief incline,  
  As Crosses therefore, subject to repine, 
  Supposing oft, thy present troubles are 
  Intolerable, and thy bane declare; 
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  Whilst thou for this, thy selfe dost maserate 
  Dispair unto thee doth intimate, 
  That none hath been afflicted like to thee, 
   Unparaleld thy visitacions bee. (ll. 41-8)  
 
This frustration stems from her soul’s apparent inability to look outside of itself—to 
properly frame her affliction within a larger narrative that enables the afflicted to 
interpret their burden as a blessing and sign of sainthood.  Instead of feeling joy at such 
an opportunity for grace, her soul wallows in despair and is consumed with self.  Failing 
to achieve a joyful normalcy, as prosthetics always do, the text has thus far only served to 
emphasize her sense of lack, of failure, and heighten the sense of isolation and lack of 
access to “normality.”  In this failure, however, the text truly proves a “prosthetic device” 
in that it operates as an “autobiographical object” wherein the “intangible aspects of 
desire, identification, and social relations” play out (Gonzalez 134).44  Collins’s 
frustration, her feelings of painful singularity, express both her desire to belong and also 
the feeling that her bodily position will ultimately always mark her as other, even if her 
soul is represented as fully able through the prosthetic intervention of the devotional text. 
The illusion of the prosthesis, she fears, cannot be accomplished to such an effect that she 
can fully experience the joy required for redemption. 
 In his landmark study, Louis Martz notes that most of the poetry within the “poetry 
of meditation” tradition “lie[s] within the realm of meditation leading to devotion” (20). 
Composing a poem to her soul, and interrogating its flaws and failures within that poetic 
space, allows An Collins to envision this crucial component of her selfhood as separate 
and available for analysis.  Through the text as prosthetic device she analyzes, questions, 
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and ultimately stages an intervention, to ensure that her soul is on the correct devotional 
path during the process of spiritual becoming that is underway.45  In this model, the 
meditation precedes actual devotion, but Collins’s interrogation of her soul in such bodily 
terms is problematic in that she does not ultimately desire to transcend her affliction, but 
rather to normalize it.  William Scott Howard has described the “conversion of spiritual 
affliction into redemptive knowledge of the soul’s regenerative powers granted through 
Christ’s sacrifice and God’s prevenient grace” as one of the “most prevalent topoi in 
seventeenth-century devotional verse” (“‘With Deborah” 242).  Howard lists the 
rhetorical hallmarks of this tradition as: self-abnegation, confession of sins, and prayers 
of repentance (“‘With Deborah” 242).  An Collins is certainly attempting to work within 
this generic topoi, but her metaphors have worked too well, and converting spiritual 
affliction into redemptive knowledge is complicated by her apparent difficulty separating 
physical from spiritual affliction.  This difficulty is, in larger part, a product of anxiety 
over how a reading public will interpret and view both her body and her text.   
 Collins has grafted body and soul so closely together in this meditation that it 
becomes difficult to read her affliction as purely spiritual, as a marker of God’s favor.  In 
fact, it seems little comfort indeed when Collins declares that the only consolation 
available for the afflicted is the knowledge that “without cause he hath afflicted none, / 
Sith without doubt, his wayes so equall be, / For som great fault he thus correcteth thee, / 
Therfore to lowest thoughts thy self retire, / To seek the cause that moved God to ire” (ll. 
74-8).  Although Collins’s instructive tone surrounding the medicated body suggests an 
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air of confidence that the body’s afflictions can be managed by medical treatments, the 
pronouncement that affliction is a sign of God’s displeasure imbues all of her earlier 
metaphors of sickness with added meaning.  If Collins has begun to believe that affliction 
is a sign of God’s ill will, and she struggles to differentiate physical from spiritual 
affliction, then it seems she has cause to be anxious over the status of both her body and 
soul.  As such, An Collins advises her soul to renew its covenant with God, try its forces 
again, and if “In them thou find a disability, / Then look to Christ, who doth thy 
weaknesse veiw / And of compassion will thy strength renew, / From him alone thou 
mayst that grace derive / Which like a Cordiall or Restorative, / Will strengthen and 
repair thy faculties, / Which else are dead to holy exercise” (ll. 88-94 emphasis added). 
Collins’s use of the term “disability” is provocative, especially as her usage specifically 
invokes the concepts of inability or lack to describe a soul that desires but is unable to 
“walk before him [Christ] with an upright heart” (l. 85).  When she describes Christ’s 
healing powers as a “Cordiall or Restorative”, Collins once again juxtaposes the 
phenomenal afflicted body of everyday experience with the spiritual curatives and 
comforts available from God alone, and in doing so underscores the interchange she feels 
between her spiritual and physical health.  This relationship proves vexing for Collins as 
her disability becomes the means by which God will “make thy Understanding apprehend 
/ God as a Father, who in Love doth send / Correction to his Children when they stray” 
(ll. 95-7).  Collins’s difficult relationship with her affliction(s) manifests in the paradox 
of interpreting her affliction as both a divine corrective and also a sign of her inability to 
act according to God’s will.  In this regard, Collins demonstrates a sense of affliction that 
most assuredly falls under the umbrella of disability as her anxiety over election bleeds 
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into anxiety over her body and both call attention to feelings of inability and lack 
resonating on spiritual as well as corporeal levels and playing out through her attempt at a 
prosthetic intervention.  
 Just as medical prostheses simultaneously confirm difference while also supporting 
the construction of acceptably normal bodies, An Collins persistently invites readers to 
gaze upon her disabled, and subsequently sorrowing body, in a manner that zooms in on 
her distinct sense of physical lack in relation to “normal” or able bodies.  Such a 
representation, especially for a contemporary reading public deeply invested in 
discerning material signs of spiritual health in and on the body, positions her text at a 
provocative crossroads: is it a bodily prosthesis, whereby the text metaphorically at least 
rehabilitates and makes able her afflicted body?  Or, as I suggest, could her devotional 
verse function as a spiritual prosthesis?  The prosthesis is at once a technical device 
meant to function as a supplement to bodily lack and also a particularly rich metaphor to 
describe the movement between the experience of lack and then the supplementation to 
remove or compensate for that lack.  If we consider the devotional text as a piece of 
technology, an implement wherein any author might construct a verbal or rhetorical 
supplement to lessen or modify their experience of spiritual lack, then the devotional text 
might function as a prosthetic of the soul.  
 The prosthetic possibilities of such a tool, appendage, or technical implement shift 
when an author like An Collins engages in the production of a text that is at once 
devotional and also prosthetic.  As a woman whose sense of self and relation to the world 
has been conditioned by real lived experience of bodily lack, and bodily disability that 
might be read as an indication of spiritual disability as well, An Collins’s devotional 
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verse makes the metaphoric and literal boundaries of prosthesis indistinguishable, just as 
the boundaries between her soul and body are indistinguishable to her.  Rather than 
constructing the text as a bodily prosthesis, whereby she might overcome her physical 
disabilities through the work of the spirit, Collins constructs a complex relational 
framework where the lines between not only body and soul but also text and self are 
blurred through the supplemental power of the prosthetic.  In this sense, I echo and build 
upon Mintz’s claim that Collins’s verse crafts a unique disability subjectivity by positing 
that the devotional text as prosthesis enables An Collins to redefine body-soul relations in 
direct response to contemporary spiritual subjectivities derived almost exclusively from 
ableist perspectives.  When read through the lens of prosthesis, Collins’s representation 
of self, body, and soul, in the space of her text forces readers to grapple with the very 
same set of boundary debates that Allucquère Rosanne Stone advances in current 
discussions of human-prosthetic relations: where do the edges lie between the person and 
the prostheses they use to communicate?46  Isn’t a devotional text an attempt to spell out, 
to communicate the language and state of the human soul?  Couldn’t Collins’s devotional 
text function as a spiritual prosthesis, especially given the interdependence between 
physical and spiritual states so widely accepted in the period?  In order to answer these 
questions and also to more fully elucidate the prosthetic function of Divine Songs, for the 
remaining pages I will focus on Collins’s oscillation between expressions of spiritual joy 
and also bodily pain, which ultimately offer a provocative new perspective in early 
modern spiritual subjectivity: a perspective deriving explicitly from the divisive space 
between recognizing the self as a member of the body politic while also negotiating the 	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politics of the body.  
 For example, in “A Song manifesting The Saints eternall Happinesse” Collins 
invokes a traditional garden metaphor to describe the godly as consisting of two types: 
the whole, described as flowers, and the weak, described as weeds.  In Collins’s 
rendering both weeds and flowers may count themselves members of the elect and thus 
achieve “eternall Happinesse”, but prior to that time they both grow together and 
similarly suffer from storms “which much confusion breeds” (l. 20).  She clarifies the 
nature of this confusion by suggesting that storms are more difficult for those who carry 
the added burden of weakness and physical imperfection: 
  Some for weaknesse are dismaid,  
  And some are comfortlesse, 
  Because of some defect of sence, 
  Or want of comlinesse 
 
  Grant some may have 
  Proporcion so compleat, 
  That correspondency of parts 
  Declares Perfections seat (ll. 21-8) 
 
In this comparison Collins places incredible emphasis on the appeal of physical 
correspondence.  The “weeds” may be described as weak, comfortless, defected, and 
unattractive, but Collins’s tone suggests a sense of incompleteness and insufficiency 
much deeper than mere dismay at being judged weak or found unattractive.  She goes on 
to assert that even those with perfect physical proportions and “correspondency of parts” 
carry burdens, but this assertion seems small comfort given her consciousness of the 
social value placed on physical symmetry.  In this sympathetic portrayal, the spiritual 
happiness and joy integral to confirming one’s election and truly uniting oneself with 
Christ is obstructed for those “weeds” who have visible signs of imperfection.  This 
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rendering of the apparently reciprocal relationship between spiritual health and bodily 
condition is echoed in Mary K. Nelson’s assertion that early moderns were inclined to 
interpret physical anomalies as indicators of immoral activity (5).  Given this mode of 
thinking, the emotional weight of Collins’s comparison certainly lies with those weeds 
who may be elect but bear the much greater burden of finding themselves 
disproportionate and lacking corresponding parts.  
 Collins’s apparent interest in making a case for the unattractive or defected as 
members of the elect lends considerable support to Gottlieb’s assertion that she did 
indeed suffer from some sort of actual affliction that left her with a “lifelong sense of 
physical vulnerability, disability, and shame” (ODNB).  It certainly supports Susannah 
Mintz’s assertion that  
  The fact that Collins never directly offers any definitive physical etiology for  
  her suffering raises a further possibility that her many mentions of   
  unspecified afflictedness, beyond simply maintaining her privacy or a certain  
  social decorum where a woman’s bodily matters are concerned, may also  
  refer to rejection from the community (66). 
 
Collins’s sense of exclusion and isolation is brought to bear in her sustained interest in 
mediating physical ailments in this particular poem as she continues on to describe the 
transition achieved by “the Saint that finish hath his course” who “Shall be for ever free” 
(ll.63-4).  These saints leave  
  Bodies which here  
  Are matter thick and grosse,  
  Attaining to this happinesse, 
  Are freed from their drosse: 
  And as the Sunn 
  Appeares in brightest Sky, 
  So every body glorifi’d 
   Shall be for clarity, 
  And likewise be impassible, 
  Uncapable of pain 
	  51 
  Having agility to move, 
  Whose vigour shall remain. (ll. 73-84)   
 
Collins is, of course, speaking of the eventual reunion of body and soul each saint will 
experience following Christ’s second coming.  She thus positions her zealous soul and 
also her broken body within the larger corporate community of the saints. Within the 
pages of her text, at least, she can fashion a place for herself within this community, even 
if it is denied to her in lived experience.  
 However, her keen interest in not only purifying the saint’s body but also closing it, 
making it “impassable” and “uncapable of pain,” demonstrates the incredible conflict 
between interpreting one’s affliction as productive, even spiritually joyful, and being 
unable to surmount the experience of actual physical pain.  Nevertheless, Collins sounds 
incredibly hopeful at the prospect of closing the body to all pain and doing away with this 
conflict.  Given her earlier emphasis on the burdens of weak and physically incomplete 
members of the godly, one gets the sense that Collins has more than a poetic or 
devotional interest in crafting a poetics of social acceptance and divine redemption for 
the afflicted.  Her desire to draw attention to the bodies of the afflicted, bodies that lack 
earthly glory and are subject to harsh judgment, and then close those bodies to pain, 
suggests a much greater investment in afflicted bodies than merely troping them for 
rhetorical purposes.  Collins’s sustained interest in the external effects of affliction 
distinguish her from other female devotional writers, like Margaret Hoby or Dionys 
Fitzherbert, who frequently cite an internal sense of being struck down by God’s rod as a 
cause to withdraw from the world.  Collins certainly expresses similarly internalized 
concerns about her relationship with God, but her anxiety centers almost exclusively on 
the relation between internal concerns and their external manifestations.  She might 
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employ widely used devotional images like gardens, flowers, weeds, and seasons to 
describe affliction within her poetry and prose, but her subject matter appears deeply 
personal.   
 Rather than arguing that she has transcended her affliction and cannot or even 
should not be judged by virtue of her bodily condition, Collins instead strategically aligns 
herself with those whose “fall is through infirmity” but “Who shall not be forsaken 
utterly” (“The Discourse” ll. 685-6). This rhetorical and spiritual positioning is important 
in that it at once argues that spiritual perfection is a hard-won and often lengthy pursuit 
while simultaneously tying her devotional voice explicitly to the weak, disabled, and 
infirm.  In fact, describing failings that manifest as “infirmity” is quite suggestive. 
“Infirmity” most prominently calls to mind bodily disease or weakness, but it can also 
refer to a “want of validity” (OED 1b), a description that pointedly speaks to the social 
context of disability.  Given Collins’s earlier defense of those faithful who wish to be 
“Like as a Child new born without defect” (l. 645) but find themselves with 
“imperfections some” (l. 650), the validation Collins so deeply desires must come in both 
physical and spiritual terms; she needs to confirm that an imperfect, infirm, and even 
disabled body may be counted among the elect.  However, Collins does more than simply 
present this problem; in the very next stanza she offers a method by which her election 
can be confirmed.  She writes: 
  For soon a Godly sorrow will arise  
  And over-flow the heart of such a one,  
  Which blessedly the same so mollifies,  
  That it relents for having so mis-gone  
  Which godly griefe or sorrow is all one  
  For having so displeased God by sinne,  
  Who hath to him a loving Father been. (“The Discourse” ll. 687-93) 
 
	  53 
It seems her “infirmity” has been productive, resulting in proof of election in the form of 
a powerful “Godly sorrow” that overflows from within and ultimately mollifies the sinful 
or doubting believer.  The production of godly sorrow confirms a type of righteous 
suffering that neatly attends to Collins’s bodily dilemma.  The final suggestion that God’s 
displeasure has manifested in the loving rod of “infirmity” clarifies Collins’s seemingly 
endless predicament of interpreting affliction as elevating while simultaneously battling 
the doubt that experiencing such an “infirmity” causes.  Collins’s decision to immerse 
herself in the experience of infirmity and disability suggests that Divine Songs is much 
more about reframing how her affliction is viewed by the surrounding world than an 
attempt to transcend it altogether.    
 This profoundly positive portrayal of godly sorrow sets up the final, and most 
impactful image of “The Discourse.”  Collins contends that the sinner or doubter must 
meditate upon their own personal failings “till he be reconcil’d to God” (l. 696) and “hath 
attain’d recovery” (l. 701), but she fails to elucidate precisely how this is accomplished or 
how one might affirm that recovery and reconciliation have actually taken place.  She 
may use the language of recuperation, recovery, and renewal, but these metaphors serve a 
larger goal: validation of the afflicted body in all its prosthetized glory.  In order to 
accomplish this task, Collins contends that her recovery is built around the activity of 
godly sorrow within, and while this sorrow may not transform her physically, it does 
have an incredible internal impact as the recuperated believer diligently works to ensure a 
continued consciousness of grace by actively securing the self.  Writing of this renewed 
believer, Collins declares:  
  The breach without delay he fortifies  
  With stronger resolucion manfully,  
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  And with a Watch impregnable likewise,  
  Against assaults of this his enimies,  
  And all assaies of their re-entry 
  Through which so many perish finally. (ll. 701-7) 
 
The image of a fortress capable of repelling even the most tempting sins and 
disconcerting doubts is undoubtedly powerful, but the heart of this fortress is the 
astonishing activity within.  This enclosed space virtually teems with the sensation of a 
grace that, having been produced by the affective work of godly sorrow in her heart, 
irradiates from within the speaker herself.  It is evocative then that Collins should 
describe this space as “impregnable”, a term that further underscores the importance of 
her self-containment while also asserting that every idea, feeling, or expression issuing 
forth from this space is the product of both a soul and a disabled body which ought to be 
read as spiritually chaste.  Through the image of her body as a fortress policed by herself 
against herself, Collins deftly introduces the devotional voice that we will hear in the 
songs to come as being “like Baakhtin’s classical body…rigidly ‘finished’: her signs are 
the enclosed body, the closed mouth, the locked house” (Stallybrass 127).  This closed 
off body is the direct result of Collins’s prosthetic intervention reframing how her body 
and soul are interpreted, and through this representation Collins attempts to prove 
chastity as well as ability.  In doing so she encourages her readers to view her songs as 
the product of not only a godly sufferer, but also as emanating from a specifically female 
point of view.  This is an important initial gesture toward the deeply gendered language 
of reproduction that runs repeatedly throughout the remainder of the volume, and it will 
be this language that Collins ultimately comes to rely upon in her examination of the 
incredible tension between a woman’s unproductive body yet productive mind.   
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Bodies that Lack: A Fruitful Female Body 
The fortified internal space crafted by Collins at the close of “The Discourse” appears a 
product of much more than just anxiety over election; it suggests a particular dilemma for 
the devout woman who must contend with constructing both a divine other and also a 
private self that the world deems proper. Susan Comilang clarifies this predicament, 
noting that the experience of spiritual retreat resonated differently for women as  
  the woman in withdrawal had to contend with being commodifed as a  
  governable, spatial body. In other words, her desire for devotion could be  
  elided by another’s need to control her; to control her privacy and what  
  she did within it. The woman  and the space become  one and the same.  
  (81) 
 
Given these restrictions, any devotional act, performed in either public or private, 
becomes a site of tension for the female saint where “the woman’s outward stillness to 
the world may create a recessed withdrawal, but her inward activities are not entirely 
solitary” (Comilang 82).  This is certainly the case for An Collins, who feels anxiety over 
not only the relationship between external and internal aspects of herself, but also the 
public’s perception of this connection.  Despite her best efforts to mitigate it, this anxiety 
ultimately impedes her ability to joyfully withdraw into herself.  As a result, Collins 
presents her literary persona as experiencing, and attempting to mediate, a personal as 
well as communal crisis of interpretation over her sorrow, the product of her bodily state.     
 Collins responds to this public-private and body-soul dilemma through frequent 
invocations of a seemingly traditional hortus conclusus, but as Patricia Demers notes, 
Collins’s hortus conclusus is unique in that her enclosed garden features unusual 
emphasis on “the specialty of intellectual parturition” (202).  Collins’s clearest 
articulation of the hortus conclusus can be found in a poem simply entitled “Another 
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Song I”, wherein Collins asserts, “Yet as a garden is my mind enclosed fast / Being to 
safety so confind from storm and blast / Apt to produce a fruit most rare, / That is not 
common with every woman / That fruitfull are” (ll. 26-30).47  Mary Norcliffe argues that 
this figuration indelibly ties Collins’s “whole identity and human worth on her ability to 
fashion language” as her mind becomes “the key refuge and center of calm…a world of 
freedom and fertility, a protected virgin womb where literary and spiritual realities exotic 
and external can be conceived and grow” (Norcliffe 233).  Indeed, this figuration 
powerfully and prosthetically cleaves Collins’s sense of self to the act of producing 
devotional verse, but in this relation Collins is not alone.  As the editors of Kissing the 
Rod keenly point out, Collins is one of several “religious women poets who would adopt 
the metaphor of literary babies to excuse their pride in their work” (Greer et al. 142, 
144).48  Collins’s divine poetry, which was previously figured in “The Discourse” as both 
offspring and also the image of her mind, thus follows the “protestant birth ethic” which 
through the literary childbirth conceit “designate[s] a lack of smart poetic or literary dress 
as a sign of pure association with truth” (Semler 433).  However, when Collins deploys 
this conceit she asserts much more than a simple correlation between her chaste soul, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Collins includes four poems in total with this self-same title.  For precision’s sake I 
will thus include a numeral with the title to distinguish. 
48 Greer and her fellow editors in Kissing the Rod directly compare Collins’s devotional 
poetry to that of the anonymous female author of Eliza’s Babes (1652) and also Elizabeth 
Major’s Honey on the Rod: or a comfortable Contemplation for one in Affliction with 
sundry Poems on several Subjects (1656).  Patricia Demers builds upon this trifold in 
which she argues that these three female authors of devotional texts respond to a 
specifically religious form of melancholy that ultimately enables movement inward in the 
face of incredible social and political loss experienced in the external, and primarily 
patriarchal, world of the Commonwealth.  See Demers, “Penseroso Triptych: “Eliza,” An 
Collins, Elizabeth Major,” in Discovering and (Re)Covering the Seventeenth Century 
Religious Lyric, eds. Eugene Cunnar and Jeffrey Johnson (Pittsburgh, Duquesne UP, 
2001): 185-204. 
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unaffected verse, and a productive mind; rather, Collins’s immensely fruitful mind is 
presented in direct contrast to the physical fruitfulness of other women.  This is one of the 
very few places in all of Collins’s collection where she projects outside of herself to 
specifically situate her own voice within a larger female community.  Norcliffe identifies 
the power of this juxtaposition when she asserts that Collins’s mental fruitfulness is thus 
depicted as extraordinary in the face of the somewhat banal fruitfulness and fertility of 
“every woman” (233).  In this deliberate juxtaposition Collins seems to not only advertise 
the purity of her soul but also celebrate her ability to access an interior realm of 
subjectivity made accessible through the supplemental power of her devotional verse, a 
place where a fertile soul is deemed far more valuable than a fruitful body.  
 However, I would contend that Collins’s assertions of a peacefully enclosed 
mental garden are not quite as confident and celebratory as previously supposed.  Rather, 
the security of Collins’s mental garden is disturbed by her continued reliance on a 
powerful seasonal conceit that proves the only ever illusionary capacity of the prosthesis 
in its persistent invitation to read her body as only generating the façade of normalcy 
while privately remaining insufficient, disappointing, lacking, and painfully present.  In 
the first stanza of  “Another Song I” Collins constructs a seasonal conceit to describe her 
expectation that “The Winter of my infancy being over-past / I then supposed, suddenly 
the Spring would hast” (ll. 1-2).  The Spring depicted in the second stanza is a bountiful 
and solely female enclave wherein “Ver brings her mate the flowery Queen / The Groves 
shee dresses, her Art expresses / On every Green” (ll. 8-10).  In Collins’s rendering, 
spring is depicted as a bastion of female fecundity with Spring personified as female and 
also mated to yet another female figure whose “Art” is so prolific that it radically 
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transforms the surrounding landscape from barren to blossoming.  This is the vision of 
spring she expects will follow a winter of immaturity and infancy, and given the natural 
seasonal cycle, she supposes that her own seasons must develop accordingly.  However, 
Collins’s celebratory portrayal of spring abruptly ends when she shifts her focus from the 
natural and expected progression of the seasons to the reality of her own personal 
experience:  
  But in my Spring it was not so, but contrary, 
  For no delightfull flowers grew to please the eye,  
  No hopefull bud, nor fruitfull bough, 
  No moderat showers which causeth flowers 
  To spring and grow.  
 
  My Aprill was exceeding dry, therefore unkind; 
  Whence tis that small utility I look to find, 
  For when that Aprill is so dry, 
  (As hath been spoken) it doth betoken 
  Much scarcity. 
 
  Thus is my Spring now almost past in heavinesse 
  The Sky of pleasure’s over-cast with sad distresse 
  For by a comfortlesse Eclips, 
  Disconsolacion and sore vexacion, 
  My blossom nips. (ll. 11-25) 
 
The somatologically rich language Collins uses to describe her condition simultaneously 
stresses the fertility she so desperately desired but “now” (l. 21) clearly lacks.  As Collins 
shifts her focus from the expectation of fertility to the reality of fruitlessness, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that while she may desire and even attempt to access the “creative 
garden of the Song of Songs” and finally “feel blessed among women” (Norcliffe 233) 
through an explanation of her extraordinarily fruitful mind, Collins’s hortus conclusus 
ultimately appears more besieged than safely enclosed.  She is beset by consciousness 
that she should be moist and fertile, but instead finds herself “exceeding dry”, a 
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physiognomic status that, when read autobiographically, suggests an absence of 
menstruation, clarifies the nature of her disability, and effectively blockades Collins’s 
entry to a larger female community defined by gendered imperatives to reproduce.49  Her 
sense of isolation from this larger female community is thus heightened as she inverts the 
common conception that women have “fruitful wombs [but] barren brains” (Gillespie 
172) by retreating into the shelter of her mind, a hortus conclusus figured in direct 
opposition to the productive and fertile female body celebrated in Song of Songs.   
 Sarah Skwire has asserted that “for Collins separation and barrenness are 
connected” and while Collins appreciates the protective shelter offered by her hortus 
conclusus she “may also believe that her seclusion contributes to her difference and 
distinction” (Skwire 14-15).50  In Skwire’s reading, as Norcliffe, and Demers also 
suggest, Collins’s sense of distinction is liberating and celebratory as she reinterprets the 
rules for defining female worth to read in strictly spiritual terms.  In this process Collins 
“re-envisions [barrenness] as an aid to creativity”, and thus “reveals her consideration of 
her gender, and her intellect and writing as signs of her power” (Skwire 15).  In this view, 
Collins’s disabled womb can only be read as a sign of election, proof that God desires her 
as much as she desires Him.  It can also be read in strictly female terms, and it is in this 
construction that the language of parturition proves as problematic for Collins as it is vital 
in the fashioning of a productive mental garden through the prosthetized text.  Collins’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Sarah Skwire reads this line as more than “simply an image of intellectual or spiritual 
barrenness, but a reference to physical barrenness or amenorrhea that may have been a 
symptom of the illness that kept Collins an invalid” (13). 
50 In the assertion of Collins’s appreciative view of her hortus conclusus, Skwire draws a 
connection between Collins and female saints who have perceived enclosure as a means 
to “refuse her destiny as a 'functionary of man and his culture' and to experiment with the 
elation of ‘true autonomy’” (15).  In this claim Skwire cites Rudolph M. Bell, Holy 
Anorexia (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985), 55.   
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seeming success in re-envisioning herself as productive is thus attenuated by an 
incredible concern over how both her physical and spiritual conditions might be 
interpreted by others who cannot see past either her disability or the prosthetic that seeks 
to normalize it.  For both Collins and her audience it seems, the prosthesis provides the 
illusion of normalcy, of ability, but ultimately keeps difference and disability the prime 
focus. 
 When Collins invokes such embodied states she once again invites readers to 
examine the state of her soul in direct correlation with her bodily condition, and in doing 
so squarely positions herself as not only separate from a larger community of women 
with fruitful bodies, but also in direct opposition to a reading public with preconceived 
notions about the relationship between a woman’s reproductive and spiritual abilities.  In 
a time when many men and women were deeply invested in discerning signs of grace and 
election in their lives, the maternal body was believed to possess the unique capacity to 
illustrate in a decidedly material fashion the status of a woman’s soul.51  Maternal bodies 
were writ large with significance, showing signs of both moral and physical health as the 
production of a whole and healthy child indicated moral living and a deformed or ailing 
child indicated the private but now public sins of the mother.52  A healthy and able-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Yet another contemporary belief about monstrous birth suggested that children took the 
shape of whatever was in the mother’s vision at the time of conception, so if a woman 
looked at an image of a horse at the moment of conception, then the child conceived 
would be imprinted with that form.   
52 For more on the relationship between maternal sin and infant deformation or disability 
see: Valerie Fildes, ed., Women as Mothers in Pre-Industrial England: Essays in Memory 
of Dorothy McLaren (London: Routledge, 1990); Mary K. Nelson, “Shakespeare's Henry 
VIII: Stigmatizing the “Disabled” Womb” Disability Studies Quarterly 29.4 (2009): 1-28; 
Julie Crawford, Marvelous Protestantism: Monstrous Births in Post-Reformation 
England (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2005).  
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bodied child thus reveals precisely what Collins’s collection of devotional verse is meant 
to reveal through its prosthetic intervention: the status of the mother’s soul.  In this sense, 
a child presents the very same supplement or addition necessary to designate a godly 
woman as Collins’s devotional verse supplements and makes visible her spiritual state. 
Patricia Crawford has claimed that in the early modern period, “it seems as if the godly 
woman was the successfully socialized woman” (Women 4), but given the spiritual and 
moral authority attached to mothers, it seems equally accurate to say that the godly 
woman was successfully socialized to associate both her spiritual and social value with 
her ability to successfully procreate.  In this vein, motherhood not only authorizes a 
woman’s speech but also her status in the religious, familial, and social communities she 
is a part of.  Such incredible contemporary interest in mediating motherhood suggests a 
sustained early modern anxiety over inscrutable private interior spaces (like the womb or 
the heart) and their ability to produce external and highly legible signs of election.53 
Collins not only participates in this anxiety but also explicitly reproduces it in the stanzas 
surrounding her declaration of mental fruitfulness.   
 Returning now to “Another Song I,” this anxiety is evident in the parenthetical 
statement embedded within the description of her infertility: “(As hath been spoken) it 
[her dryness] doth betoken / Much scarcity” (ll.19-20).  The state of Collins’s womb has 
been the subject of considerable expectation within the space of this poem, but this 
parenthetical suggests that it is not only her own personal expectations Collins is keen to 
redress.  She worries about popular opinion, and rather than retreating inward as she 
attempts to redefine barrenness as an aid to her creative powers, Collins instead projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Culpeper’s Directory for Midwives saw consistent reprinting from its original 1651 
publication date into the eighteenth century. 
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an anxious gaze outward onto a larger community likely inclined to view an infertile 
female body as disabled, ungodly, and reprobate.  In this regard, Collins’s anxiety over 
the “scarcity” of her bodily productions is much more the focus of this poem than any 
celebratory assertion of a powerful and enabling hortus conclusus.  This anxiety 
manifests in the stanzas immediately following her assertion of a fruitful mental garden 
when she asserts, “A Love of goodnesse is the chiefest plant therein” (l. 31); the second 
most bounteous plant is a “Dislike to sin” (l. 32) which “grow[s] in spight of misery” (l. 
33).  These plants produce moral qualities “Which Grace doth nourish and cause to 
flourish / Continually” (ll. 34-5).  If Collins’s sense of separation and distinction from 
other women both constructs and causes her retreat to the security of an immaterial 
spiritual realm of the self then her access to this garden, and the fruitful plants within, can 
only come through consciousness of that which distinguishes her from other women. 
Recognition of the affliction of reproductive disability becomes the conduit by which she 
confirms her election, and in this movement An Collins once again inverts the 
expectation that disability is negative, abnormal, or proof of God’s disfavor.  Just as able-
bodied women confirm the status of their souls by bearing healthy and able-bodied 
children, An Collins affirms her spiritual ability through the production of a text which 
functions prosthetically to materialize and make known the immaterial status of her soul. 
 However powerful this inversion might be, it is temporary.  Collins’s external 
concerns impede upon the security of her mental garden as she abruptly ceases to 
celebrate the workings of inward Grace by declaring: 
  But evill mocions, corrupt seeds, fall here also 
  whenc springs prophanesse as do weeds where flowers grow 
  Which must supplanted be with speed 
  These weeds of Error, Distrust and Terror, 
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  Lest woe succeed 
 
  So shall they not molest, the plants before exprest 
  Which countervails these outward wants, & purchase rest 
  Which more commodious is for me 
  Then outward pleasures or earthly treasures 
  Enjoyd would be. (ll. 36-45) 
 
The initial “but” effectively, and swiftly, diminishes her previous avowal that Grace 
continuously nourishes “and cause[s] to flourish” (l. 34) the moral virtues cultivated 
within her mental garden.  As a result, it becomes apparent that Collins’s hortus 
conclusus is not secure; it has been penetrated by the “weeds of Error, Distrust, and 
Terror” (l. 39).  The presence of such contamination causes a flurry of anxiety-inducing 
internal activity to expunge such disruptive emotional states before they take root.  Her 
choice to break the stanza mid-sentence places considerable emphasis on the connection 
between her desire to speedily supplant these weeds and their incredible power to molest, 
disrupt, or afflict all of the plants growing within her mental garden.  The nature of this 
affliction is telling: Collins contends that, if left to grow, these weeds would 
“countervail,” or make equal, her external wants and the plants she desires to cultivate 
within, namely a love of goodness and a dislike for sin.  The tension apparent in her 
concern over equalizing the external and the internal points to the heart of Collins’s 
anxiety over the relationship between her body and her soul and how easily they might be 
countervailed.  Although Collins’s mind, her hortus conclusus, can produce a “fruit most 
rare”, it appears that the fruit found within Divine Songs is constructed as much by 
Collins’s careful linkage between physical infertility and spiritual productivity as it is by 
the seventeenth-century readers whom she fears will interpret her disabled body as an 
indicator of her spiritual worth.  
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 Writing within the tradition of godly sorrow then provides An Collins with a very 
pointed end goal: to normalize, but never erase, her experience of physical affliction.  
This is evident as she consistently draws attention to the impact of her physical condition 
on her sense of godliness.  This is accomplished early in her collection when she ties her 
experience of physical suffering and isolation with the scriptural encouragement found in 
Hebrews 13:5 and Romans 8:28, that “He doth not leave nor forsake them” “But causeth 
all things to work for theyr good” (“To the Reader” 1).  Collins reads these passages 
typologically, immediately applying their message to her own condition, declaring: “this 
I doubt not, but most Saints in som measure, do experimentally know” (1).  This self-
assured statement stems from her position as an afflicted person; the affirming words of 
scripture work to reassure Collins that her lived experience of suffering and bodily 
ailment is a “normal” marker of sainthood.  By conjoining her continued position as an 
afflicted person with scriptural referents stressing God’s commitment to His children 
through times of trial, Collins suggests that she has been, and continues to be, tested, but 
not forsaken, by God.  Her affliction will work for her good, and this she “experimentally 
know[s].”      
  As a result, Collins frames her poetic and spiritual joys as dependent upon each 
other, and through this fusion, both spiritual and poetic joys work prosthetically to affirm 
her personal election as well as her status within the larger community of saints. 
Following this vein, Collins most clearly attempts to align her affliction as evidence of 
God’s grace when she depicts her seemingly ceaseless crosses as being “like the 
messengers of Iob” (“The Discourse” l. 64), a rhetorical maneuver that Sidney Gottlieb 
has characterized as “an almost obligatory” allusion to the trials of Job “which still fails 
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to add much interest to this particular tale of woe” (Gottlieb “Introduction” viii).  The 
allusion does seem formulaic, and thus evidence that Collins consciously writes in a 
devotional mode wherein her right to speak is authenticated by situating her literary 
persona directly within the tradition of Christian suffering, as her lived experience as a 
disabled woman presents a number of hurdles to such self expression.  Far from 
signifying that Collins is merely troping her afflictions, this formulaic gesture, I think, 
does a great deal to situate the prosthetic impulse of the text itself.  Job is not only one of 
the most archetypal figures of godly suffering, but he is also the quintessential 
“supercrip,” a current term deployed by Disability Studies theorists to describe a disabled 
or afflicted individual whose “inspirational stories of courage, dedication, and hard work 
prove that it can be done, that one can defy the odds and accomplish the impossible” 
(Berger 648).54  Or, and perhaps even more to the point in An Collins’s case, the label 
“supercrip” might be bestowed on an impaired individual who simply lives “an ordinary” 
life (Kama 450), and thus overcomes the obstacles presumed to accompany their 
affliction.55  In either case, Job is a figure whose faith was so powerful that he was not 
only able to cope with his many afflictions, but he also becomes an object of admiration 
for all those able-bodied people encountering his suffering through their own scriptural 
reading and devotional work.  Collins’s formulaic gesture to Job, in this regard, 
acknowledges that while she cannot affect a complete erasure of her difference altogether 
she can present her difference in a manner that normalizes it by inviting readers to view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 R.J. Berger, “Disability and the Dedicated Wheelchair Athlete: Beyond the ‘Supercrip’ 
Critique,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 37.6 (2008): 647–78. 
55 Amit Kama “Supercrips Versus the Pitiful Handicapped: Reception of Disabling 
Images by Disabled Audience Members. Communications 29.4 (2004): 447–66. 
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her joyful suffering as the sign of an able soul marked for redemption.  Given the 
contemporary roadblocks limiting women’s speech, let alone disabled women’s speech, 
this crucial shift in perception towards a normalized experience of disability could only 
be achieved via the prosthetic possibilities of a devotional text that relentlessly makes 
visible both a faithful soul and a suffering body. 
 However, Collins can only go so far to connect her suffering with Job’s—she does 
not present herself, or her spiritual ability for that matter, in the form of a “supercrip” 
zealously overcoming her obstacles.  While Job elicits both pity and adoration via his 
unceasing faith in God’s goodness despite his suffering, Collins complicates her portrayal 
of godly suffering by declaring that her sufferings are so pronounced they not only 
remove “all mocions of delight” but also leave such motions altogether “defast” (“The 
Discourse” l. 66).  Collins’s diction is provocative in its invocation of defacement, an 
immensely powerful act of violation and destruction made particularly painful by virtue 
of its ability to obscure the object of defacement, to let the object remain, but strip it of its 
original signification.  In Collins’s case, delight is the object of defacement: still present, 
but inaccessible and obscured through the veil of her affliction.  As a result, she becomes 
profoundly anxious to the point that “my minde it self, would much torment, / Vpon the 
rack of restless discontent” (ll. 69-70).  This statement suggests that the spiritual 
consolation Collins claimed as a product of her affliction has been difficult to maintain or 
perhaps has not fully formed.  
 Following this tension, the expression of affliction within Collins’s spiritual 
autobiography points to a psychology of anxiety in keeping with larger corporate concern 
over identification of the godly in post-Reformation England.  However, this tension 
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resonates quite differently for An Collins as she experiences it dually: first, in regard to 
her election and secondly as to how her disabled body is interpreted by a populace largely 
inclined to associate the status of the body with that of the soul.56  While Collins might 
initially link her sorrows to a joy that confirms her election, she also gives a great deal of 
attention to the tenuous nature of this connection.  
 Rather than presenting her suffering body as subordinate to “a triumphantly active, 
productive, and hermetic mind,” as is the case in a great deal of devotional verse, 
Susannah Mintz contends that Collins disrupts the “strict dichotomies of breakage and 
wholeness, disablement and capability, penetration and enclosure” in order to ultimately 
“locate in her portrayal of breakdown, bodily interiors, sensory experience, and the 
boundaries of gender a celebration of the self and a form of devotional practice that does 
not set the broken body aside” (Mintz 63-4).  Mintz thus suggests that Collins invites 
readers to place their gaze squarely on her disabled body and come to view it as anything 
but an obstacle to be overcome.  Through the prosthetic intervention posed through 
Divine Songs and Meditacions, Collins’s disabled and insufficient body is consistently 
presented within and in relation to the “normal” body, but her body is never fully 
normalized in the sense that she might now “pass” as able-bodied; rather, Collins ensures 
that her readers cannot avoid or ignore her sense of bodily lack.  In doing so, Collins’s 
prosthetized text presents a disabled body that sorrows in a godly fashion, and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For more on the psychological effects of Puritanism, particularly, see: John 
Stachniewski, The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism and the Literature of 
Religious Despair (New York: Oxford UP, 1991), and John Morill, “A liberation 
theology? Aspects of Puritanism in the English Revolution,” in Puritanism and its 
Discontents, ed. Laura Lunger Knoppers (Newark and London: U of Delaware P, 2003), 
27-48. Morill describes the anxiety that accompanied Puritanism as a “cultural process” 
(38).  
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celebrating her ability to sorrow in such a manner we must also celebrate the experience 
of lack that is her norm.  It is in An Collins’s fascinating invitation to gaze upon and 
celebrate her disabled body and to identify the spectrum of divinely desired bodies that 
the prosthetic possibilities of the devotional text come into view, as the text allows 
Collins not to “pass” as a normal member of the godly community, but to transform the 
very rules by which godliness is both written and read on the body.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REFLECTIONS OF A DIVINE (M)OTHER: 
THOMAS TRAHERNE AND THE GENDERING OF DESIRE 
 
 
The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be 
full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore 
the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! 
—Matthew 6:22-23 
 
 
 As has frequently been noted, the eye plays an important role not only in Thomas 
Traherne’s (c. 1637-74) poetic representation of selfhood, but also in his rendering of 
God, the soul, and the relationship between God and mankind.57  Traherne’s poem “My 
Spirit,” for example, begins with a pun that proves foundational for his poetic: “My 
Naked Simple Life was I. / That Act so Strongly Shind / Upon the Earth, the Sea, the 
Skie, / It was the Substance of My Mind. / The Sence it self was I” (1.1-5).58  In this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The importance of eye imagery to Traherne has been a touchstone for Traherne 
scholarship following the publication of the following foundational studies on Traherne’s 
imagery: Harold G. Ridlon, “The Function of the ‘Infant–Ey’ in Traherne’s Poetry,” SP 
61 (1964): 627-39; A. L. Clements, The Mystical Poetry of Thomas Traherne, 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1969); and Alison J. Sherrington, Mystical Symbolism in the 
Poetry of Thomas Traherne (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1970). 
58 This and all subsequent references to Traherne’s poetry are taken from The Poetical 
Works of Thomas Traherne, Ed. Gladys Wade (London: P.J. & A.E. Dobell, 1932). 
Poems of Felicity was not published in Traherne’s lifetime, and went unknown until 
1896-7, when W. T. Brooke purchased a manuscript copy of Centuries of Meditation and 
also a folio volume containing poems and a commonplace book originally thought to be 
the work of Henry Vaughan until 1903, when Betram Dobbell identified the poetry as 
Traherne’s and published The Poetical Works of Thomas Traherne (1903) and also 
Centuries (1908). This recovery led to the 1910 discovery and publication of Poems of 
Felicity in the British Museum. The collection that makes up Poems of Felicity exists in 
two manuscripts: the Burney MS and the Dobbell MS. The Burney MS appears to have 
been the copy from which the poet’s brother, Philip, was working to prepare for 
publication after Thomas’s death; the editorial license with which Philip altered and 
rearranged the poems, however, have led me, whenever possible, to refer to the Dobbell 
MS, which appears to be free from Philip’s rather heavy hand.   
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depiction, Traherne’s ability to know himself and understand God’s creative force is 
entirely dependent upon a particular bodily sense: sight.  Sightedness enables Traherne’s 
speaker to craft an “I” that is fully understood and also fully in line with God’s love, a 
love that manifests in His creative activity, which in turn provides a plethora of material 
delights for Traherne to feast his eyes upon.  As the poem continues, however, Traherne’s 
investment in sightedness becomes even more apparent when his subject-speaker gestures 
beyond his own sightedness toward the importance of divine sight.  Describing his spirit 
as boundless, not contained by “Brims or Borders,” Traherne asserts, “We see, My 
Essence was all Capacitie” (1.7-8).  The “We” capable of seeing an entity that has neither 
“Dross nor Matter” (1.6) can only comprise the speaker himself and his maker, God.  In 
this sense, Traherne’s ability to “see” himself for what he truly is (eye/I) relies entirely 
upon God also seeing him.  Traherne proceeds to declare his spirit “all Ey, all Act, all 
Sight” (2.12), but he also asserts that it is “more Voluble then Light: / Which can put on 
ten thousand Forms, / Being clothd with what it self adorns” (2.15-17).  Traherne’s soul 
may be all capacity, all perception, but if it is voluble, it is also the object of a readily 
moving eye (OED 2b).  Traherne’s comparison between his soul and light that becomes 
even more apparent when it comes into contact with matter, and then takes on the image 
of that which it enlightens, confirms A. Leigh De Neef’s claim that Traherne’s “entire 
poetic is predicated upon a spectacular objectification, a fashioning of a self-to-be-seen 
for the Other who is conceived of having a desire to see” (116).  God’s choice to see, to 
observe, and to gaze upon Traherne’s speaker is confirmation of His desire for a 
reciprocal gaze, which in turn registers desire for God.  This relation makes a great deal 
of sense in that Traherne’s eye/I formulation is premised upon the presumed correlation 
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between seeing and knowing—that when God sees into human souls, He knows what 
they truly desire, and when humans see their desire for and communion with God they 
come to greater knowledge of self.   
 This formulation of divine-subject relations has resulted in a number of 
Heideiggerian, Hegelian, and Lacanian readings of Traherne reliant upon the premise that 
we cannot desire what we do not lack.59  Traherne’s economy of desire built around sight 
has thus been found to represent God as an absent object of desire, the result of which is 
both divine and human desire necessarily reaching out across a daunting metaphysical 
chasm that Traherne’s devotional poetry seeks to bridge.60  Indeed, in Centuries of 
Meditation (pub. 1908) Traherne himself has the following to say about desire: 
  Desire imports something absent: and a need of what is absent.  God was  
  never without this Tree of Life.  He did desire infinitely, yet He was never  
  without the fruits of this Tree, which are the joys it produced.  I must lead  
  you out of this, into another World, to learn your wants.  For till you find  
  them you will never be happy.  Wants themselves being Sacred Occasions  
  and Means of Felicity. (qtd. in Cefalu 166-7)61  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For the most extensive Lacanian interpretation of Traherne’s rendering of desire, see 
A. Leigh De Neef, Traherne in Dialogue: Heidegger, Lacan, and Derrida (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP, 1988), 115-38.  See also Denise Inge, Wanting Like a God: Desire and 
Freedom in Thomas Traherne (London: SCM Press, 2009), 184-91; Paul Cefalu, English 
Renaissance Literature and Contemporary Theory: Sublime Objects of Theology 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), ch. 4.  In contrast, Gary Kuchar opposes readings 
of Traherne that emphasize lack.  See Gary Kuchar, Divine Subjection: The Rhetoric of 
Sacramental Devotion in Early Modern England (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 2005), ch. 4; 
and Kuchar’s “Organs of Thy Praise: The Function and Rhetoric of the Body in Thomas 
Traherne,” in Religion in the Age of Reason: A Transatlantic Study of the Long 
Eighteenth Century (New York: AMS Press, 2009), 58-81.  
60 A chasm that fashions the anxiety, despair, melancholy and angst of protestant poetics 
that decidedly contrasts with Traherne’s felicitous and celebratory expression.  
61 Christian Ethicks, I:43.20-30. 
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Traherne’s explanation of desire as an “importing” of absence suggests that desire itself 
is grounded upon recognition of lack—that God must be absent for humans to desire 
Him.  However, the “Tree of Life” Traherne refers to is the selfsame Tree of Life cited in 
Revelation 22:1-5, the means by which all that was lost in the Fall is returned to mankind 
through the salvific power of Christ’s sacrifice and second coming.62  Traherne’s 
invocation of this Tree implies that when humans consume the fruits offered by Christ’s 
sacrifice, they accept God’s loving offer for redemption.  When considering the role 
desire plays in Traherne’s rendering of divine-human relations, Paul Cefalu accurately 
contends that “Traherne is concerned with the mutability by which desire forms a circuit 
between God and man” (167).  The resolution to desire’s mutability is, for Traherne, 
Christ, the very vehicle by which desire between mankind and God passes because “one 
can say of Christ unproblematically that his essence is pure love and pure act, if one 
considers that his person is pure act, but his substance is pure love” (Cefalu 171).  
Traherne’s devotional poetry may be framed around a desire to see and be seen by an 
absent divine Other, but I would add that the love Traherne so vigorously celebrates 
points to an immanence made wholly accessible through the nourishing and regenerating 
body of Christ, a body that paradoxically confirms and conquers the speaker’s experience 
of lack. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Revelation 22:1-5: Then he showed me a river of the water of life, clear as crystal, 
coming from the throne of God and of the Lamb, in the middle of its street. On either side 
of the river was the tree of life, bearing twelve kinds of fruit, yielding its fruit every 
month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. There will no longer 
be any curse; and the throne of God and of the Lamb will be in it, and His bondservants 
will serve Him; they will see His face, and His name will be on their foreheads. And 
there will no longer be any night; and they will not have need of the light of a lamp nor 
the light of the sun, because the Lord God will illumine them; and they will reign forever 
and ever. 
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 This chapter will thus contend that Thomas Traherne develops a relationship 
between the gendered dimensions of seventeenth-century ocular theory and his own 
excessive exclamations of joy and Adamic purity to craft a Christ-figure who functions as 
both mother and Other to Traherne’s speaker.  Reading Christ as a desired and desiring, 
foreign and familiar Other shifts the interpretive landscape of Traherne criticism to open 
up a new way of reading Traherne’s representations of sight and selfhood as expressions 
of both knowledge and desire.  In the passage from Centuries quoted above, Traherne 
declares that it is important to know one’s own desires because “Wants themselves” are 
“Sacred Occasions and Means of Felicity” (I.43.30).63  In this construction, knowing his 
desires offers Traherne the ability to celebrate a sacred Other who is simultaneously 
different from but also present within himself.  The result of accurately perceiving desire 
then is a greater knowledge of how to locate a concomitant divinity and difference within 
the self.  I will assert that in Traherne’s poetic representation, this desire finds form in the 
body of a hermaphroditic Christ who is both like and unlike Traherne’s desiring subject 
but is always immanently present. 
 
To See and Be Seen as Adam 
When considering the poetry of Thomas Traherne it has become commonplace for critics 
to note both the singularity of his bewildering taxonomies and excessive physiological 
blazons and also how these stylistic choices display Traherne’s desire to marry the 
otherwise fractious bedfellows of faith and reason, the anatomist’s theatre and the temple, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Thomas Traherne, Christian Ethicks, Ed. Carol L. Marks and George Robert Guffey 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 1968).   
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and Neoplatonism with Mechanism.64  Traherne has thus been dubbed a poet who 
burdened himself with the incredible task of “transform[ing] what the anatomist 
displayed into a richer prospect than science could imagine, since he sought to reinvest 
the body with a species of awe and wonder” (Sawday 258).  The desacramentalization 
and objectification that accompanied increasingly mechanist views of the body fall flat in 
the face of Traherne’s supremely connected and wholly felicitous self.  Traherne’s 
expressions of joyful bliss are so abundant that his early biographer Gladys Wade asserts 
that Traherne himself “became one of the most radiantly, most infectiously happy mortals 
this earth has known” (Wade 3), an estimation that derives almost exclusively from his 
frequent allusions to overwhelming sensations of jubilance as a result of connectedness 
with the divine.  For Traherne, this sense of communion with his maker does not register 
in small and passive inklings; rather, Traherne’s happy knowledge of oneness vibrates 
throughout the natural world.  He sees and celebrates God in every feature and form of 
the material world, a world governed by a divine logos that not only gives humans 
dominion over a bright and beautiful universe but also invests their bodies with a 
marvelous internal cosmos all its own.  Indeed, Thomas Traherne is a poet, priest, and 
perhaps even a mystic, who wrote in an age when the explorer’s zeal had turned inward 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Over the last fifty years a great deal of Traherne’s manuscript writings have been 
recovered: in 1964 Select Meditations was identified: in 1981 Commentaries of Heaven 
was properly attributed to Traherne, after being saved from a burning trash heap in 1967, 
and most recently in 1996 and 1997 two more manuscripts were unearthed: “The 
Ceremonial Law”, which had been in the Folger Shakespeare Library since 1958 and also 
a large volume in the Lambeth Palace Library containing “Inducements to Retiredness”, 
“A Somber View”, and “Seeds of Eternity.”  Currently, all of Traherne’s extant works, 
both those published in his lifetime and those discovered in manuscript form only, are for 
the first time being brought together in a collected edition, including commentary, under 
the editorial supervision of Jan Ross with the intent to be published in 2017 through 
Boydell & Brewer Press.   
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and identified the human form as the greatest region of discovery.  Within the caverns of 
the human body lay astounding knowledge, but Traherne, a poet who “reaches down into 
the bones and discovers an altogether different rhetoric of discovery” (Sawday 257), 
claims more than simple knowledge when he ventures into the recesses of the human 
body: he claims revelation.   
 While his poems revel in every inch of intestine and every blush of blood 
coursing through veins, they also firmly position the human body as a type crafted in the 
image of the body incarnate.  For Traherne, each and every human body was intended for 
study, meditation, and ultimately reading in relation to the archetypal body of Christ, a 
body both open for viewing but closed to sin, both suffering and celebrating.  It is his 
desire for intimate communion with this dialectical and divine body that enables Traherne 
to fashion an incarnational poetic that celebrates not only God’s immanence but also the 
fact that humans were created with the inherent ability to see, know, and feel divine 
presence.  Despite his well-noted appreciation for the visible body, Traherne frequently 
gestures to an internal comportment deemed even more important than reveling in 
divinely ordered viscera.65  Traherne articulates a desire to return to a perfect prelapsarian 
time that closes the metaphysical gap between man and his maker.66  This desire comes to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Traherne’s celebration of the body is perhaps best shown in “The Person,” wherein 
Traherne pronounces: “The Naked Things / Are most Sublime, and Brightest shew, / 
When they alone are seen [….] When we all Metaphores remov, / For, Metaphores 
conceal, / And only Vapours prove. / They best are Blazond when we see / The 
Anatomie” (“The Person” 2.1-3, 8-12). 
66 In “‘Organs of Thy Praise’: The Function and Rhetoric of the Body” Gary Kuchar 
notes that Jonathan Sawday’s influential reading of Traherne’s resistance to a wholly 
anatomized, empirically ordered, and thus desacralized, body fails to fully recognize the 
importance of embodiment itself as a mode of knowing both God and the self.  As a 
result, Kuchar asserts that for Traherne, “embodiment and the ‘intermutuality’ that 
follows from it is nothing less than the most intimate dimensions of sacramental 
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bear in Traherne’s insistent celebrations of childhood innocence and his fascination with 
the pure, undiluted sight associated with an infancy that is always figured as prelapsarian.  
In “Eden,” for example, Traherne declares: 
  Those things which first his [Adam’s] Eden did adorn, 
  My Infancy 
  Did crown.  Simplicite 
  Was my Protection when I first was born. 
  Mine Eys those Treasures first did see 
  Which God first made.  The first Effects of Lov 
  My first Enjoyments upon Earth did prov.  (6.1-7) 
 
The Adamic state of childhood Traherne fashions is grounded in the speaker’s ability not 
only to see God’s creation, but also to see it rightly.  As his eyes perceive the “first 
Effects of Lov,” the speaker’s access to felicitous recognition of agapic love is grounded 
in metaphors of sightedness.  When Traherne gains Adamic sight he knows God as Adam 
did.  In this original state of connectedness, Traherne feels neither sensations of need nor 
lack.  It is only in a postlapsarian world that Traherne’s speaker becomes aware of wants, 
needs, and lack when he comes into contact with “Vain Costly Toys, / Swearing and 
roaring Boys, / Shops, Markets, Taverns, Coaches…” (4.2-4); living in this fallen world 
reorients the speaker’s perception so dramatically that “Unwelcom Penitence” (4.1) 
becomes paramount in his thoughts.  As a result of such distractions, Traherne expresses 
incredible desire to return to a place in time, or a spiritual state, when “my Sight, / My 
Ears and Heart did fill, and freely mov” (3.3-4).  In this ideal space, Traherne’s speaker is 
all sensory perception: he is all eyes, ears, and heart, but all of these receptors convey 
information to a self that is solely spiritual, a state that is a direct result of his presence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
experience and knowledge at a point in time when the metaphysical framework 
grounding such sacramentality had begun to shift toward a dualist, and in this respect 
wholly non-sacramental, view of the body/mind relation” (62). 
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Eden, where there are no physical wants.  Instead, in Eden, the only “lack” available to 
prelapsarian man is a divinity that is both present with Adam but absent from him, and 
thus God himself can be the only object of Adam’s desires. 
 In this sense, Traherne’s desire for Adamic purity becomes a fantasy of shutting 
his body off to all external influences, of making it a closed container that cannot be 
penetrated by the world around him, and in doing so, Traherne hopes to fashion an 
Adamic self whose sole desire is God. This brand of prelapsarian desire is perhaps most 
fully expressed in “Dumnesse,” a poem that again longingly reaches back to a childlike 
state of purity: 
  Man was born to Meditat on Things,  
  And to Contemplat the Eternal Springs 
  Of God and Nature, Glory, Bliss and Pleasure;  
  That Life and Love might be his Heavenly Treasure: 
  And therefore Speechless made at first, that he 
  Might in himself profoundly Busied be: 
  And not vent out, before he hath t’ake in  
  Those Antidots that guard his Soul from Sin. 
  Wise Nature made him Deaf too, that he might  
  Not be disturbd, while he doth take Delight 
  In inward Things, nor be depravd with Tongues, 
  Nor Injurd by the Errors and the Wrongs 
  That Mortal Words convey.  For Sin and Death 
  Are most infused by accursed Breath, 
  That flowing from Corrupted Intrails, bear 
  Those hidden Plagues which Souls may justly fear.   
  (ll. 1-16, original emphasis) 
 
Traherne’s intense desire to remove himself from both an oral and aural world issues 
forth a fantasy of isolation contingent upon disabling the speaker’s ability to both 
perceive and create language.  When the speaker is removed from this disabled yet secure 
space, communication with other postlapsarian people proves a destabilizing and even 
contaminating prospect.  Traherne portrays language itself as fallen: the product of a 
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corrupting “Living Vehicle of Wind” (l. 25) that leaves the speaker’s mind “infected” (l. 
26) by the “Mixture” (l. 28).  For Traherne, externals generate contagion, and this 
contagion registers in and on the penetrable body.  By figuring himself as both deaf and 
mute, and thus isolated from the sinfulness of the world, Traherne’s speaker turns inward 
to find “total and unbounded connection with the divine, producing in turn assertions of 
unpermeated self-possession” (Mintz 9).  This sense of self-possession, however, is, as 
Susannah Mintz notes, built entirely upon the absolute reality of Traherne’s sightedness: 
“Only by being able to look (and not simply to imagine, understand, or intellectualize) 
does the subject-speaker of Traherne’s poems make his expansive claims of possession 
and joyfulness” (Mintz 4).67  In the isolation produced by his “Dumnesse,” Traherne’s 
bliss is dependent upon his “Non-Intelligence of Human Words” (l. 21), but even when 
he does open himself up to the world through language he constructs yet another space 
where he might find the spiritual union attributed to this state of isolation. 
 
To See and Be Seen as Christ 
Following his unwholesome “mixture” with the postlapsarian world, “the Holy Door, / Or 
Gate of Souls was closd, and mind being One / With in it self to me alone was Known” 
(“Dumnesse” ll. 28-30).  The communion between Traherne’s speaker and the divine is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 In “Strange Bodies: Thomas Traherne’s Disabled Subject” Mintz very usefully applies 
the language and lens of Disability Studies to Traherne’s metaphoric imaging of himself 
as deaf, mute, and blind.  Ultimately, Mintz argues that Traherne’s entire poetic self-
representation derives from an “ableist” position that appropriates the language of 
disability without addressing the social and material circumstances of the disabled.  As a 
result, the disabled body becomes a foil to Traherne’s ideal and felicitous body, and this 
relationship serves only to “reinforce problematic stereotypes by underwriting the 
hegemony of an idealized, ‘natural,’ wonder-inspiring physical form that strives for order 
against the vagaries of embodiment” (Mintz 20).    
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such that even when he breaks his bliss and engages in fallen speech, he is still able to 
access the divine through a conscious rejection of the contaminating external world; he 
can further quarantine himself by retreating through a “Holy Door” that is closed to 
sinners, but enables him singular access to oneness with God.  Once through this sacred 
doorway, Traherne finds “Cleerer Eys / To see all Creatures full of Deities; / Especially 
Ones self: And to Admire / The Satisfaction of all True Desire” (ll. 40-3).  When 
Traherne moves inward he crosses a threshold between his own body and the body of the 
divine Other that comes to bear in his metaphoric representation of interiority as passing 
through a “Holy Door.”  This imagery draws explicitly from John 10:7-9, wherein Christ 
proclaims, “I am the door of the sheep….I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he 
shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and find pasture.”  In medieval and Roman 
Catholic imagery, Christ’s crucifixion wounds were frequently imaged as doors or 
passageways that, when meditated upon, offered access to divine communion, or in 
Bonaventure’s formulation entrance into Christ’s “wombe” (qtd. in Covington, 164).68  
The spiritual and physical rebirth made available to humanity through Christ’s 
willingness to be wounded underscores Bonaventure’s deployment of the wound-as-
womb metaphor, but it also calls attention to Traherne’s suggestive gestures toward the 
affective tradition that depicts Christ as both feminized and maternal in order to 
emphasize not only his humanity but also his undeniably physical role in ensuring human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The wound-as-door metaphor was a popular touchstone well beyond the medieval 
period.  See, for example, George Herbert’s “The Bag” wherein Christ asserts, in the 
moments directly after receiving his side-wound, “hereafter /…the doore / shall still be 
open” (ll. 37-39).  See also Richard Crashaw, “John 10:7-9. I Am the Door,” Divine 
Epigram #205, ll. 1-2. 
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redemption.69  Through the Christ-as-door metaphor, Traherne reimagines the speaker’s 
desire for the Other as a desire to remove the boundaries between them, to do away with 
the wounds he has experienced in the world by fashioning the Other as present and 
nourishing, as a mother’s womb is to her unborn infant.70  When Traherne’s speaker 
begins to think of himself in such a way, he suddenly understands “True Desire” and also 
identifies the divine as working within all of His creatures.  The figure of “Mother Jesus” 
undergirds this newborn self-perception, and enables Traherne to refigure the relationship 
between his speaker and the Other as one of mutually shared desire. As one of the sheep 
invited through the door to salvation, Traherne’s speaker experiences admiration of both 
the self as one who desires truly and the divine as the truest object of desire.  
 In contrast, when he was solely concerned with external contagion, and thus 
primarily oriented toward the body, he did not recognize this internal grace so readily, 
and his ability to desire rightly was subject to both disease and disability.  It is in the 
reorientation of the speaker’s desire that Gary Kuchar contends that Traherne’s body is   
  figured not only as something in excess of representation, but also   
  operates as one of the central means by which the self realizes a view of  
  itself as “a seeming Intervall between Time and Eternity, the Golden link  
  or Tie of the World, yea the Hymenaeus Marrying the Creator and his  
  Creatures together” (Centuries, 4.74). Operating as a copula within the  
  sacramental grammar of his work (a “hymen”), the body functions   
  mystically, filling up, as it were, the loss inflicted through the   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For the most noted work on Christ’s feminization, see Caroline Walker Bynum, Jesus 
as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkley, Los Angeles, 
and London: U of California P, 1982), 113-34. 
70 In an assessment of George Herbert’s manipulation of the widespread medieval image 
of “Mother Jesus,” Michael Schoenfeldt has persuasively argued that the image of a 
feminized Christ was alive and well in Reformed discourse in England as Christ’s 
nurturing qualities pair with his “willingness to assume a vulnerable body and be entered 
by all opens him up to the contamination of a fallen, and surprisingly feminine, sexuality” 
(Schoenfeldt 282).  
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  desacramentalization of the corpus mysticum. (original emphasis, Divine  
  Subjection 188) 
 
Kuchar’s evocative association between the symbolism of the hymen and mind-body 
relations makes Traherne’s aim to sacralize the body quite clear.  Just as the hymen 
functions as the “door” to the womb, Christ himself functions as the door through which 
salvation for body and soul becomes possible.  In Traherne’s representation of Christ’s 
body as a door, a door that his speaker eagerly enters into, he is reborn.  As a result, his 
sight is fully reoriented toward the internal rather than the external, and his body can be 
read “as a sacred hymn—an embodied psalm, as it were” (Kuchar, Divine Subjection, 
182).  Once this reorientation is initiated, Traherne immediately sings an ecstatic hymn 
celebrating his ability  
  To see, love, Covet, hav, Enjoy and Prais, in one:  
  To Prize and to be ravished: to be true,  
  Sincere and Single in a Blessed View  
  To prize and prais.  (“Dumnesse” ll. 51-4)   
 
In this state of right desire and pure selfhood Traherne can authentically see himself and 
celebrate not only by praising but also by “prizing,” a term that frequently appears in 
Traherne’s poetry and does much to clarify his sense of felicitous oneness with a divine 
Other.  To “prize” something means either to greatly esteem or value it (OED 2a) or to 
offer an evaluation of its monetary worth (OED 1a).  When Traherne declares that he will 
“prize and praise” he invokes both senses of the verb.  He suggests that God is a valuable, 
praiseworthy object of his desire, but Traherne is interested in much more than merely 
“prizing” God—he also desires to be prized.  Thankfully for our speaker the act of 
“prizing” appears reciprocal as Traherne’s divine appraisal is quickly followed by 
ravishment, a confirmation that the divine Other finds him prize-worthy.  Through 
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“prizing,” we are confronted with “Traherne’s theology of desire…because it is in his 
discussion of prizing that we see desire not just as that which indicates or locates treasure, 
or that which awakes in us the infinite, but as a force that purifies our sight and 
transforms our actions” (Inge 107).  Prizing and being prized thus demonstrate desire in 
both the speaker and his God, and in doing so, clarifies the manner in which Traherne’s 
God can appear to be absent but also immanent and accessible within his poetry.   
 The act of prizing confirms the communal relationship between the two, a 
relationship that prompts the speaker to move even further inward.  Following the 
ravishment that confirms God’s estimation of Traherne’s subject-speaker as a prize worth 
the wanting, he proclaims: “Thus was I pent within / A Fort, Impregnable to any Sin” 
(“Dumnesse” ll. 54-5).  Being “pent within” is not only an assertion of interiority, but a 
claim to exclusive access to the most secure hortus conclusus ever created: Eden.  In this 
sense, Traherne’s subject-speaker figures himself as a type of Adam, who himself is a 
pre-type for Christ.71  This rhetorical alignment comes to fruition in the speaker’s 
recognition of himself as the singular object of God’s gaze.  Like Adam and then Christ, 
Traherne’s speaker sees and celebrates himself as God’s most valuable prize.  As the 
single object of God’s “Blessed View” (l. 53), Traherne asserts a sense of oneness with 
God that could only be matched by a prelapsarian Adam or the God incarnate, Christ.72  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The biblical connection between Christ and Adam lies in Christ’s role as the mediator 
through whom Adam’s fall is redeemed.  Adam is thus seen as a pre-type for Christ and 
Christ is seen as a second Adam.  See Romans 5:19-21 and 1 Corinthians 15:21-2. 
72 Traherne’s typological alignment between his subject-speaker and both Christ and 
Adam is perhaps most explicit in the following announcement from “The Salutation”: 
“Long time before / I in my Mother’s Womb was born, / A GOD preparing did this 
Glorious Store, / The World for me adorne. / Into this Eden so Divine and fair, / So Wide 
and Bright, I com his Son and Heir.  (6.1-6). “The Salutation” is the opening poem in 
both the Dobell (1903) and Burney (1910) manuscripts; however, this particular stanza, 
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However, Traherne’s celebrations of communion are entirely contingent upon his speaker 
being “pent within / A Fort, Impregnable” (ll. 54-5).  Depicting the body as impenetrable 
might appear to comfort a subject-speaker deeply concerned with finding security in 
God’s loving gaze, but Traherne’s feelings of being “pent within” suggest that 
recognition of the self as the sole object of God’s gaze might also cause considerable 
apprehension.73   
 The tension between desiring God’s gaze and the unease it might produce 
manifests most clearly when Traherne’s celebrations of impermeability to sin and 
prelapsarian purity intersect with contemporary ocular theories that position the eyes as 
orifices capable of both penetrating and being penetrated by a loving gaze.  Early 
moderns inherited two vying but coexistent interpretations of the mechanism of sight 
from classical Antiquity.74  Plato posits an effluxive theory of vision wherein the eyes 
project beams of light outward that then transmit perceptions of the essential spirits 
emitted by external objects.  This Platonic theory of extramission was further refined by 
Galen, who engenders the eye with even greater creative force as it transmits a “visual 
pneuma” that imposes form upon the essential spirits it comes into contact with.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the sixth of the otherwise seven stanza poem, was removed in the Burney MS, 
presumably by its editor Philip Traherne.  
73 According to the OED, to be “pent” as: “shut up within narrow limits; closely 
confined; held back under pressure” (1).   
74 For more on classical sources detailing the workings of vision, see Sergei Lobanov-
Rostovsky, “Taming the Basilisk,” in The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in 
Early Modern Europe, eds. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (London: Routledge, 1997), 
195-217; and also, Lance K. Donaldson-Evans, Love’s Fatal Glance: A Study of Eye 
Imagery in the Poets of the Ecole Lyonnaise, Romance Mongraphs 39 (University of 
Mississippi, 1980). 
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contrast, Aristotle offers an ocular theory of intromission where the eye functions as 
receptacle to the essential spirits radiating outward from objects of vision.  The 
extramission theory thus denies the eye “the aggressive and dynamic quality implicitly 
vested in them by the platonic theory” (Donaldson-Evans 13), while intromission 
presents sight as “the painful reception of tiny images sent out by the objects of vision, 
and as an intrusion of things upon the eye and mind” (Westeijn 151).  These theories 
merge in erotically charged Renaissance poetry that genders the penetrable, womblike 
Aristotelian eye as female and the penetrating, transforming, power of the Platonic-
Galenic eye as male.  In the language of love, and particularly the Petrarchan conceit of 
the eroticized eye, the lover’s eye might emit ocular darts that first penetrate the 
beloved’s eyes and then penetrate her soul just as the ocular rays emanating from her 
beauty might dangerously mingle with the lover’s blood making him all the more 
receptive to her image.  In this poetic tradition, love is conceived through a swirl of 
wounding, penetrating, and imprinting gazes that can leave both parties indelibly altered.  
As Robert Burton notes in The Anatomy of Melancholy, the “Eye betrays the soul and is 
both Active and Passive in this business; it wounds and is wounded, is an especial cause 
and instrument, both in the subject and in the object” (qtd. in Lobanov-Rostovksy, 203).  
In Burton’s estimation, eyes are figured as both active and passive, the matter and maker 
through which love is conceived, and thus to gaze or be gazed upon lovingly is to enter 
into a battle where ocular beams engage the penetrable early modern body and ultimately 
place Traherne’s eye/I formulation at considerable risk. 
 It comes as no surprise then, that when Traherne blissfully envisions himself shut 
off from the fallen world and the sole object of God’s gaze, he faces the discomfiting 
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recognition that despite his best efforts to render the body impregnable, if he desires 
God’s loving gaze he cannot escape penetration.  The vision of a self almost hermetically 
sealed from sin thus functions as an ideal that is both supported and destabilized by the 
very ocular theories Traherne employs to construct it. Traherne’s interest in fashioning 
such an ideal subject-speaker does much to underscore Gary Kuchar’s assertion that 
Traherne’s poetry “constructs a vision of the ideally praising subject that is grounded 
upon a deepened focus on experience and consciousness vis-à-vis embodied existence” 
(Kuchar, Divine Subjection, 182).  I agree with Kuchar’s evaluation of Traherne’s 
relationship with the body—Traherne’s speaker, mystical as he may at times appear, is 
not interested in crafting a vatic devotional subject removed entirely from the reality of 
embodiment.  Traherne is so deeply concerned with embodiment that rather than 
retreating from a body that cannot be made perfectly impenetrable, he fashions a subject 
capable of ideally praising God by investing his subject-speaker’s body with a transitivity 
that encourages the very doubleness Burton attributes to the eye, an organ that itself 
crosses boundaries by being simultaneously active and passive, male and female.  It is in 
this manipulation of ocular theories that Traherne develops an ideal subject in typological 
alignment with the body of Christ, a body that is also traditionally figured as active and 
passive, male and female, open for viewing but closed to sin. 
 For example, in the poem “Sight” Traherne invites his readers to consider how 
both ocular theories contribute to the eye/I construction of selfhood that undergirds his 
poetics.75  Traherne writes: 
  Mine Infant-Ey 
  […] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 “Sight” appears in the Burney MS and not in the Dobell MS. 
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  Did make me see 
  Two Sights in me, 
  Three Eys adorn’d my Face: 
  Two Luminaries in my Flesh 
  Did me refresh; 
  But one did lurk within, 
  Beneath my Skin, 
  That was of greater Worth than both the other; 
  For those were Twins; but this had ne’r a Brother.  (ll. 1-12) 
The importance of sightedness to Traherne’s selfhood is paramount as he explicitly 
juxtaposes the fleshly physical eyes against the immaterial spiritual eye of the soul, but 
this very construction places Traherne’s inescapable doubleness at the forefront: he is a 
man who desires the spirit alone but finds himself encased in flesh.  This sense of 
doubleness is structured upon ocular theories that position the eye as both penetrable and 
penetrating as well as a multivalent archetype evocative of spiritual enlightenment but 
also a representation of female genitalia, the womb even.76  According to Carl Jung, the 
eye’s archetypal relation to female genitalia underscores the eye as a symbol for 
newfound enlightenment that begins with rebirth or a symbolic return to the womb of the 
mother and reentry into the physical world as an indelibly altered, enlightened, 
individual.77  In his desires to become solely spiritual, Traherne has figured his speaker as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The metaphoric sexualization and gendering of the eye was frequently employed in 
Shakespearean language where the “eye” became a common pun for vagina (Williams 
118).  
77 Carl Jung identifies the eye as one of the suprapersonal archetypes that span both 
culture and time to form humanity’s collective unconscious.  Jung specifically identifies 
the gendered aspects of the eye as an archetype at work in both Eastern and Western 
religious iconography and imagery.  Specifically, he points to the Hindu story of Indra 
who was punished for his wanton behavior with representations of female genitalia all 
over his body that were then exchanged for eyes as a symbol of his renewal when he was 
forgiven (Symbols 268). Likewise, the multi-eyed and multi-sided Hindu figure of Shiva 
is styled as an excessive individual catapulting between hedonism and asceticism who 
only finds balance through his wife, Parvati.  Shiva’s third eye represents his wisdom, but 
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all eye, both an active agent and a passive receptacle.  This doubleness comes to bear in 
Traherne’s representation of extramission as he declares,  
  Those Eys of Sense 
  That did dispense 
  Their Beams to nat’ral things,    
  I quickly found      
  In narrow Bound  
  To know but earthly Springs. 
  But that which throu the Hevens went 
  Was excellent, 
  And Endless; for the Ball   
  Was Spirit’ all: 
  A visiv Ey things visible doth see; 
  But with th’ Invisible, Invisibles agree.  (ll. 13-24) 
Traherne’s rendering of extramission suggests that the pneuma radiating outward from 
his “visiv eye” is capable of perceiving only that which is equally as physical as the eye 
and its beams, but the eye that was styled as being of “greater Worth” (l. 11) in the first 
stanza is able to project its beams outward to that which is also invisible precisely 
because it too lacks matter.   
 This double sight encourages Traherne to view himself as an active, even potent, 
agent in the world precisely because, “One World was not…Ev’n then enough for me” 
(ll. 25-7).  As a result of his perception that he is a master of that which can be seen and 
also that which cannot, Traherne’s speaker claims an implicitly masculine desire: 
 New Regions I must see. 
 In distant Coasts new Glories I 
 Did long to spy: 
 What this World did present 
 Could not content (ll. 30-4). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
he is also frequently imaged as half man and half woman, a representation that speaks to 
the insight that accompanies Shiva’s balance through Parvati. 
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When Traherne’s speaker describes the process of sight through extramission and 
simultaneously demands to see new regions of the world, he suggests a desire to conquer, 
transform, and make the world his own precisely because in this ocular theory “the eye is 
both sovereign and implicitly male: it engenders the visible world by its projection of 
spiritual substance” (Lobanov-Rostovsky 198).  Traherne’s self-directive to essentially 
see the world into being thus functions as a particularly male imperative: his desire to 
inscribe himself upon the world follows the popular representation of literary creation as 
childbirth, a relatively commonplace metaphor amongst male writers of the seventeenth 
century.78  In this construction, Traherne’s representation of sightedness seems to fall in 
line with the phallocentric discourse of seventeenth-century literary production wherein 
masculine creativity works as a projection of sexual potency precisely because, following 
the theory of extramission Traherne outlines above, his male subject-speaker engenders 
being through both the force of his sight and the power of Traherne’s pen.  
 However, Traherne’s concentrated focus on his speaker’s inherent doubleness 
precludes this masculine desire from being read as either wholly spiritual, as in a desire to 
discover new regions of the soul, or wholly physical, as in a desire to conquer the world 
through the transformative power of sight.  Traherne’s speaker acknowledges this 
ambiguity when he concludes the stanza by declaring, “But, while I look’d on Outward 
Beauties here, / Most earnestly expected Others there” (ll. 35-6, original emphasis).  The 
masculine agency Traherne gestures toward is complicated by the recognition that he 
expects outward beauty here in the external world to produce inward beauties there in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For a detailed discussion of this topos amongst seventeenth-century male poets, see L. 
E. Semler, “The Protestant Birth Ethic: Aesthetic, Political, and Religious Contexts for 
Eliza’s Babes (1652),” ELR 30.3 (2000): 432-56 (esp. 433-34). 
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soul; he expects to be penetrated just as he desires to penetrate.  He also expects this 
penetration to be productive, and it is: stanza four is entirely focused on the “Som such 
thing” (l. 41) generated within the mind as the result of his perception of external beauty.  
The clumsiness of this expression alone suggests a lack of mastery, perhaps even 
recognition that Traherne’s subject-speaker is not truly able to consider himself the potent 
and active male spectator he so desired to present himself to be.  Instead, his assurance is 
undone by his doubleness, and he cannot escape the sensations of lack that find 
expression in his inability to master his own speech.   
 Such a construction appears to counter Stanley Fish’s claims that an authoritative 
masculine speaker cannot voice masculine creative authority unless he is presented with a 
feminine principle that “provides him with the occasion of self-assertion” (Fish 229).  In 
Fish’s estimation, the blank page presents the male poet with a “female passivity” open 
for inscription by the male poet’s pen (Fish 228), a pen that feminist literary critics have 
equated with the phallus.79  The feminine principle available to Traherne to assert himself 
upon may be his manuscript, but the feminine principle he makes available to his subject-
speaker to assert masculine authority upon and through is Nature herself, an entity 
emitting rays of beauty that generates much more anxiety than authority over the “Som 
such Thing” (l. 41) produced within him as a result of this contact with Nature’s beauty.  
The combination of Traherne’s subject-speaker recognizing his own penetrability while 
also being unable to articulate the precise nature of his mind contributes to a subjectivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Feminist criticism has convincingly documented the link between linguistic 
representation and the phallus.  See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. 
Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975); Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, The 
Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986); Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic (New Haven: Yale UP, 1979). 
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which is, in his own words, caught between “here” (l. 35) and “there” (l. 36), neither 
entirely in the physical world nor the spiritual world, and neither wholly male nor wholly 
female.  Instead, Traherne’s speaker both shapes the world and is shaped by externally 
penetrating agents in the world.  In this duality Traherne’s subject-speaker may be read as 
a metaphoric hermaphrodite, a being Ovid describes as “both and neither” (DeVun 194, 
emphasis added). 
  
To See the Self as Both and Neither 
Just as ocular theories attributed male and female characteristics to the eye through the 
language of activity and passivity, Traherne’s gender transitivity is evocative of 
contemporary speculation over the nature of human conception and the gender 
doubleness that was considered a natural outcome of the mixing between male and 
female seed within the private and mysterious recesses of the womb.  Following in the 
same vein as their theoretical counterparts of extramission and intromission, the 
Aristotelian argument that the male “seed” was hotter and therefore a more active 
reproductive agent than the female component was equally as popular as the Galenic 
position that conception was the result of co-mingling between the male and female 
elements where either could dominate but not fully extinguish the other.  As a result, 
Anthony Fletcher has argued, “there was seen to be in everyone some trace at birth of 
gender doubleness…belief in the mingling of [woman’s] seed with their own in the 
womb made it impossible for men to think of themselves as wholly gendered male beings 
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until they had struggled free of maternal making and maternal influence” (58-9).80  Given 
the contemporary opacity surrounding conception and the activity of the male and female 
agents within the maternal body, it thus becomes important for early modern men to 
confirm maleness.  Mental creativity provides a likely means to prove distinction from 
the feminine as Galenic models of the humoral body attributed intellectual dexterity with 
the dry and hot bodies equated with masculinity.  As a result, the Spanish physician Juan 
Huarte de San Juan can confidently assert: 
  To think that a woman can be hot and dry, or endowed with wit and ability 
  conformable to these two qualities, is a very great error; because if the  
  seed of which she was formed, had been hot and dry in their domination,  
  she should have been born a man, and not a woman…she was by God  
  created cold and moist, which temperature, is necessary to make a woman  
  fruitful and apt for childbirth, but an enemy to knowledge.  
  (qtd. in Eisaman Maus Inwardness 183-4)  
 
In Huarte’s estimation, maleness is as much a mental predisposition to creativity and 
ability as it is a result of chromosomal dominance that initiates within the womb but 
carries on without.  To be female was to be a passive but fertile receptacle to the active 
male agent.  The hermaphrodite, however, was a liminal figure, the result, according to 
Aristotle, of an excess of the passive reproductive material contributed by the mother 
(DeVun 197).  Within the transitive body of the hermaphrodite, as it is in the transitive 
organ of the eye, lay the ability to be active and passive, both and neither.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Fletcher’s assertion, I think, lends considerable context to the popularity of the literary 
childbirth conceit amongst male authors; it is also worth noting, however, that Elizabeth 
D. Harvey has drawn correlations between male usage of this trope and the 
medicalization of pregnancy and birth by male physicians seeking to replace female 
midwives and thus refashion the previously female domain of the birthing chamber.  See 
Harvey, Ventriloquized Voices: Feminist Theory and English Renaissance Texts (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 76-115. 
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 This duality positions the hermaphrodite as an apt, albeit potentially surprising, 
metaphor for Christ from the late Middle Ages through the seventeenth century.  As both 
the Son of God and also the body through which all of humanity is reborn, Christ is both 
male and maternal, divine and human.  In this sense, Christ is, like the hermaphrodite, 
liminal, both and neither. As is the case with the affective piety of the high Middle Ages 
that popularized the image of the hermaphroditic Christ, Traherne’s devotional verse 
emphasizes creation and incarnation much more than atonement and judgment.81  The 
mystery of the incarnation finds form in the image of the hermaphrodite as it enables 
Traherne to assert a plasticity of identity for his subject-speaker by positioning him in 
direct relation to what Michel de Certeau claims is the chief focus of seventeenth-century 
mysticism: “to produce a mystic body…an alien body against which the institution of 
medicine would eventually win out in imposing a scientific body” (85).  In this assertion, 
de Certeau describes early modern Catholicism and Protestantism as adhering to an 
invisible/visible binary wherein the Protestant arm favored the visual in its privileging of 
the scriptural corpus while the Catholic arm aligns with the invisible in its privileging of 
the sacrament.  The result, according to de Certeau, is that until the mid-seventeenth 
century, the mystical body functioned as the “other” in relation to visible realities (84-5).  
When Traherne positions his subject-speaker across gendered divides, he actively invites 
readers to look across binary constructs and gendered modes of writing and reorient their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Caroline Walker Bynum writes that “concentration on the Eucharist and on Christ’s 
suffering in the Passion, which increases in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century devotions, 
is not primarily a stress on the sacrifice needed to bridge the enormous gap between us in 
our sin and God in his glory; it is rather an identification with the fact that Christ is what 
we are” (Jesus as Mother 130). 
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sight to embrace the inherent duality within themselves, and thus come to perceive an 
alien but accessible divine Other already within the self. 
  In the poem “Fullnesse,” for example, Traherne ties his speaker’s revelation of 
divine love specifically to an experience of embodiment that crosses gender lines, and in 
doing so, gestures specifically toward our inherent duality.  He describes the recognition 
of agapic love as, 
  The Mirror of an Endless Life, 
  The Shadow of a Virgin Wife, 
  A Spiritual World Standing within, 
  An Univers enclosed in Skin. 
  My Power exerted, or my Perfect Being, 
  If not Enjoying, yet an Act of Seeing. (ll. 5-10) 
 
As the poem’s title suggests, this “Act of Seeing” produces a “Fullnesse” within the 
speaker that utilizes the language of pregnancy to convey the intimate and mysterious 
bond shared between the divine Other and the speaker.  Through recognition of how 
agapic love works from within to reorient his perception of the self, the speaker comes to 
recognize an enigmatic internal duality that generates an entirely new conception of the 
self.  When Traherne’s subject-speaker describes himself as “an Act of Seeing” he invites 
readers to reimagine his eye/I construction of selfhood as generating a subjectivity that is 
formulated upon the active and passive, penetrating and penetrable qualities of the eye.  
As such, Traherne’s subject-speaker becomes ideal precisely because he embodies the 
very transitivity attributed to a hermaphroditic Christ.  The metaphors he selects in this 
brief passage do much to convey his newfound sense of not just any duality, but of an 
otherness projecting well beyond the speaker’s purview.  In his own representation he 
becomes a mirror and a shadow, both reflective items that tender access to idyllic states 
of being in the form of “an Endless Life” and “a Virgin Wife.”  Traherne’s ideal subject 
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finds form in his frequent gestures to mirror imagery and the importance of sightedness 
as the means by which the devotional subject can become an inward-looking and 
authentic spectator of the self’s mystical alien aspects. 
 Traherne’s interest in sightedness and his frequent tropes on mirrors and 
mirroring work to develop a prosthetized relation between his speaker and a God who 
desires him as much as He is desired.  The poem “Amendment,” for example, includes a 
stanza devoted to an ecstatic questioning of the soul’s nature: Traherne wonders, “is my 
Soul a Mirror that must Shine / Even like the Sun, and be far more Divine?” (5.6-7).82  
By invoking the metaphor of a mirror that ideally reflects something “far more Divine” 
than itself, the speaker imagines God’s desiring gaze shining down upon him and then 
reflecting back a confirmation of shared desire.  The tone of the question is hopeful.  The 
speaker wants this mirror metaphor to prove true, but if the soul is indeed the most valued 
component and truest formulation of the self, then imaging the soul as a mirror presents 
the speaker with yet another potentially anxiety-inducing dilemma.  Sight of the “real” 
self may offer an uncomfortable recognition of the self as simultaneously self and other 
as the external presence reflected in the mirror is suggestive of the reality within, but can 
only function as an insufficient sign of that internal reality.  The mirror does not offer any 
assurance that what we see will correlate with our self-conception.  The fact that 
Traherne constructs this mirror image in the form of a question confirms the uneasy truth 
that he has no assurance the reflection gazing back at him will pair with the self he 
desires to see.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The poem “Amendment” appears in the Dobell MS, but not in the Burney MS.  
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 Anxiety over a potential discrepancy between one’s reflection and self-conception 
extends well beyond Traherne’s invocation of mirror imagery.  The fact that mirror 
imagery appears in Western literature from the medieval period onward, roughly 
following the wide-scale production and dissemination of mirrors both on and beyond the 
continent, suggests considerable concern over how mirrors might, or might not, offer 
access to the “real” self.83  Early modern mirrors, although much improved from their 
medieval precursors, were as likely to distort images, as they were to display them.  As a 
result, Deborah Shuger has argued that early moderns might envisage more than their real 
forms when they gazed into mirrors.  The mirror could reveal an ideal form, as the devout 
viewer might see the image of Christ through the mirror, or, in contrast, the mirror might 
reveal uncomfortable truths about the viewer as its own pneumatic rays penetrate the 
body’s surface and peer deep into the viewer’s soul to mirror back knowledge of 
sinfulness or reprobation.84  As a real material object, Frederick Goldin claims the early 
modern mirror has the unique capacity to 
  consider both the matter and form together.  The mirror awakens our  
  consciousness of the idea by translating it into sensible images.  It shows  
  us an image of eternal beauty….But that image is fleeting, it has no  
  substance; and we must learn how to leave the mirror behind and to love a  
  being that is invisible and immutable. (178) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For a more detailed discussion of mirrors and mirror technology in the Renaissance, 
see Herbert Grabes, The Mutable Glass: Mirror-Imagery in Titles and Texts of the 
Middle-Ages and English Renaissance, trans. Gordon Collier (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1982); Edward P. Nolan, Now Through a Glass Darkly: Specular Images of Being 
and Knowing (Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1990); and Faye Tudor, “‘All in him 
selfe as in a glass he sees’: Mirrors and Vision in the Renaissance,” in Renaissance 
Theories of Vision, eds. John Shannon and Charles H. Carman (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2010), 171-86.  
84 See Deborah Shuger, “The ‘I’ of the Beholder: Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive 
Mind,” in Renaissance Culture and the Everyday, eds. Patricia Fumerton and Simon 
Hunt (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1999), 21-41. 
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In Goldin’s rendering the mirror bridges the divide between the real and the ideal or the 
earthly and the divine, but it also speaks to a very real problem for early modern believers 
gazing into a mirror hoping to confirm divine desire.  This is precisely the case for 
Traherne, and as a result the mirror images that appear in his poetry enable the speaker to 
discern not only divine desire but also an authentic sense of the dual self. 
 Returning now to Traherne’s ponderous question regarding the reflective nature 
of his soul, and whether it truly does mirror back divine love, it is no surprise to find that 
he wastes little time toying with so potent an image.  In the stanza immediately following 
his query Traherne offers the following response, and in doing so renders his question 
rhetorical: 
  Thy Soul, O GOD, doth prize 
  The Seas, the Earth, our Souls, the Skies, 
  As we return the same to Thee; 
  They more delight thine Eys, 
  And Sweeter be, 
  As unto Thee we Offer up the same, 
  Then as to us, from Thee at first they came. (“Amendment” 6.1-7) 
 
Traherne resolves the tension the mirror might have evoked by clearly affirming that 
when he looks into his soul, he sees God gazing and prizing, and in return reciprocates 
the very divine love God has tendered.  The mirror thus offers Traherne’s subject-speaker 
much more than simple confirmation of divine desire: it offers him the ability to respond 
to agapic love appropriately, by reflecting it back.  As a result, he is able to ecstatically 
exclaim, “O how doth Sacred Lov / His Gifts refine, Exalt, Improve!” (“Amendment” 
7.1-2).  Traherne’s ability to love, to prize, and to praise God is grounded in his mirroring 
back the love he receives, and in this swirling exchange it seems as though the “Sacred 
Lov” issued back to God is nothing less than divine love itself.  The speaker’s soul, the 
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mirror that love is channeled through, thus offers Traherne’s subject-speaker the ability to 
not only receive divine desire, but also the ability to come to envision an “other” image 
of the divine within the self capable of emitting divine love. 
 In this regard, mirror imagery proves the foundation for Traherne’s argument that 
the ideally praising subject must be able to see and reflect what is simultaneously present 
and not present within him.  As the mirror image of agapic love, the speaker’s soul 
becomes “A living endless Ey” and “an inward Sphere of Light, / Or an interminable Orb 
of Sight” (“The Præparative” 2.2, 5-6).  In this ideal state Traherne’s subject-speaker is 
“thus prepar’d for all Felicity” (5.1).  The sacramental nature of this newfound self-
perception is undeniable, as the speaker has progressed from mere assertions of 
prelapsarian purity to ecstatic exclamations of divine union so intense that the speaker 
finally cannot conceive of himself as autonomous from the divine Other.  This 
construction of the self encourages the speaker to sublate any perception of self that is not 
in connection with the divine.  In this self conception, Traherne appears to write in what 
Nancy Chodorow has called a feminine devotional mode shaped by culturally produced 
values and practices that encouraged women to “experience a sense of self-in-relation 
that is in contrast to men’s creation of a self that wishes to deny relation and connection” 
(viii).  As a male poet interested in crafting a relational model of selfhood, Traherne 
appears to defy critical constructions of the devotional mode as adhering to strictly 
gendered lines; instead, Traherne’s intentional blurring of the male/female binary 
problematizes the construction of the self as either wholly male or wholly female. 
 This mode of self-fashioning enables Traherne to craft extraordinarily rich 
connections between the body of Christ and the body of the believer, and in doing so 
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Traherne demonstrates interest in fashioning an “ideally praising subject” (Kuchar, 
Divine Subjection, 182) who is ideal precisely because his body, like Christ’s, invites us 
inward to revel in being both and neither, foreign and familiar.  This newfound sense of 
self, however, requires a great deal of work to fully reorient the speaker’s sight from the 
visible/invisible, male/female binary modes of perception.  In order to achieve this task, 
Traherne once again shapes his speaker into a prelapsarian Adam whose desire is 
naturally oriented toward God.  In the poem “Silence,” for example, Traherne expresses 
desire to perform the self-same work Adam is tasked with as he declares, “The Inward 
Work is the Supreme: for all / The other were occasioned by the Fall” (ll. 3-4).  In 
Traherne’s styling, the “work” of Adamic man was simply to look “in himself to feel his 
Bliss, to view / His Sacred Treasures” (ll. 22-3).  However, this “inward work” requires 
insight and evaluation as Traherne’s would-be-Adam must do more than simply exult in 
the many treasures available to him in the prelapsarian world.  Traherne issues two 
proximate lists that order his speaker’s internal work: he must first, “See, Prize, Give 
hearty Thanks within, and Love” (l. 25), and secondly, “see, Approve, take Pleasure, and 
rejoice” (l. 29).  Traherne’s injunction to “see” first and foremost conveys the importance 
of knowledge and understanding as the most essential tools of evaluation, for it is 
evaluation in the form of prizing and approval that enables thankfulness, love, pleasure, 
and ultimately the ability to rejoice.  These lists employ the language of the rising market 
economy, an economy increasingly based upon speculation and a reformulation of value 
and worth in purely commercial terms.  As such, this economic language betrays a truth 
about Traherne’s speaker: he may claim Adamic purity and prelapsarian sight, but he is 
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deeply anxious about his worth, his prize-worthiness, and his own desire for divine 
appraisal.85   
 This anxiety proves the impetus to more fully fashion the self as Adamic, and by 
virtue of the typological association between Christ and Adam, as Christ-like.  Only 
when the speaker is able to view the inward work as the most important work available to 
him can he move to man’s true calling: “to Enjoy him, and to Imitate / The Life and 
Glory of his High Estate” (ll. 37-8).  Traherne thus constructs an ideal subject-speaker 
who consciously values, or “prizes” a life lived in divine imitation.  Once this choice is 
made, the speaker is able to fully articulate his experience of divine love: 
  All Spirit, Life and Power,  
  All Lov and Joy, in his Eternal Bower. 
  A World of Innocence as then was mine, 
  In which the Joys of Paradice did shine  
  And while I was not here I was in Heaven, 
  Not resting one, but evry Day in Seven. (ll. 45-50) 
 
In this explanation, Traherne’s speaker moves beyond simple imitation of the divine: he 
expresses union.  To describe himself as experiencing not only the joys of Eden, but also 
being with the divine Other in “his Eternal Bower” suggests incredible intimacy.  This 
intimacy is enabled by the security of a space protected from all forms of sin and 
sinfulness, as the speaker makes clear in his assertion that “No other Customs, New-
found Wants, or Dreams / Invented here polluted my pure Streams” (ll. 55-6).  The 
speaker’s anxiety over pollution, or a corruption that might open the speaker to unwanted 
impurities, is evidenced further in his final assertion before entering the bower: “There’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 For more on economic language and imagery in Traherne’s canon, see David Hawkes, 
“Thomas Traherne: A Critique of Political Economy,” Huntington Library Quarterly 
62:3-4 (1999): 369-88.  See also Denise Inge, Wanting like A God: Desire and Freedom 
in Thomas Traherne (London: SCM Press, 2009), 110-23. 
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no Contagion here” (l. 60).  Traherne’s angst over spiritual contagion, and his adamant 
pronouncement that his streams are not polluted, offers a suggestive reading of a bower 
in which joy and love can be fully experienced.  Traherne’s bower is meant to be wholly 
spiritual, but the language is altogether corporeal, betraying apprehension over the state 
of the body in a realm defined entirely by desire.   
 To counter the concern that sexual desire might supplant spiritual desire, 
Traherne’s speaker issues the following pronouncement: “An unperceived Donor gave all 
Pleasures, / There nothing was but I, and all my Treasures” (ll. 61-2).  The closed recess 
of a bower populated solely by pleasure is reminiscent of the sensual delights offered in 
Spenser’s Bower of Bliss, but this potentially carnal association is quickly abandoned as 
Traherne’s speaker clarifies the nature of the pleasures offered within: 
  The Union was so Strait between them two,  
  That all was eithers which my Soul could view. 
  His Gifts, and my Possessions, both our Treasures; 
  He mine, and I the Ocean of his Pleasures. 
  He was an Ocean of Delights from Whom 
  The Living Springs and Golden Streams did com: 
  My Bosom was an Ocean into which  
  They all did run.  And me they did enrich.  (ll. 67-74) 
 
The union that takes place is thus figured as deeply reciprocal, where the divine is so 
“other” to Traherne’s speaker that he can only be articulated as an “unperceived donor” 
who brings gifts and also receives the speaker’s bountiful treasures.  Although each party 
is intensely different than the other, they are each enriched by the mutual flow of gifts 
between the two.  Their union is both joyful and sensual, an emulation of the erotic 
blazons in Song of Solomon, particularly the passages that describe the beloved as both 
unspotted (Song of Solomon 4:7) and also as a pure spring discharging clear streams 
(Song of Solomon 4:12).   
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 Traherne desires to see himself as the ideal object of desire portrayed in Song of 
Solomon, but his erotically charged rendering of the private interior space within the 
bower moves toward a violation of the very bodily boundaries he has so anxiously 
constructed.  This violation of the body’s borders comes in the overtly sexual expression 
of their union as undulating waves of pleasure that enrich the speaker by exceeding and 
overwhelming his physical boundaries—the gift that Traherne’s divine Other brings into 
the bower is a jouissance so excessive it dissolves the speaker’s body.  In the same vein 
as some of Crashaw’s most controversial baroque imagery, both the speaker and his 
beloved Other are reduced to liquid. As their spirits intermingle in what appears to be a 
procreative process of unification they become “Ocean[s] of Delight” to each other, and 
the speaker’s bosom brims over with “Living and Golden Streams.”86  The result of this 
consanguinity is the perception of “A vast and Infinit Capacitie” (l. 75) that makes the 
speaker’s bosom “like the Deitie” (l. 76).  The union between speaker and the previously 
unperceived donor is far removed from the physical coupling Traherne’s eroticism 
gestures toward.  His newborn perception of personal and unmediated access to the 
divine derives specifically from the speaker’s liquefaction and the disintegration of 
bodily boundaries.  This wholly spiritual imaging removes the threat of external 
penetration and contagion precisely because the highly pleasurable interrelation between 
donor and speaker is anything but the result of an externally penetrating agent.  As his 
body becomes more and more difficult to perceive as his own matter, the speaker 
becomes increasingly capable of perceiving the divine as a type of mnemic residue that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 This imagery also appears to draw from Song of Solomon 4, wherein the beloved is 
described as “a fountain of gardens, a well of living waters, and streams from Lebanon” 
(4:15). 
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has always been imprinted within his bosom—Traherne’s subject-speaker thus comes to 
recognize an all-encompassing but un-invasive Other who has always been present within 
himself.   
 Given this transitivity across physical boundaries, the speaker’s self-perception 
shifts entirely away from external forms at the close of “Silence.” This becomes clear 
when he asserts: “For so my spirit was an Endless Sphere, / Like God himself, and 
Heaven and Earth was there” (ll. 85-6).  Like the divine Other whom he now fully 
perceives, the speaker comes to recognize himself as boundless, which in turn reinforces 
the Other’s desire for the speaker, who has himself become an ideal subject worthy of 
being prized.  Through the speaker’s newfound recognition of the Other within himself, 
the physical, earthly body has been renovated into celestial flesh, but this does not mean 
Traherne abandons the body or simply renders it an empty vessel for the divine spirit to 
fill.  Traherne’s object is to fashion a speaker who is capable of not only identifying 
otherness within himself, but also attuning his desire toward this present Other in an 
effort to experience a sense of felicitous union.  Figuring himself as an “Endless Sphere” 
enables just such an attunement as the speaker imagines himself a body of polyphonous 
love with no beginning or end, but circling back to a divine Other who takes as much 
pleasure in him as He gives.   
 This self-conception is just that—self-conceiving.  The union between the self and 
newly perceived but always present Other is generative in that the “conception” produces 
a deeply felt perception of a self-in-relation-to-Other that takes place wholly within the 
self.  In this regard, the liquescent and procreant union that occurs inside Traherne’s 
enclosed bower is reminiscent of yet another internalized, fecund, and liquid landscape: 
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the womb.  Throughout his devotional verse Traherne gestures to the female womb 
frequently, and consistently represents the womb as a desirably generative space.  In 
“The Return,” for example, Traherne’s subject-speaker not only announces, “My early 
Tutor is the Womb: / I still my Cradle lov” (ll. 3-4), but also passionately “Perceiv[es] it 
safest to abide / An Infant still; and therefore fly/ […] to the Womb, / That I may yet 
New-born becom” (ll. 9-10, 12-14).87  In these representations, the womb presents a 
metaphoric space where the speaker can access not only the particular security available 
to unborn infants but also the purity available to those yet to be tainted with original sin 
or the temptations of the fallen world.   
 In this sense, the womb functions as the apogee of Traherne’s desire for 
prelapsarian purity, but womb imagery also explains his subject-speaker’s most basic 
expectation for his soul.  For example, in “The Estate” Traherne’s subject-speaker 
ponders:  
  Shall I becom 
  Within my self a Living Tomb 
  Of useless Wonders?  Shall the fair, and brave, 
  And great Endowments of my Soul lie Waste; 
  Which ought to be a Fountain and a Womb   
  Of Praises unto Thee? (ll. 5-10) 
 
The outcome of such an inquiry is a profound emphasis on both productivity and 
usefulness as key components to the speaker’s conception of self.  With the soul figured 
as either a tomb filled with useless wonder or a womb actively producing divine praise, it 
is obvious which option the speaker finds most desirable.  If the object of the speaker’s 
desire is an intimate union with the divine Other, the comparison between a womb and a 
tomb makes it quite clear that Traherne’s speaker must be useful; he must render himself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 “The Return” appears in the Burney MS, but not in the Dobell MS. 
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productive.  It is in this representation that Traherne’s gender transitivity truly finds form.  
Rather than figuring the womb as a purely enclosed and private space removed from the 
penetrating eyes of the world, and thus a safe space for his speaker to craft subjectivity 
and selfhood, Traherne links the activity of a flowing fountain and a womb that nourishes 
and incubates that which is within.  The weight of this passage is thus on the importance 
of the internal being made external, a movement outward rather than a retreat within.  In 
contrast, the “Living Tomb” is described with a resoundingly negative adjective: it is 
“useless” precisely because what is contained within cannot flow outward; it is self-
contained and sealed off.   
 This isolation points to the very state Traherne so adamantly desired in his poems 
“Dumnesse” and “Silence,” but this depiction of isolation and containment appears 
entirely pejorative.  If, as Susannah Mintz notes, Traherne is interested in 
“demarcate[ing] the boundaries of the normal body” (Mintz 18), he must attend to the 
fact that a “normal” body cannot ever be fully sealed—it must be penetrable and it must 
be productive.  The womb is an ideal image for such an argument as its inscrutability 
renders it an apt metaphorical space to craft and secure an otherwise vulnerable and 
unstable subjectivity, but it is also a bodily organ whose “normal” function is to expel 
and make visible that which it once concealed.  Pointing to the metaphoric linkage 
between the womb and the enclosed gardens, little rooms, and prison cells favored by 
male poets like Carew, Donne, and Lovelace, Katherine Eisaman Maus asserts:  
  the appeal of the woman’s body, then, for a man who wants a subjective  
  refuge, seems to be the way it is closed in upon itself, the way her interior  
  is protected by opaque bodily perimeters.  At the same time, as an emblem 
  of a “closed” subjectivity the female body is defective insofar as it is  
  penetrable, insofar as it is, in fact, a sort of paradigm of penetrability.  
  (Inwardness 193) 
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Insofar as the female body’s penetrability renders it “defective” in the construction of a 
securely fashioned masculine subjectivity, this self-same “deficiency” renders it a deeply 
effective image in Traherne’s construction of the lack required to inspire the divine desire 
that ultimately leads to union.  It is thus in Traherne’s celebration of the womb’s duality, 
its interiority and also external production, that Traherne’s deployment of womb imagery 
resonates in a distinctly different fashion than the appropriation of female physiology 
Maus identifies in so many of Traherne’s male peers.  Rather than simply supporting an 
assertion of masculine authority over the inscrutable female body, in Traherne’s 
depiction, the womb’s numinous and shadowy recesses are just as important as its 
effluxive habit of making the unknown known.  Just as Traherne celebrates the eyes’ dual 
capacity for emanation and reception, his depiction of the womb as paradoxically 
penetrable yet secure engenders his subject-speaker with admiration for a body that is 
both and neither, alien and familiar, and in this duality very much like the divine. 
 For Traherne then, the image of an actively generative womb that both reveals 
and conceals underscores the importance of a productive union between the speaker and 
the divine Other in the process of self-conception.  The womb is neither a passive nor 
impotent image; Traherne’s correlation between a productive womb and an active, pure, 
secure soul relies upon the complex physical union between mother and unborn child and 
the speaker’s recognition of union with a distinctly present but different Other within 
himself.  The collective force of Traherne’s womb imagery thus seems to offer the very 
type of “gender disorientation” which Katherine Eiasaman Maus identifies as an effect of 
early modern male poet’s troping the internalized, productive, and penetrable female 
body (“A Womb of His Own” 275).  However, Traherne’s affective and erotically 
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charged metaphoric of divine-human union occludes the sensual, and sexed, body in 
favor of a subject-speaker who positions himself across the binary of male/female.  
Whether it is expressed as a desire to return to the security of an unborn infant within the 
womb, to experience the sensuous pleasures within the womblike space of the bower, or 
to revel in the undeniable productivity of the womb as it transmits interior knowledge to 
the exterior world, Traherne’s desire to identify sacred otherness within himself shatters 
the “natural” binaries of presence/lack, self/Other, external/internal, and male/female that 
both desire and devotional subjectivity have so frequently been framed upon. 
 
To See the Other as the Mother 
Feminine states like pregnancy and feminine spaces like the womb work in consort with 
tropes on sightedness to form the foundation upon which divine-human relations are 
fashioned within Traherne’s poetic.  Traherne’s interest in the enigmatic recesses of the 
womb and his depiction of wombs as safe and secure havens of spiritual and physical 
connectivity echo his representation of eyes as the vehicles by which his subject-speaker 
seeks and discovers subjectivity and selfhood in direct relation to a divine Other.88  Such 
a figuration demonstrates Traherne’s investment in blurring gender boundaries in order to 
articulate a relationship with the divine Other that is at once grounded in the lack 
necessary to generate true desire but also attuned to constructing an Other who is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 As noted in the previous chapter, early modern theories of conception and sight 
intersect in their gendering of the organs and physiological material involved in both 
seeing and conceiving as either active or passive, but their overlap can be seen even more 
clearly in the commonly held opinion that an infant would take on the shape of whatever 
object was in the mother’s line of vision at the moment of conception.  This theory 
follows the intromission model, as it figures the mother’s eyes as being just as penetrable 
as her body, and in both respects figures the woman as the passage agent in the 
procreative acts of both sight and sex.  
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accessible enough that the experience of lack registers as inspirational rather than 
disheartening.  There is perhaps no better example of this stratagem than Traherne’s 
representation of the Virgin Mary, a figure closely connected with Christ’s metaphoric 
hermaphroditism.89  Just as Christ occupies a liminal status between human and divine, 
Mary’s complex, and paradoxical, representation in Catholic and Protestant traditions as 
perpetual Virgin but also Mother and Bride to Christ epitomizes the union of contraries 
attached to Christ himself.  Mary’s role in providing Christ’s humanity positions her in a 
place of otherwise unparalleled intimacy with the divine. As such, Mary provides 
Traherne with a potent image of binary-breaking divine-human relations precisely 
because she has an altogether unique and undeniable access to the very divine otherness 
Traherne’s speaker so desperately desires.  
 Traherne’s depiction of Mary in Part II of “The Inference” actively invites readers 
to look across contemporary gender constructs and gendered modes of writing to reorient 
their sight toward a divine Other within the self.90  The poem is divided into two sections, 
with the first focused on the speaker’s progression from concerning himself with 
“Things” to more correctly attuning his attention to “Thoughts.”91  In this setup, the 
speaker implicitly compels himself to turn inward and “see” with his mind’s eye rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 For a more detailed discussion of the Jesus-Mary hermaphrodite, see Leah DeVun’s 
study of alchemical treatises tracing the usage of religious language to describe the 
philosopher’s stone and alchemical practices: “The Jesus Hermaphrodite: Science and 
Sex Difference in Premodern Europe,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 69:2 (2008): 193-
218. 
90 “The Inference” is included in the Burney MS, but does not appear in the Dobell MS. 
91 Barbara Lewalski describes this progression as a movement “from the infant’s delight 
in and possession of all God’s works to the man’s intellectual comprehension of his 
nature and privileges” (359). 
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than allowing physical sights and physical temptations to cloud his judgment.  In an 
attempt to distinguish between the two, and reorient his sight appropriately, the speaker 
declares: “…Thoughts the Sense / Affect and touch.  Nay, when a Thing is near / It can’t 
affect but as it doth appear” (1.18-20).  This description echoes the ocular theories of 
extramission and intromission insofar as the speaker finds himself always affected by 
“Thoughts” that radiate outward but is still anxious over how “Things” penetrate the 
mind and body once they are perceived.  However, as Barbara Lewalski argues, 
Traherne’s commitment to attune himself to “Thoughts” rather than “Things” reveals a 
desire to progress “from the infant’s delight in and possession of all God’s works to the 
man’s intellectual comprehension of his nature and privileges” (359).  As a result of this 
desire, Traherne’s subject-speaker ties his sense of selfhood not only to “Thoughts,” but 
also to the duality at the heart of the ocular theories undergirding his eye/I construction of 
subjectivity.  The speaker thus focuses on the effects his thoughts will generate: 
  Since then by Thoughts I only see; 
  Since Thought alone affecteth me; 
  Since these are Reall things when shewn; 
  And since as Things are known 
  Or thought, they pleas or kill:  What Care ought I 
  (Since Thoughts apply 
  Things to my Mind) those Thoughts aright 
  To frame, and watch them day and night; 
  Suppressing such as will my Conscience stain, 
  That Hevn’ly Thoughts me hev’nly Things may gain.  
  (1.21- 30, original emphasis) 
 
His thoughts may be internalized and appear entirely spiritual, but the speaker’s focus on 
their productivity confirms both the activity of the speaker’s mind and also the fact that 
his mind is correctly oriented toward heaven.  Within this articulation of the mind’s 
orientation is a surprising refusal to abandon “Things” entirely.  Instead, Traherne’s 
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speaker declares that his thoughts enable proper sight of the “few Things alone” that 
“griev my Soul, or gratify my Mind, / Which I do find / Within” (1.34-7).  It seems 
Traherne’s speaker cannot fully disconnect “Things” from “Thoughts” because both 
prove pathways to knowledge of the self as transitive, dual even.  Just as “Thoughts” are 
initially introduced in “The Inference” as “inward Balms or Spears; / The living Joys, or 
Griefs and Fears; / The Light, or els the Fire” (1.11-13), “Things” too appear dual in that 
they exist internally as well as externally and may also bring either joy or grief, 
depending on one’s orientation toward them.  For Traherne’s speaker, things and 
thoughts are not mutually exclusive, and as a result, the speaker wonders: “How many 
Thousands see the Sky, / The Sun and Moon, as well as I?” (1.51-2).  His is a question of 
sight.  He wonders if he really does perceive what he ought to: is his sight properly 
oriented toward God, and if so, what might it mean that his experience of both 
“Thoughts” and “Things” proves so difficult to distinguish.   
 When the speaker thinks of himself in binary modes, as either joyous or grieving, 
he seems at odds with both his thoughts and the things around him.  He locates himself in 
a middle ground between these states as he asks, “How many more that view the Seas, / 
Feel neither Joy nor Eas?” (1.53-4).  Traherne’s subject-speaker appears isolated in his 
singular perception of the divine, and as a result, his properly oriented sight that embraces 
his and the Other’s duality produces apostrophic exclamations celebrating his 
discernment of a divine Otherness imbuing both things and thoughts with a wonder that 
inspires desire through and acknowledgment of what he lacks.  Traherne writes:  
  Let all my Thoughts be fixt upon His Throne; 
  And Him alone 
  For all His gracious Gifts admire, 
  Him only with my soul desire: 
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  Or griev for Sin.  That with du Sense, the Pleasure 
  I may possess of His Eternal Treasure.  (1.55-60) 
 
These lines conclude Part I of “The Inference,” and in keeping with the section’s theme, 
Traherne’s emphasis lies firmly on the progress from “Things to Thoughts” and how this 
progress is accommodated exclusively by the senses.  In his entreaty to desire God more 
than His gifts, Traherne acknowledges his own inability to separate fully from a world so 
full of beautiful things made by God’s own hand.  Instead of fully retreating from things, 
Traherne cleverly reorients his speaker’s desire to focus solely on God while also 
enabling him to admire the earthly treasures available to those “with du Sense” to 
perceive such divine gifts.  Traherne’s thoughts thus appear transitive: they are focused 
on God alone, but are still able to account for the things around him that prove God’s 
absolute Otherness.  As it was with Traherne’s celebration of the womb’s ability to both 
secure the internal while also making that which is contained available to the external 
world, Traherne’s progress from “Things to Thoughts” reveals an interest in crafting a 
subject-speaker who can truly see the flux between things and thoughts, the internal and 
the external, and in doing so come to union with the divine.   
 Given Traherne’s interest in this interplay, it should come as no great surprise to 
find the Virgin Mary at the heart of his argument about the relation between the 
otherwise binary constructions of things/thoughts, external/internal, male/female, and 
divine/human.  At the outset of Part II, however, Traherne once again relies on typology 
to demarcate his speaker’s right thoughts about the relation between himself and the 
divine Other.  In this instance, Traherne styles his subject-speaker in relation to David, a 
biblical figure who “a Temple in his Mind conceiv’d; / And that Intention was so well 
receiv’d / By God, that all the Sacred Palaces / That ever were did less His Glory pleas” 
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(2.1-4, emphasis added).  Traherne’s admiration for David’s ability to construct an 
interior palace hallmarked by enviable intimacy with the divine registers in the speaker’s 
subsequent reflection:  
  If Thoughts are such; such Valuable Things; 
  Such reall Goods; such human Cherubins; 
  Material Delights; transcendent Objects; Ends 
  Of all God’s Works, which most His Ey intends. (2.5-8) 
 
Traherne thus claims that rightly oriented thoughts are productive: they produce material 
delights as valuable as the thoughts that produce them.  These material delights, or 
“Valuable Things” as it were, invite humans into the realm of the transcendent, and our 
experience of them is pleasing to God’s eye precisely because God created them to be 
enjoyed.  In this formulation, if we desire God to look on us with pleasure, our thoughts 
must be oriented toward Him in such a way that we see Him in all of His works: 
everything resonates as a “transcendent Object” because there is transcendence in every 
object.  This mindset encourages Traherne to launch into a full-fledged celebration of 
humanity precisely because man is capable of producing “such Thoughts…So excellent 
in Nature, Valu, Use” (2.9-10).  Devout men’s hearts, Traherne asserts, “conceiv” (2.14) 
a limitless number of such thoughts, and are thus “Seed-plots of activ Piety” (2.17).  
These thoughts, which orient men’s sight to properly interpret the material world, “He 
values more / Than the Material World He made before” (2.17-18).  In this construction, 
Traherne finally comes to celebrate his position as the singular object of God’s gaze, the 
first in His sight.   
 However, Traherne’s recognition of the Other’s desire for him is also presented as 
a celebration of the mind’s creative powers, an image that is reinforced by the language 
of conception surrounding Traherne’s right thoughts and delightful things.  This language 
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is bolstered by yet another typological linkage that both solidifies and complicates the 
speaker’s position as an individual both desiring and desired of God.  Reflecting upon the 
activity of the devout, and ostensibly male, minds capable of conceiving such thoughts, 
Traherne shifts our attention from David’s internally conceived Temple to “the Blessed-
Virgin-Mother / Of God’s own Son, (rather than any other)” (2.19-21).  The intended 
comparison between David and Mary comes to bear in Traherne’s efforts to draw our 
attention to Mary’s doubleness: she is both virgin and mother, a fact reinforced by the 
parenthetical which reminds readers of her singular position in this respect.  David’s 
inwardly conceived temple is thus juxtaposed against Mary’s inward conceptions, which 
are plural in nature.  Through the mystery of the Immaculate Conception Mary conceives 
Christ, but it is her internal conceptions, or thoughts, to which she  
  Apply’d her Mind; for, of her pious Care  
  To treasure up those Truths which she did hear 
  Concerning Christ, in thoughtful Heart, w’re told; 
  But not that e’r with Offerings of Gold 
  The Temple she enricht.  (2.22-6) 
 
In his representation of Mary’s internal and maternal conceptions, Traherne highlights 
her duality.  She is, like David, able to construct an interior space in her mind that God 
prefers above all others, but Mary’s body houses more than a mental seed plot from 
which her piety springs forth.  Mary’s body is undeniably generative, and following the 
metaphorical linkage between the male poet’s creative mind and the creative capability of 
the female womb, Mary’s mind is imbued with a creative force equal to that of her 
womb.  As a result of this incredible power, a power that seems to cross gendered 
constructions of creativity, authorship, and interiority, Mary experiences the very 
material delight and transcendent objects Traherne’s speaker so joyfully celebrated as the 
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outcome of his properly attuned thoughts.  Traherne’s invocation of Mary solidifies that 
the “conception” Traherne speaks of is meant to be read as both physical and spiritual: 
Mary’s thoughts render her body and her mind a “seed-plot of activ piety,” the result of 
which is an unparalleled physical intimacy with the divine Other in the form of Christ.   
 Mary’s divine conception thus positions her within the scope of the 
hermaphroditic. She carries a child that is part of her flesh and yet not of the flesh; she 
carries divinity within her, but she is not divine herself; she is both and neither.  As such, 
Mary’s body, like Christ’s body, functions as a simultaneously symbolic and fleshly door 
by which men might reorient their thoughts and gain spiritual rebirth and renewal.  
Mary’s conceptions, both somatic and spiritual, serve as an amplification of Gary 
Kuchar’s assertion that the body functions as a sacred hymen in Traherne’s poetic 
representation precisely because Mary’s body enables a view of the self that is both 
rightly attuned to internal thoughts but also capable of externalizing that which is 
produced within.  Mary’s mental and physical aptitude for faith provides a provocative 
type for Traherne to celebrate the relationship between thoughts and things insofar as her 
properly attuned mind results in such visible and even visceral evidence of right thinking.  
When Mary conceives of the divine, she makes meaning within her body; rather than 
moving from “Things to Thoughts,” Mary’s rightly oriented thoughts produce the 
divinest things: Christ.  Mary’s example thus serves to highlight the interplay between 
things and thoughts much more than it suggests a linear movement transitioning fully 
from one to the other.  Once “This understood,” writes Traherne, “How glorious, how 
divine, how great, how good / May we becom!” (2.25-7).  Mary’s paradoxical 
penetrability and purity is thus celebrated as the means by which all of mankind might 
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fashion intimate union with the divine and become “like the Deity / In managing our 
Thoughts aright!” (2.27-8).  Mary proves a powerful and evocative image of spiritual 
union because we see, as a result of her spiritual aptitude for God, a bodily proximity to 
Christ, but what looms just as large in our envisioning of Mary is her dissimilitude to the 
Other, because she is like us.  She is both and neither, and in this state, Mary experiences 
the self-same lack that drives our desire to see and know the body of the Other, even if it 
is already present within both she and us. 
 In his construction of the productive body as the means by which the self might 
come to view itself as an object of God’s desiring gaze, Traherne ultimately fashions a 
subject-speaker who comes to view himself as participating in an imago dei relationship.  
In such a relationship, Traherne’s subject-speaker turns his penetrating eyes inward, upon 
himself, to become the Pauline speculum enigmatically reflecting back the presence of an 
alien Other.  In “The Odour,” for example, Traherne commands: “thy self enjoy and see: / 
At once the Mirror and the Object be” (ll. 53-4).92  It is an assertion of interiority and also 
a call to self-examination, but through the evocative image of the mirror it is also an 
honest directive to identify the self’s duality, its otherness.  Looking into a mirror 
provides access to a self that is, like Christ, Mary, and even Adam, foreign and familiar, 
yet highly accessible.  Through this lens, and the gendered and bodily boundaries 
embedded within the contemporary ocular theories Traherne relies upon to shape his 
speaker’s subjectivity (eye/I), Traherne is able to fashion a subject-speaker who sees 
himself in the imago dei relationship as “both like God and, not being God, unlike God” 
(Nolan 5).  In this relationship Traherne’s subject-speaker finds the lack that generates a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 “The Odour” appears in the Burney MS, but not the Dobell MS. 
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desire for intimate union with a divine Other who is accessible, present, and available to 
him because of the transitive natures they share. 
 Ultimately, then, Traherne’s careful interrelation between eyes, wombs, and 
mirrors all work to craft a poetic space wherein his subject-speaker might come to know 
himself through the prosthetic possibilities of his devotional verse.  Rather than retreating 
inward and entirely away from the body, Traherne persistently draws our attention to the 
space between the postlapsarian self he sees and experiences and the self he wishes God 
to see.  Insofar as Traherne focuses on the ideal self through his eye/I formulation, and 
particularly in his indistinction between experiencing and mirroring back God’s agapic 
love, Traherne’s subject-speaker transverses the gap between his own postlapsarian 
condition and a divine Other who is not so distant as to be beyond desire.  In the space 
between the body and belief, Traherne fashions a devotional text with what seems the 
sole purpose of refiguring the self as mutable, transitive, both part of the divine and not.  
In Traherne’s felicitous rendering of the body as a vehicle toward rather than a hurdle 
occluding authentic intimacy with the divine Other, his devotional verse comes to 
function as a type of spiritual prostheses, an extension of his body that both aids in the 
process of identifying the abilities of his soul and even enhances his soul’s ability to 
transverse the space between the body and belief.  In this vein, Traherne’s figuration of 
the body reads quite distinctly from An Collins’s rendering of a body plagued with 
anxiety-inducing otherness. 
 The devotional verse of Thomas Traherne, and also Richard Crashaw, as I will 
demonstrate in the coming chapter, productively stages the experience of otherness as a 
necessary tool in the generation and maintenance of a divine desire that cannot be 
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separated from the body.  As such, it becomes apparent that unlike An Collins, whose 
very real experience of otherness and lack prove so overwhelming that they preclude 
expressions or sensations of divine union, Traherne and Crashaw each seek not only to 
maintain “want” or “lack” to generate desire for the divine, but they build it into the 
body.  Writing from the privileged position of able-bodied men, both Traherne and 
Crashaw celebrate the body’s duality as their devotional speakers and subjects bound to 
and fro across gendered lines and in doing so come to know themselves in relation to a 
divine Other who is both present and accessible, like but unlike them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WHO’S HOT FOR CRASHAW?: GENDER ILLITERACY, 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, AND THE IDEAL READER  
IN “THE FLAMING HEART” 
 
 
The tender pragmatisms of flesh have poetries no enigma—human or divine—can 
diminish or demean.  Indeed, it can only cause them, and then walk out. 
—John Fowles93  
 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, Edmund Gosse declared Crashaw’s 
description of Mary Magdalene’s eyes as “Two walking baths; two weeping motions; / 
Portable, & compendious oceans” in “The Weeper” as not only “the worst lines in 
Crashaw” but also “perhaps the worst lines in all English poetry.”94  In the excoriating 
criticism initiated by Gosse, Crashaw’s style has variously been derided for its “over-
ripeness” and “hysterical intensity,” the “repulsive succulence” of his imagery, and the 
“cheap glitter of his diction.”95  In fact, one can hardly speak of Crashaw without some 
reference to his checkered critical reception, a reception that has proven quite as 
excessive as Crashaw’s verse itself.96  It has thus become an unfortunate commonplace in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 The Ebony Tower (New York: Little Brown, 1974), 244. 
94 Edmund Gosse, “Richard Crashaw,” Seventeenth Century Studies (London: William 
Heinemann, 1914), 174.  However, Gosse’s chapter on Crashaw is reprinted from 
Cornhill Magazine 47 (1883): 424-38. 
95 For “over-ripeness” see: Douglas Bush, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth 
Century 1600-1660, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), 147.  For “hysterical intensity” 
see Gosse, “Richard Crashaw,” 157.  For “repulsive succulence” see John M. Wallace, 
rev. of The Wit of Love: Donne, Carew, Crashaw, Marvell, by Louis Martz, Renaissance 
Quarterly 24.2 (1971), 282.  For “cheap glitter” see Percy H. Osmond, “Crashaw and 
Beaumont,” in The Mystical Poets of the English Church (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 
125.  
96 In his survey chapter on Crashaw in The Cambridge Companion to English Poetry: 
Donne to Marvell, ed. Thomas N. Corns (New York: Cambridge UP, 1993): 244-55, 
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Crashavian criticism to note the frequency with which Richard Crashaw’s poetry has 
been the subject of critical lambast directed almost exclusively at his sacramental 
imagery.   
 Crashaw and his offensive excess, his often disturbing blending of bodies, blood, 
milk, and tears, has been described as evidence of his “feminine engendered faith,” a 
claim that has typically tied Crashaw’s verse to the Roman Catholicism he converted to 
sometime between 1644 and 1645.97  Despite the fact that Crashaw composed most of his 
poetry well before his eventual conversion to Roman Catholicism, the pairing of his 
ultimate confessional alignment with his penchant for imaging the affective and mystical 
unions at play between a divine Other and holy women, namely Saint Teresa, Mary 
Magdalene, and the Virgin Mary, have marked both the poet and his poetry with the label 
of “alien” and “other” in its apparent departure from the masculine devotional voice 
critics have come to associate with contemporary English poetics. 98  In his introduction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Anthony Low notes that Crashaw’s poetry has been attacked as “among other things, 
neurotic, perverted, feminine, infantile, ‘foreign’, extravagant, tasteless, Catholic, and 
even cannibalistic.  Some central quality in his poetry has consistently outraged critical 
tempers, inspiring otherwise moderate writers to reach for their purplest prose” (242).  
97 The phrase derives from Maureen Sabine, Feminine Engendered Faith: John Donne 
and Richard Crashaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992).   
98 Crashaw’s 1970 editor George Walton Williams describes him as “the most un-English 
of all the English poets,” and even Williams’ praise of Crashaw as “the leading English 
representative” of the Baroque style is couched in the disparaging caveat that the Baroque 
is “fundamentally foreign to the spirit of English poetry”: The Complete Poetry of 
Richard Crashaw (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1970), xv, xxii. Likewise, and in 
direct contrast to John Donne’s central voice in seventeenth-century English verse, Janel 
Mueller describes Crashaw as an “eccentric, marginal figure…an idiosyncratic extreme 
in the adoption of Continental modes of sensibility”: “Women among the Metaphysicals: 
A Case, Mostly, of Being Donne For,” Modern Philology 87 (1989), 144. Such 
marginalization of Crashaw in comparison to the most acclaimed voices of English 
metaphysical poetry draws largely from Barbara Kiefer Lewalski’s influential study 
Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric (Princeton, N.J.: 
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to the most recent critical edition of Crashaw’s collected works, Richard Rambuss keenly 
notes, “Since the mid-nineteenth century, critics have taken Crashaw’s Catholic 
conversion not only as his life’s signal event (which it probably is) but also as the 
explanatory context for his work’s every mannerism (which it is not)” (xviii).  Crashaw’s 
checkered critical heritage, his labeling as neither English nor masculine, thus appears a 
direct result of his eventual Roman Catholicism, a conversion which facilitates Crashaw’s 
apparent ‘“bad taste” in both religion and aesthetics” (Murray 105).  More recently, 
however, Crashaw’s excess, as well as his “female-centered sacramental vision” (Kuchar 
93), has been associated with the Eucharistic theology and Laudian devotional practices 
that Puritan divines critiqued as both highly feminine and Roman Catholic in origin.  This 
critical turn to more fully incorporate Crashaw within the High Anglicanism of the 
English church, and thus diminish, if not eradicate his alien status prompts, I think, a 
reassessment of not only how “other” Crashaw and his verse may be to contemporary 
English devotional poets, but also how Crashaw’s verse disturbs our fixed notions of 
“normal” representations of devotional subjectivity in the early modern period.  This 
chapter will thus attempt to redress Crashaw’s critical othering by demonstrating how his 
“feminine engendered faith” compels readers to engage in a type of devotional 
spectatorship that ties subjectivity not only to the body of the believer, but also to the 
relation between the self and an Other who is immanently present within the devotional 
work of reading and writing poetry.  This relational mode becomes apparent in Crashaw’s 
frequent gestures toward embodied modes of reading and receiving his verse that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Princeton UP, 1979), wherein Lewalski identifies Crashaw’s verse as emerging “out of a 
very different aesthetics emanating from Trent and the continental Counter Reformation” 
(12). 
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correlate closely with the liturgical literacy at the heart of medieval Catholicism, but 
largely associated with women religious.  Ultimately, I will argue that the most extreme 
sacramental moments within Richard Crashaw’s verse work to develop a subjectivity that 
is anything but stable; rather, it is always fluxing between the text itself, the reader, and 
the sacred affect at work in both.  Thus, the subjectivity cultivated in Crashaw’s verse is 
far from the type of selfhood critics have come to expect from the “self-fashioning” 
poetics of the early modern era in that it moves well beyond the bounds of the self.   
 Rather than seeking to secure and stabilize the borders of the individual self, 
Crashaw reveals an incredible commitment to destabilizing the very bounds that we have 
seen An Collins and Thomas Traherne so adamantly attempt to construct and maintain in 
their verse.  Instead of imaging the body as a tightly sealed container, closed to sin, 
Crashaw’s often female or feminized sacramental subjects jubilantly intermingle with 
each other, Crashaw’s speaker, and even the reader.  If Crashaw is a poet of liquefaction, 
wherein the tears, milk, blood, and water that flows between his sacred subjects have 
been condemned as the most far-fetched of all his metaphysical conceits, this chapter will 
interrogate how those sacramental moments produce scenes of devotional spectatorship 
that both engage and also stress the transposition between liturgical and grammatical 
literacies, male and female gender categories, self and other.  Ultimately, I will argue that 
Crashaw’s sacramental vision is grounded in fashioning a self-in-relation, an 
intersubjective self wholly reliant on the generation of empathy and affect in not only 
Crashaw’s sacred subjects but also his readers.  Crashaw’s careful attention to the 
somatic marking of empathy between the subjects of his verse and also its readers thus 
imagines the body as anything but ancillary to the spiritual work of salvation.  Instead, in 
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Crashaw’s excessive and empathic blurring of both bodily and gendered boundaries, his 
verse becomes the vehicle by which “we come to experience our bodies as objects 
belonging to an intersubjective world” (Teske 779).99  Ultimately, then, entering the 
often-liquid landscapes of Crashaw’s most provocative verse encourages readers to 
become conscious of their own “somatic marking,” and thus initiate the kenotic process 
that ties our experience of consciousness to the bodily sensations of encountering a divine 
Other.  The result of this newfound consciousness and interrelation between reading, 
seeing, feeling, and believing is an ideal reader who comes into being through the 
triangulated relation between Crashaw’s subject-speaker, his devotional subject, and 
themselves. 
 
Learning Our Literacies: Gender, Affect, and Right Reading 
 
A great deal has been written of Richard Crashaw’s devotion to holy women and the 
affective traditions of the late medieval Roman Catholic Church that inspired women like 
Teresa of Avila to express her sense of union with the divine so emotively.100  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 J. A. Teske, “From Embodied to Extended Cognition,” Zygon: Journal of Science and 
Religion 48 (2013): 759–787.  
 
100 Happily, the pejorative association of Crashaw’s work as “feminine” has also begun to 
lose critical steam: see Molly Murray, “Richard Crashaw and the Gender of Conversion,” 
in The Poetics of Conversion in Early Modern English Literature: Verse and Change 
from Donne to Dryden (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009),105-137; Gary Kuchar, “The Gendering of God and the Advent of the Subject in 
the Poetry of Richard Crashaw,” in Divine Subjection: The Rhetoric of Sacramental 
Devotion in Early Modern England (Duquesne: Duquesne UP, 2005), 93-149; Maurine 
Sabine, Feminine Engendered Faith: The Poetry of John Donne and Richard Crashaw 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992); Eugene Cunnar, “Crashaw’s ‘Sancta Maria Dolorum,’ 
Controversy and Coherence” in New Perspectives on the Life and Art of Richard 
Crashaw, ed. J.R. Roberts (Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1990), 80-98; Mueller, “Women 
among the Metaphysicals”; Paul A. Parrish, “The Feminizing of Power: Crashaw’s Life 
and Art,” in “The Muses Common-Weale”: Poetry and Politics in the Seventeenth 
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affective devotional practices developed in late medieval England equipped both lay and 
elite with the steadfast belief that devotion was both a doing and a feeling thing, and this 
sense of interplay between the earnest commitment to right devotion and the sensations 
of godly affect brought about through that devotional work was not lost with the 
Reformation.  Occupying an ambiguous position in seventeenth-century moral 
philosophy, the passions were both great devotional aids but also great hurdles in their 
responsiveness to outward objects and ideas: desirable passions, such as godly affect, 
could be generated and directed through prayer and meditation practices which could also 
diminish undesired passions.  The work of devotion, then, takes place on and within a 
passionate and desiring body that requires hyperbolic expressions of faith to at once 
engender godly affect and also sustain it long enough to stir the self toward real remorse 
and repentance in the face of our less than divine affections.  “Heightened rhetoric,” 
according to Kate Narveson in her study of early modern prayer books, “was the answer 
to the deadness the believer experienced daily.  What is expressed in meditation and 
prayer is not direct experience but rather an intentionally exaggerated and vivid self-
imagining along lines set out by the theological discourse of spiritual psychology, 
calculated to ignite and shape affective experience” (“Profession” 128).  In Roman 
Catholicism the fashioning of such affective experiences was accommodated by both a 
liturgical service and ritual piety practices attuned to sensory engagement that 
encouraged the type of “sacramental seeing” Bob Scribner describes as “a visual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Century, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Columbia: U of Missouri P, 
1988), 148-62; Parrish, “‘O Sweet Contest’: Gender and Value in ‘The Weeper,’” in 
Roberts (ed.), Life and Art of Richard Crashaw, 127-39; and Sandra K. Fischer, 
“Crashaw, Ste. Teresa, and the Icon of Mystical Ravishment,” Journal of Evolutionary 
Psychology 4 (1983): 176-89. 
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experience and a pious action . . . essentially a form of the gaze, prolonged, 
contemplative encounter with the holy figure represented” (461).  This mode of seeing 
and believing supports Eamon Duffy’s description of late medieval religious culture as 
one which “responded vividly and immediately to the visual.”101  Accordingly, late 
medieval devotion meant much more than the ability to read scripture; it required the 
ability to engage in a “sacramental seeing” that manifested in the body through the 
production of godly affect.   
 Katherine Zieman’s nuanced exploration of gender and literacy in late medieval 
England speaks to the prominence of this mode of sacramental seeing, as she identifies 
two vying literacy practices at play in late medieval devotional culture: liturgical literacy 
and grammatical literacy.  Zieman distinguishes these interpretive and meaning-making 
modes by suggesting that largely illiterate laypeople might be denied access to 
grammatical literacy but had unmediated access to liturgical performance, which could 
“draw upon a number of learned abilities” and thus become a site for exploring the 
“ambiguous relationship between skill and performance, and between performance and 
understanding.”102  Zieman’s ultimate argumentative thrust contends that for the 
liturgically but not grammatically literate “meaning is perceived in the body, not in the 
mind” (101).  This particular variety of literacy was most frequently associated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Eamon Duffy, “Late Medieval Religion,” in Gothic Art for England, 1400-1547, eds. 
Richard Marks and Raul Williamson (London: V&A Publications, 2003), 56-67 (65). 
102 Katherine Zieman, “Reading, Singing and Understanding: Constructions of the 
Literacy of Women Religious in Late Medieval England,” in Learning and Literacy in 
Medieval England and Abroad, ed. Sarah Rees Jones (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 
2003), 97-120 (106).  Zieman defines literacy as such: “not a unitary or uniform activity, 
nor does it have meaning outside of the social formations that determine how written 
texts might function within them” (97).  
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women religious.  As a result, liturgical literacy became a contested space where a highly 
educated and Latinate priesthood concerned over the potential for false claims of 
revelation began a campaign to adjoin spiritual Truth with grammatical competency 
(Zieman 110).  This linkage between grammatical literacy, or learnedness, and spiritual 
authority extends from the Roman Catholicism of the late medieval period to the 
thoroughly Protestant landscape of post-Reformation England where a highly educated 
professional clergy/prelacy grounded their access to the divine and their right to preach in 
the demonstrated performance of grammatical literacy.  What is more, the increased 
popularity of sermons and sermon-hearing in the seventeenth century as a form of 
popular worship also did much to generate a culture of religiosity wherein grammatical 
literacy was deemed paramount for salvation.103  The linkage between performance of 
grammatical literacy, either in the form of private godly reading or public participation in 
its exercise through godly hearing of a learned divine, collectively supports the 
Reformation dictum of sola scriptura, a pronouncement that all but cements the triumph 
of grammatical literacy over liturgical literacy as the means of godliness in the Protestant 
faith.104 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 James I’s personal interest in academic/theological disputation did much to popularize 
the sermon in seventeenth-century England, just as James’ conception of kingcraft 
heavily relied on the balance of faction within his growing episcopacy.  On the growth of 
sermon-culture in seventeenth-century England, see Lori Anne Ferrell, Government by 
Polemic: James I, the King’s Preachers, and the Rhetorics of Conformity, 1603-1625 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998); Peter McCullough, Sermons at Court: Politics and 
Religion in Elizabethan and Jacobean Preaching (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998); 
and Ferrel and Mcullough’s The English Sermon Revised: Religion, Literature and 
History 1600-1750 (Manchester and New York: Manchester UP, 2000).   
104 James Simpson calls attention to a crucial paradox in the Protestant dictum that 
reading Scripture is a necessary component, but that only the elect could read it correctly.  
Furthermore, Protestant divines certainly knew that reading Scripture required linguistic 
and interpretive skills that might be beyond unlearned laity, but still proclaimed the 
	  125 
 The post-Reformation interdependence between grammatical literacy and 
godliness then places considerable weight on not only the linguistic skill required to read 
and comprehend, but also properly attuning one’s mind to receive the scriptural message 
at hand and immediately apply it to the self.  Grammatical literacy, as it is implemented 
in the practice of active reading, thus “transforms the heart, opens the eyes, and suffuses 
the soul with sweet comfort and zeal for godliness.”105 Like devotion itself, godly reading 
was conceived of as both a doing and a feeling thing.  Reading Scripture in a godly 
fashion required both grammatical literacy and also a commitment to engage in a great 
deal of interpretive work.  The godly, however, were called to perform that interpretive 
work on much more than Scripture alone; reading well demanded that godly believers 
deploy those soul-saving interpretive skills on their own bodies in the careful 
examination, production, and maintenance of the passions required to enflame the 
otherwise cool hearts of fallen men and women.  The strain between the interpretive work 
of reading and feeling appears strikingly similar to the tension Katherine Zieman 
identifies between grammatical literacy and liturgical literacy, but in a post-Reformation 
England where grammatical literacy functions as the modus operandi for devotion, any 
preference for liturgy over grammar as a means to grace was grounds enough for the 
accusation of a preference for Arminianism over Calvinism, or even further down the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
necessity of godly reading. Kate Narveson identifies these paradoxes as trapping the laity 
in “an anxiety-producing mode of reading that gave the illusion of freedom but insisted 
on submission to the church’s ‘true’ interpretation as a mark of election” (85).  See James 
Simpson, Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and its Reformation Opponents 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008), ch. 4; and Kate Narveson, Bible Readers and Lay 
Writers in Early Modern England: Gender and Self-Definition in an Emergent Writing 
Culture (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).    
105 Narveson, 81. 
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slippery confessional slope paved with ritual and ornamentation: a preference for Roman 
Catholicism over the true Protestant Church.  Similarly, High Churchmen found equal 
fault with too great an emphasis on grammatical literacy and the preeminence granted to 
hearing the preached word over feeling and appropriately responding to “the beauty of 
holiness” that ought to be part of liturgical performance.   
 In his support of Archbishop Laud’s mission to reinvest English churches with 
liturgical elements meant precisely to stimulate the type of sacramental seeing required to 
generate and maintain godly affect, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes complains that “the 
stream of our times makes religion nothing but auricular profession…The word is holy, I 
know, and I wish it all the honour that may be; but God forbid we should think that in hoc 
uno sunt onmia.  All our ‘holiness’ is in hearing, all our service is ear-service; that were 
in effect as much as to say all the body were an ear” (qtd. in Fincham 232).106  Andrewes’ 
criticism of the preeminence of hearing Scripture expounded by learned divines over all 
other forms of worship, and over all of the remaining bodily senses that ought to be 
equally engaged in devotional work, functions as a critique of a devotional mode solely 
reliant on grammatical literacy.  Rather, High Churchmen desired devotional spaces that 
attended to the grammatical literacy of the Word but also to the liturgical literacy that 
could span the gap between performance and understanding; thus the concerted interest in 
liturgical reforms and physical beautification of Richard Crashaw’s own Cambridge 
enclave at Peterhouse, as Matthew Wren, John Cosin, and Crashaw himself worked to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Kenneth Fincham, Prelate as Pastor: The Episcopate of James I (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1990). 
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refit the chapel with stained glass windows and paintings, among a great many other 
ornamentations.107   
 The ceremonial, visually rich, and blatantly Roman Catholic court of Charles I’s 
Queen, Henrietta Maria, magnified Puritan anxiety over such renewed interest in the 
affective elements of worship, and the surge of courtly lady converts to Roman 
Catholicism that reached its zenith in the 1630s eventually pushed Puritan anxiety over 
religious backsliding into the all-out frenzy against devotional images conducive to 
affective piety practices that came with the Civil War.  The “emotional fervor and sensual 
vividness of much Catholic devotional literature directed specifically at women,” writes 
Molly Murray, led many virulent anti-Catholics, William Crashaw, Richard’s father, 
chief amongst them, to associate Roman Catholicism’s sensual eye-devotion with 
seduction, as women’s impressionable nature gave way to the eroticized eye gazing on 
affective images capable of transforming devotional desire from caritas to eros.  Much 
like spiritual love, passionate love was styled in equally exalted language, typically 
taking the form of a burning presence that often manifested in vision, as passionate gazes 
emit fiery darts that wound and penetrate the object of affection.  With the highly public 
Catholicism of Henrietta Maria, and the rapid-fire conversion of many of her ladies in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 For more on Crashaw’s commitment to outfitting and adorning his “Mother of 
Peter[house]” in the Laudian style see Paul Parrish’s analysis of Crashaw’s occasional 
poetry explicitly composed to raise funds for the replenishment and beautification of 
Peterhouse: “Writing about Mother: Richard Crashaw and the Maternal Body,” in 
Performance for a Lifetime: A Festschrift Honoring Dorothy Harell Brown: Essays on 
Women, Religion, and the Renaissance, ed. Barbara Ewell (New Orleans, LA: Loyola 
University, 1997), 223-38.  For the influence of Peterhouse on Crashaw and other poets 
see Hilton Kelliher, “Crashaw at Cambridge,” in New Perspectives on the Life and Art of 
Richard Crashaw, ed. John Roberts (Columbia and London: U of Missouri P, 1990), 180-
214; and also Patrick Grant, Images and Ideas in Literature of the English Renaissance 
(Amherst, MA: U of Massachusetts P, 1979), 118. 
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1630s-40s, “reimagining the Catholic conversions of women,” particularly of elite 
women who could potentially sway their politically powerful husbands, “as the result of a 
sexualized ‘fall’ enabled Protestant men to maintain the fantasy of a simple 
countermeasure: protecting women from eroticized Catholic temptation” (Murray 110).  
In the association of Roman Catholic faith with the sensual female body, anti-Catholic 
polemicists like William Crashaw attacked what they interpreted as an inappropriate 
concentration on female authority in devotional practice, Mariology particularly.108  The 
result is the popular argument that Roman Catholicism appealed to the body’s 
sensibilities while Protestantism appealed to the intellect. 
 Thus comes the accusation that Crashaw’s “rhetorical copiousness” (Wong 351), 
his excessive flux between divine images and ever more extreme metaphors functions as 
evidence of feminine predilections, in aesthetics as well as religion.  Given Crashaw’s 
admiration of and devotion to extraordinary holy women like the Virgin Mother, Saint 
Teresa, Queen Henrietta Maria, the highly principled ‘mother’ of Little Gidding, Mary 
Collett, and the seeking but wholly devout patroness the Countess of Denbigh, it comes 
as little surprise then to see that contemporary responses to Crashaw’s conversion circle 
just as pointedly around the association of Roman Catholicism with women.  The 
anonymously authored pamphlet Legenda Lignea (1652/3) clarifies such an association 
with the following description of a recently converted Richard Crashaw:  
  This peevish sillie Seeker glided away from his Principles in a Poetical  
  vein of fancy and impertinent curiosity, and finding that Verses…much  
  pleas’d some female wits, Crashaw crept by degrees into favour and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 For a detailed account of the contemporary correlation between Roman Catholicism 
and women, femaleness, and the sensual body see Frances E. Dolan, Whores of Babylon: 
Catholicism, Gender, and Seventeenth-Century Print Culture (1999; Notre Dame, IN: U 
of Notre Dame P, 2005). 
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  acquaintance with some Court-Ladies, and with gross commendations of  
  their parts and beauties (burnisht and varnisht with some other agreeable  
  adulations) he got first the estimation of an innocent, harmless Convert;  
  and, a purse being made by some deluded, vain-glorious Ladies.  
  (Rambuss “Introduction” xlix) 
This account firmly aligns Crashaw’s conversion not only with delusion but Crashaw 
himself with the overly emotional vanities of women whose confessional affiliation was 
envisioned as deriving more from aesthetic appreciation of images and the emotions that 
accompany them than rational discernment of the Word.  The perceived emotional 
instability of women, and Catholicism’s seeming manipulation of this very quality, is 
further highlighted as the Legenda Lignea author goes on to describe Crashaw as a 
“shuttlecock so tost with every changeable puff and blast” (Martin xxxvi).  Crashaw, it 
seems, is accused of not only converting to a faith actively deceiving susceptible and vain 
women, but also being as changeable as women themselves.109  
  The carefully constructed affective and somatic register responsible for the 
liturgical resonances within Crashaw’s verse thus appear to mark his otherness in 
comparison with contemporary English devotional writers like Donne and Herbert, 
whose devotion it seems is more to the “rhetorical gods of logic, argumentation, and 
analysis” than Crashaw’s own devotion to “intimate and emotional experiences” that 
move well beyond the purview of logic.110  These critical divisions, it seems, mirror those 
found within post-Reformation literary and confessional circles to the extent that the 
early twentieth-century critic Percy Osmond’s dismissal of Crashaw’s verse as nothing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Molly Murray identifies the Legenda Lignea depiction of Crashaw as an early, 
perhaps the earliest, version of the critical claim that Crashaw’s Catholicism “unmanned 
him” (107). 
110 Parrish, “Gender and Value” 128. 
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but “cheap glitter,” could easily and convincingly be attributed to a post-Reformation 
anti-Catholic polemicist bemoaning the attraction of the Roman Catholic faith, and its 
appeal to women particularly.  Rather than giving any real weight to Crashaw’s 
contemporary description as “Herbert’s second,” a portrayal found in the title of both the 
1646 and 1648 editions of Steps to the Temple and penned by his likely original editor 
Joseph Beaumont, it has proven much more popular to singularly identify Crashaw with 
the affect of the Continent than the intellectualized spiritualism of his native English 
Protestantism.111  Indeed, Crashaw’s verse is liturgical in nature, and thus it does lend 
itself to an interpretive mode that has historically been associated with women religious, 
but the aesthetic binaries between early modern Protestantism and Roman Catholicism 
appear far blurrier in contemporary practice than their representation in our own critical 
categories.112  The critical claims that Crashaw’s verse both derives from and also appeals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 This trend has marked modern Crashaw scholarship.  See Austin Warren, Richard 
Crashaw: A Study in Baroque Sensibility (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1939); Mario 
Praz, “The Flaming Heart: Richard Crashaw and the Baroque” in The Flaming Heart: 
Essays on Crashaw, Machiavelli, and Other Studies in the Relations between Italian and 
English Literature from Chaucer to T.S. Eliot, ed. Mario Praz (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1958), 204-63; Barbara K. Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-
Century Religious Lyric (Princeton: Princeton UP: 1979); Ryan Netzley, “Oral Devotion: 
Eucharistic Theology and the Religious Lyrics of Richard Crashaw,” Texas Studies in 
Language and Literature 44 (2002), 247-72; James M. Bromley, “Intimacy and the Body 
in Seventeenth-Century Religious Devotion,” Early Modern Literary Studies 11 (2005): 
1-41; Kimberly Johnson, “Richard Crashaw’s Indigestible Poetics,” in Made Flesh: 
Sacrament and Poetics in Post-Reformation England (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 
2014), 119-47; Ryan Netzley, “Reading Indistinction: Desire, Indistinguishability, and 
Metonymic Reading in Richard Crashaw’s Religious Lyrics,” in Reading Desire and the 
Eucharist in Early Modern Religious Poetry (Toronto: U of Toronto P: 2011), 66-105.   
112 Among revisionist critics who point explicitly to Crashaw as they highlight aesthetic 
and devotional indistinction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sophie Read 
argues that with the Reformation the language of transubstantiation does not disappear 
from reformed thought and verse; instead, Eucharistic theology began to be viewed 
symbolically rather than literally, becoming a central means of figuring sacramental 
presence in English devotional verse of the period for both reformed and recusant alike.  
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to a feminine rather than masculine point of view only serve to reproduce the fault lines 
within the post-Reformation English church, wherein Catholic and Counter-Reformation 
devotional verse was (and often continues to be) typically associated with a visual and 
highly feminine aesthetic and Protestantism with a masculine verbal aesthetic.113  As the 
case may be, however, these superficial divisions appear to neatly mirror the very literacy 
modes, and their gendered dimensions Katherine Zieman outlines in late medieval 
culture. 
 As such, an analysis of how Richard Crashaw engages these two aesthetics, and 
the vying literacy modes they attend to, provides a compelling new lens through which 
we might examine not only the affective surfeit in Crashaw’s critically contested poetry, 
but also the legitimacy of delineating confessional affiliation through such aesthetic 
distinctions altogether.  Deneen Senasi has similarly drawn attention to the intersection 
between reading and embodiment in Crashaw’s poetry, claiming that Crashaw  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See Read, “The Rhetoric of Real Presence in the Seventeenth Century” (PhD diss., 
University of Cambridge, 2008).  P.G. Stanwood makes a similar claim regarding 
Crashaw’s verse, particularly in “Time and Liturgy in Donne, Crashaw and T.S. Eliot,” 
Mosaic 12 (1979): 91-105.  Finally, and most recently, Joseph R. Teller convincingly 
demonstrates that the always-controversial sensuality in Crashaw’s Passion poetry 
derives from the immensely popular and thereby mainstream English crucifixion piety 
following St. Bernard of Clairvaux, whose highly stylized, open, bleeding, and suffering 
images of Christ’s body deeply resemble Crashaw’s own portrayal of Christ.  See Joseph 
R. Teller, “Why Crashaw was not Catholic: The Passion and Popular Protestant 
Devotion,” English Literary Renaissance 43.2 (2013): 239-67. 
113 In his influential 1926 Clark Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, T.S. Eliot 
identifies Donne as conveying a “powerful intellect” and decidedly “strongly masculine 
nature” while Crashaw exhibits a “devotional temperament rather than a theological 
mind” (162).  Eliot’s distinction of Donne as a “voluptuary of thought” where Crashaw 
“could be called a voluptuary of religious emotion” (168) has done a great deal to tie 
Crashaw’s verse to a “feminine” mode and define the feminine versus the masculine 
qualities in all metaphysical poetry. See, The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry, ed. 
Ronald Schuchard (London: Faber and Faber, 1993). 
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  orchestrates an aesthetic of reading and embodiment whose locus is the  
  convergence of the spiritual with the material.  That poetics compels  
  readers to confront the tenuous, tension-filled intersections where bodies  
  and words collide, where they seem to struggle with one another for  
  ascendency, and where those  boundaries that force them into opposition  
  become more malleable, more dissolute, and more problematic.  
  (Senasi 1-2)   
 
In this focus Senasi ultimately asserts that Crashaw’s poetics, and the embodied reading 
that he demands within them, problematizes the binary association of Protestantism with 
the Word and Counter-Reformation culture with the visual; Crashaw’s verse, according 
to Senasi, “reflects the semiotic sophistication of that admixture of Word and flesh, as he 
incorporates the body into the Word as an integral part of the sacred ritual of reading.  In 
this way, the body becomes a sign of the Word and the Word a sign of the body, while 
significance materializes in both directions at once” (3).  Thus, my analysis of how 
Crashaw’s sacramental and incarnational poetics invoke both grammatical and liturgical 
literacies, and the gendered representation of these interpretive modes, is deeply indebted 
to Senasi’s work on how Crashaw’s poetry actively instructs its readers to engage in 
embodied reading practices. 
 
Indistinguishable Others: Spelling Wrong to Read Crashaw Right 
 
Crashaw’s most explicit and oft-quoted poetic instruction for right reading is indisputably 
within his poem “The Flaming Heart,” wherein his admiration for Saint Teresa and her 
ecstatic union with Christ is provocatively figured in direct comparison to its usual 
pictorial representation.  In the poem’s prefatory note, Crashaw invites readers to 
consider “the Book and Picture of the Seraphical Saint Teresa (As She Is Usually 
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Expressed with a Seraphim beside Her)” (238).114  The parenthetical note directs readers 
to engage in a dual interpretive practice: not only must they read the poem, but also 
envision Saint Teresa’s image as it is traditionally figured with a spear-wielding 
Seraphim hovering over her.  We are thus encouraged to simultaneously engage in 
several reading modes that also represent divergent aesthetic appeals: the visual and the 
verbal.  These modes appear equally important to the reading task at hand, as Crashaw 
advises that neither interpretive method alone could provide the correct reading of this 
stimulating devotional image.  Instead, by inviting readers to study his words as well as 
the picture in their mind’s eye, Crashaw asks those “Well-meaning readers! you that 
come as friends” (l. 1) to practice the grammatical literacy required for reading and also 
the liturgical literacy required for viewing and experiencing the sacred scene imagined 
within the space of the poem.  In order to accomplish this dual reading, Crashaw 
commands,  
  Readers, be ruled by me; and make 
  Here a well-placed and wise mistake.  
  You must transpose the picture quite,  
  And spell it wrong to read it right (ll. 7-10).   
 
In the remainder of the poem to come, as Senasi points out, “the reader here will be 
directed, through the use of imperatives and capitalization linked with verbal meaning, to 
think and feel in specified ways at specified times…. that sense of authorial control is not 
merely a question of what is being read, but how it is read” (Senasi 14).  Crashaw’s 
urging “to read rightly not only the individual words of the poem” but also “larger bodies 
of meaning envisioned on a broader semiotic scale” (Senasi 14), suggests that both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Unless otherwise noted, this and all subsequent references to Crashaw’s poetry will be 
taken from The English Poems of Richard Crashaw, ed. Richard Rambuss (Minneapolis 
and London: U of Minnesota P, 2013). 
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grammatical and liturgical interpretive practices are necessary for readers to accurately 
and feelingly interpret his poem.   
 This bridging of literacy practices that appear to be otherwise at odds is reinforced 
by Crashaw’s instruction to “transpose” the picture, a verb choice with multivalent 
possibilities.  Crashaw could be instructing his reader to rearrange the picture’s elements 
and imagine Teresa as the active agent, piercing and penetrating the passive seraphim 
with her dart (OED 5).  Likewise, the directive to transpose might simply encourage 
readers to consider the picture’s adaptation in terms of artistic form as it moves from 
visual image to verbal poetry (OED 2).  Finally, in his command to “transpose the picture 
quite” Crashaw might very well allude to Teresa’s own transformation and conversion 
from a single self into another form, a self-in-other as the saint and seraphim transform 
from separate entities to one celestial being through an indiscernible exchange of ecstatic 
darts and wounds (OED 1).  The verb choice simultaneously suggests all three meanings, 
but the weight of Crashaw’s instruction lies in this last connotation, as the first stanza’s 
concluding couplet makes clear: “Read him for her, and her for him; / And call the saint 
the seraphim” (ll. 11-12).  In order to read rightly, instructs Crashaw, we must understand 
the exact nature of the transposition that has taken place.  Prior to this couplet, Crashaw 
bids his reader to “spell it wrong to read it right” (l. 10), which encourages grammatical 
attention through its precise focus on spelling, or the execution of proper linguistic skill 
as the primary means to interpret the picture.  The final couplet, however, inverts the 
orthographic order we have been called to notice, and we are left at odds with the poem’s 
verbal meaning as Crashaw directs the imagined painter to reinterpret and reorient his 
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painting to better account for the liturgical semiotics of Teresa’s writing, rather than 
simply reporting their grammatical content in visual form.  
 Given the pictorial representation of the saint and seraphim as side-by-side 
Crashaw’s instruction to read him for her and her for him means much more than simply 
imagining the two switching physical locations.  Rather, the reader must transpose the 
affective work and embodied state the saint and seraphim are meant to represent.  
According to the appropriate order of the painting, the male seraphim penetrates the 
female saint, and she is inseminated with a powerful godly affect that alters her bodily 
state from a woman’s usual coolness to a hot fiery zeal for God: 
  Why man, this speaks pure mortal frame; 
  And mocks with female frost love’s manly flame. 
  One would suspect thou meant’st to paint 
  Some weak, inferior, woman saint. (ll. 23-6)   
 
Crashaw directs our attention explicitly to this humoral transformation, and the affective 
state that causes such a transposition in order to accentuate the inversion that has taken 
place.  Senasi’s reading of this transposition, that “Crashaw admonishes the conventions 
of painterly representation in this poem not to dismiss them as a ‘vehicle of truth’ but to 
correct them” (15) is certainly accurate, but I would like to push this assertion even 
further.  Crashaw’s transposal of her for him and weak female coolness for powerful 
male heat does more than correct the notion that either the word or the image is the 
“vehicle for truth”; instead, they function in unison, mutually reinforcing the other as 
both the saint and seraphim as well as painting and poem take on the other’s qualities.  
This convergence of supposed opposites reveals the troubling incongruity that led Robert 
Martin Adams to influentially identify Crashaw’s affinity for unifying elements of “the 
most intense opposition, his ‘highest’ thoughts and ‘lowest’ feelings, his most physical 
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sensations and his most spiritual aspirations” (66) with the poet’s inherently “bad 
taste.”115  The hierarchy Adams alludes to here is interesting, in that Crashaw’s spiritual 
thoughts are described as much higher in the taxonomy of appropriate subjects for poetry 
than the ardent feelings he evokes or appeals to in order to express those thoughts.  Given 
the gendering of these two categories, and Crashaw’s indecorous blending of the two, 
Adams’ reaction to Crashaw’s apparently lofty masculine thoughts but lowly feminine 
expression sounds altogether like the very anxiety expressed by male clergy who so 
diligently tied devotion to linguistically expressed thoughts over the feelings which might 
convey those very ideas in and through the body’s participation with liturgical 
performance.  The yoking of Crashaw’s “bad taste” with his blending of contraries that 
evoke the divisive interpretive paradigms of Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, as 
well as contemporary notions that grammatical literacy appealed to men and liturgical 
literacy to women, reveals potential critical discomfort with, and perhaps even bias 
against poetry that seeks more than mimesis, but incarnation of real presence and the real 
devotional affect that positions believers to receive such presence.116 
 Happily, Alexander Wong’s treatment of Crashaw’s “weak, inferior, woman 
saint” (l. 26), reprises Adams’s portrayal of Crashaw’s incongruity by suggesting its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 For the relationship between Crashaw’s conjoining of incongruous images, like pain 
with pleasure, life with death, fruition with denial, and the body with the spiritual, see 
Robert Martin Adams, “Taste and Bad Taste in Metaphysical Poetry: Richard Crashaw 
and Dylan Thomas,” Hudson Review 8 (1955): 61-77. 
116 Recent Crashaw studies, thankfully, have sought to redress Crashaw’s label of having 
“bad taste” with careful attention to the sacramental and incarnational elements within his 
verse.  See Ryan Netzley, “Reading Indistinction” (2011); Gary Kuchar, “The Gendering 
of God” (2005); Kimberly Johnson, “Richard Crashaw’s Indigestible Poetics” (2014); 
and Richard Rambuss, “Crashaw and the Metaphysical Shudder; Or, How to Do Things 
with Tears,” in Structures of Feeling in Seventeenth-Century Cultural Expression, ed. 
Susan McClary (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2012), 253-71. 
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foundation in the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition of utilizing inappropriate or unfitting 
images to describe the divine.  According to Wong, the sheer incongruity of some of 
Crashaw’s more grotesque or improper images serve the larger, and Dionysian, aim of 
highlighting the numinous and inexpressible nature of God.  Crashaw’s deliberate gesture 
to the painting’s “weak, inferior, woman saint” thus appears incongruous with the 
impressive and spiritually potent figure the poem later depicts.  In contrast, Wong 
suggests that  
  the image of a dumpy old woman, so mundanely realistic, might likewise  
  prevent the imagination from reaching the higher truth about the saint.  So  
  Crashaw suggests an imaginative alteration to the traditional image,  
  which, making it much less realistic or believable – making it, indeed,  
  rather absurd, by means of a paradoxical and deliberately perverse   
  metaphysical transposition –  allows for a more profound understanding of 
  spiritual realities.  (Wong 356) 
Crashaw’s revision thus intentionally moves from “pure mortal frame” (l. 23) by 
compelling readers to account for the abundant and unnatural heat that Teresa emits as a 
woman who “mocks with female frost love’s manly flame” (l. 24).  Readers are called to 
take heed of the material elements of the figures presented, but in this inversion, readers 
are equally directed to realize that this exchange is, in Wong’s words, “perverse” and 
“absurd.”  The absurdity of the humoral inversion of the genders productively propels 
readers to understand that the passionate body is an important conduit of faith, but those 
passions must be directed by right thoughts. Robert Martin Adams’ categories might well 
be reinvoked more productively here as it appears Crashaw’s incongruous portrayal of 
the saint and the seraphim require that both thoughts and feelings be directed toward the 
highest spiritual ideal for meaning to be made.  Rather than bad taste, it seems, Crashaw’s 
inverting transposition of gender categories intentionally blurs the divide between 
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liturgical and grammatical literacy modes, words and images, thoughts and feelings, cold 
women and hot men. 
 The result in readers is both a heightened attention to grammatical as well as 
liturgical literacy as they become conscious of a struggle between these vying interpretive 
modes.  As this process is underway, Crashaw refuses to relinquish his authorial 
prerogative.  He plays the part of school master fashioning and framing our grammatical 
literacy, and never letting its import escape us, whilst also playing the role of affective 
tutor, by forcing us to develop the proper bodily responses to the liturgical resonances of 
the images he lays out before us, both verbal and visual.  For instance, immediately after 
compelling readers to attribute “all those fair and flagrant things” (l. 34) that describe the 
young seraphim to Teresa, Crashaw reminds readers that he is in control of both the 
images before us, and also the interpretative work we engage in through our reading:  
  Do then as equal right requires, 
  Since his the blushes be, and hers the fires, 
  Resume and rectify thy rude design;  
  Undress thy seraphim into mine. 
  Redeem this injury of thy art; 
  Give him the veil, give her the dart. (ll. 37-42)   
Crashaw instructs readers to “resume” our interpretive work through the blending of our 
grammatical attention to his words and their precise order with the image in our mind’s 
eye as we “rectify” or improve the visual image by following his direction alone.  The 
reader must thus become conscious of their own cognitive processes, which rely entirely 
upon an imagined reenactment of the scene according to Crashaw’s precise direction; the 
reader is compelled to follow Crashaw’s lead as his picture is reassembled and simulated 
in their mind’s eye, replete with its emotional underpinning.  In this hermeneutic, readers 
become deeply aware of how their own cognitive processes are written on and within the 
	  139 
body as they struggle to make meaning in the poem, either grammatically or through the 
emotive responses that register through the passionate body as a consequence of 
Crashaw’s surprising inversions.  Regardless of which register is at work, though, 
Crashaw remains in complete and total control.  All of the reader’s interpretive agency is 
subsumed in Crashaw’s imaging; in comparison to his ornate inversions, our design is 
deemed “rude” and in need of rectification.  Crashaw’s charge that readers “Undress thy 
seraphim into mine” (l. 40) insinuates that right reading will only come when readers 
strip themselves of individual interpretive agency.  In this blending of grammar, grace, 
and godly affect, readers, it seems, must be ruled in order to read right. 
 Ultimately, as a result of the synchronized push and pull between reader and 
speaker and also word and image, the text becomes a space of liturgical performance 
constructed around the very ambiguity between learned ability, performance, and 
understanding that Katherine Zieman points to in her construction of liturgical literacy.  
This tension allows Crashaw to not only transcend the oppositional constructions of 
verbal versus visual and grammatical versus liturgical literacies, but also to construct 
space for an ideal reader who, by virtue of forced attention to these binary categories, is 
both linguistically capable of following Crashaw’s direction and also emotionally 
engaged enough to perform the type of sacramental seeing Crashaw requires.  Crashaw 
thus encourages a potentially surprising view of the cognition required to practice 
grammatical literacy in that his ideal reader cannot separate the body from the mind, but 
must come to recognize that “cognition not only requires a brain, but is grounded more 
fully, not only in the body, but in the marriage of a whole person with the world” (Teske 
760).  For the poem to make meaning, readers are compelled to at once identify the 
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poem’s liturgical resonances while also feeling them deeply and authentically in their 
hearts, but a singular deployment of either meaning-making mode will fail to accurately 
reflect the poem’s message.  That message can only come from a marriage of mind with 
body, thoughts with feelings, and the reader with an Other whom selfhood is recognized 
through and with.   
 As these interpretive modes have historically been attached to female and male 
devotional communities, Crashaw’s ideal reader crosses a set of discursive boundaries 
that fall along deeply gendered lines.  Much like Thomas Traherne, Richard Crashaw’s 
construction of such a reader proffers a vision of devotional practice, and godly reading, 
that embraces a thoroughly intersubjective mode of self-making, a mode that is 
profoundly reliant on gender transitivity.  While I have made a similar claim about 
Thomas Traherne, who depicts both Christ and the Virgin Mary with hermaphroditic 
qualities so that his Divine Other can be both foreign and accessible by crossing gendered 
divides, Richard Crashaw has been accused of writing from a solely feminine point of 
view.117  As a result, focusing on Crashaw’s gender transitivity opens up a new way of 
approaching this controversial poet.  In order to highlight this manipulation of gender 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 It is important to note that while a great deal of Crashavian criticism has focused on 
Crashaw’s seemingly feminine perspective, Richard Rambuss has made significant 
contributions to Crashaw studies with his assertion that much of Crashaw’s incarnational 
verse invokes a sacred eroticism that is deeply homoerotic. What is more, and in 
welcome contrast to critical attention to Crashaw’s commitment to religious women in 
both life and devotion, Rambuss has also called attention to the intimate circle of male 
poet-priests in which Crashaw circulated in his lifetime, of whom the most notable are 
Nicholas Ferrar, Joseph Beaumont, Abraham Cowley, and Thomas Carre.  For Rambuss’ 
analysis of Crashaw’s treatment of sacred eroticism see, Closet Devotions (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP, 1998); and “Sacred Subjects and the Aversive Metaphysical Conceit: Crashaw, 
Serrano, Ofili,” English Literary History 71.2 (Summer, 2004), 497-530.  For Rambuss’ 
treatment of homosocial resonances in Crashaw’s verse, see “Introduction,” in The 
English Poems of Richard Crashaw (Minneapolis and London: U of Minnesota P, 2013), 
lx-lxiii. 
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bounds, I would like to gesture back to Crashaw’s earlier directive that he will rule within 
the space of his poem and later that readers should “undress thy seraphim into mine” (l. 
40).  These domineering assertions do much to emphasize Crashaw’s own linguistic and 
poetic power, perhaps even hinting at the masculine voice critics expect from 
metaphysical poets of the period. It is on this very point that Susannah Mintz criticizes 
Maurine Sabine’s argument that Crashaw subverts conventionally gendered notions of 
identity in that Crashaw’s frequent portrayal of the feminine as emotional, nurturing 
mothers relegates women “to the realm of passivity and denies strong feeling to other 
contemporary male poets,” which ultimately leads to the “overtly male, often fiercely 
aggressive tone which Crashaw at times exhibits” (Mintz 113).118  Crashaw’s directive to 
“rule” his readers in “The Flaming Heart” is certainly one of the most aggressively 
masculine moments in his entire canon.  Yet this masculine potential is at risk of being 
overrun by the feminine excess that characterizes the passages to come and Crashaw’s 
description of Teresa’s effluxive and ecstatic union with the divine.  In an attempt to 
straddle the fine line between masculine poetic control and the feminized excess that 
guarantees “the mysterious moment of illumination” that comes with “the Eucharistic 
‘sealing’ of words with Word, of names and Name, of particular with universal” (Kuchar 
101), Crashaw constructs a devotional speaker whose poetic skill and very selfhood rely 
upon an intersubjective exchange with several Others: a divine Other in the form of 
Teresa, a devotional Other in the form of his reader, and also an artistic Other in the 
fictitious painter against whom Crashaw compares his artistic skill and the veracity of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In Mintz’s claim that such gendered binaries deny other early modern male poets the 
ability to feel strongly and deeply, she specifically points to Herbert’s “Grief” and 
Donne’s “A Valediction Forbidding Weeping,” where both male poets express 
considerable, if not prodigious grief and emotional vulnerability.  
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devotional vision.  By developing such an extensive set of Others, Crashaw is able to 
engage directly in the “tensions between his phallogocentric form and gynocentric 
theme” (Kuchar 98), or, as I have argued above, the tensions between the grammatical 
literacy that supports a phallogocentric view of devotional practice and the liturgical 
literacy that enables incarnational poetics.  
 In order to maintain his control, Crashaw reinvests in the power of his gendered 
inversion and heightens the rhetoric surrounding Teresa’s masculine fire as he directs 
readers, through the guise of instructing the painter, “Give him the veil; that he may 
cover / The red cheeks of a rivaled lover. / Ashamed that our world, now, can show / 
Nests of new seraphims below” (ll. 43-46).  Teresa’s astounding activity is deliberately 
juxtaposed with the seraphim’s passivity, but his bashful shame is also the result of 
Teresa’s perverse figuration as a rival lover whose virility is confirmed in the production 
of “nests of seraphim below.”  The “nests” that have only “now” been filled with newly 
conceived seraphim are a result not of the male seraphim’s zeal for God, but Teresa’s 
startling virility.  In Crashaw’s rendering, Teresa’s fiery zeal for God flies out from her 
ecstatic merger with the divine filling nests in the world below with her spiritual 
children.119  The image evokes Song of Solomon 14 wherein the beloved bridegroom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Likewise, Teresa’s virility is similarly figured in “A Hymn to the Name and Honor of 
the Admirable Saint Teresa,” wherein Teresa’s ecstatic communion and enflaming faith 
produces “sons of thy vows” (l. 167).  In his “Introduction” to the most recent critical 
edition of Crashaw’s poetry, Richard Rambuss points to the transition from the feminine 
pronouns of “she” and “her” to “he” and “his,” the result of which is Teresa’s 
“hypergender” morphing into a “hypermaternity” in “A Hymn” (lxx).  While Rambuss 
identifies the gendered transpositions of these pronouns as producing “hypermaternity,” I 
think it is important to note that this brand of maternity is characterized by its masculine 
production, which in turn highlights Teresa’s own masculine qualities.  Like 
Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth, whose self-induced unsexing leads her husband to declare, 
“Bring forth men children only, / For thy undaunted mettle should compose / Nothing but 
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Christ is metaphorized as a dove fluttering to nest within the clefts of the rock.  The 
erotics of the passage suggest that the nurturing and procreant image of a nest enclosed 
within the security of a rocky barrier could easily be read as a womb.  The anonymous 
late fourteenth-century religious love lyric “In a Valey of This Restless Mynde” clarifies 
this reading as its author “draws on the rich tradition of associating Christ’s wounds with 
sexual and spiritual ecstasy” (McCullough 28).  The poet writes:  
  Alle myn humours Y have opened hir to – 
  There my bodi hath maad hir hertis baite, 
  Quia amore langueo. 
  In my side Y have made hir neste.  
  Loke in: How weet a wounde is here! (originally cited in McCullough 29)   
The sexual and Eucharistic connotations of these lines work together, as Eleanor 
McCullough points out in “the reference to ‘humours,’ or the mingling of the blood and 
water of Christ with the milk and blood of the female” (29).120  While Crashaw’s allusion 
to Song of Solomon does not contain the suggestive language of Christ’s side wound as a 
womb-like sacred space in which ecstatic lovemaking and mystical union occur, the 
resonances are still quite similar.121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
males” (1.7.72-74), Teresa’s maternal mettle, it seems, reveals masculinity and thus her 
gender representation is blurry at best. 
120 Eleanor McCullough usefully offers this modern rendition of the verse: “I have 
opened her up to all my bodily fluids -- / There my body has been made bait for her heart, 
/ Because I languish in love. / In my side I have made her nest. / Look in: How wet a 
wound is here!” (29). 
121 Crashaw’s devotion to imaging the sacred body, and sacred wounds, of the God 
incarnate Christ, is perhaps most evident in his sequence of divine epigrams wherein 
Christ’s wounds are repeatedly celebrated for their productivity: in “On the Wounds of 
Our Crucified Lord” Crashaw’s speaker wonders if Christ’s wounds are either mouths or 
eyes that either cry or kiss; in “On our Crucified Lord Naked, and Bloody” the side 
wound is imagined as a “purple wardrobe” housing Christ’s sacred blood, which the 
faithful should put on as the richest dressing available to them (l. 4); and finally, in “On 
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 Teresa’s humoral inversion earlier in the poem similarly calls our attention to the 
bodily effects of love.  Christ the bridegroom’s assertion that his body is open for 
penetration, indeed graphically so as he demands that his beloved, and also his reading 
audience, look into his wet wound, is the result of languishing in love for his beloved.  
The result of such deeply felt love is a highly feminized Christ who simultaneously 
occupies the position of male bridegroom and the female beloved who both invites and is 
open for penetration.  Teresa’s position in “The Flaming Heart” is similarly gender 
bending in its increasingly devotional emphasis on a female body that morphs into a lover 
capable of filling all of the nests, or wombs, of the world with her inseminating spirit.  
According to Roland Barthes, “A man is not feminized because he is inverted but 
because he is in love” (14); ironically, when this same philosophy of love is applied to a 
woman, it seems as though she can be made masculine through the inverting power of 
love.122  Regardless, just as Christ’s hermaphroditic qualities mark him as both and 
neither, Teresa similarly occupies a transitive position within this poem.  She is powerful 
and active, penetrating and potent, but Crashaw ultimately restrains her shocking 
transitivity, and the liturgically rich resonances that come with it, in favor of reminding 
his readers that he, not she, holds the power.  She might have the dart, but his pen 
ultimately has the power to craft our relationship with her through his art.  
 Crashaw’s speaker shifts from directly addressing and commanding his readers to 
focus on Teresa’s procreative, and seemingly masculine, power to direct not only the 
young seraphim within the poem, but also the very darts that spring from Teresa’s eyes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Bleeding Wounds of our Crucified Lord,” Christ’s wounds emit rivers (l. 4) that 
ultimately mix with his tears to water roses (l. 24). 
122 Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (1978; New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2010). 
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Crashaw repeatedly charges the young male seraphim to not only give Teresa the dart, 
but he commands all of the hearts she has penetrated to speak and verbally recount the 
power of her love.  For example, Crashaw compels the seraphim to  
  Give her the dart for it is she 
  (Fair youth) shoots both thy shaft and thee. 
  Say, all ye wise and well-pierced hearts  
  That live and die amidst her darts, 
  What is’t your tasteful spirits do prove 
  In that rare life of her, and love? 
  Say and bear witness.  Sends she not  
  A seraphim at every shot? 
  What magazines of immortal arms there shine! 
  Heav’n’s great artillery in each love-spun line. (ll. 47-56) 
Through the amplified register with which Crashaw fashions Teresa’s heart-piercing 
penetrative ecstasy, the passionate and permeable hearts of his readers are metonymically 
represented in those that “live and die amidst her darts.”  Crashaw’s affective language is 
meant to function as powerfully as Teresa’s gaze within the space of the poem.  In life 
Teresa may have favored private and secluded devotional spaces for prayer and writing, 
as her reform initiatives within the Carmelite order suggest, but within the space of 
Crashaw’s poem, her heart flames outward as effervescently and publicly as possible.  
What is within Teresa cannot be contained.   
 The intensity of her penetrating gaze is further highlighted by Crashaw’s repeated 
imperative to “say” (l. 49) and then to “say and bear witness” (l. 53).  While readers may 
respond with lively affect to Crashaw’s shocking and incongruous representation of 
Teresa as a wildly productive lover, these demands ensure that readers remain cognizant 
of the linguistic skill required to properly read and interpret his poem and not become 
transfixed on the provocative images alone.  This figuration of Teresa decisively fashions 
this provocative female saint in the image of Christ in its deliberate echo of the Christ-as-
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Cupid conceit deployed throughout much of Crashaw’s Christological poetry.  For 
example, just as Crashaw demands here that readers “say and bear witness” to Teresa’s 
loving and productive excess, he makes a similar gesture in his Passion poem, “On the 
Wounds of the Lord Jesus” when his speaker ostensibly invites the Roman soldiers 
responsible for Christ’s crucifixion to “come, and see / Mighty Love’s artillery” (ll. 1-2).  
This directive to view the instruments of Christ’s sacred wounds as “Mighty Love’s 
artillery” sounds remarkably similar to Crashaw’s pun on Teresa’s fiery gaze produced 
through his own enflaming poetry in “The Flaming Heart” when he asserts that apt 
readers will surely identify “Heav’n’s great artillery in each love-spun line” (l. 56).  In his 
refashioning of the traditional arma Christi with eroticized weapons of love, Teresa 
comes to occupy Christ’s exact position in this Passion poem.  While Teresa sends “a 
seraphim at every shot” (l. 54) and shines forth with “magazines of immortal arms” (l. 
55), readers of “On the Wounds of the Lord Jesus” are instructed to imagine 
  the conquering dart; and lo  
  There shines his quiver, there his bow.  
  These the passive weapons are,  
  That made great Love a man of war.  
  The quiver, that he bore, did bide  
  So near, it proved his very side.  
  In it there sat but one sole dart;  
  A piercing one, his pierced heart.  (ll. 3-10) 
Crashaw thus simultaneously figures Christ as a “man of war” whose “great Love” 
renders him both a victim of the Roman soldiers’ weapons and also a weapon who 
himself wounds those readers who read Crashaw’s words with appropriate emotional 
engagement.  
 Teresa’s martial representation is similarly reflexive as she wields a gaze whose 
darts equal even God’s greatest battery, and, according to Plato’s effluxive visual theory, 
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that gaze may be emitted through eyes that project beams or “lines” of light outward.  
However, Crashaw reminds us that it is he who wields the pen that engenders such 
incredible devotional affect in Christ, Teresa, and readers themselves.  My reading of 
“pen” for “dart” here is aided by Crashaw’s own comparison earlier in “The Flaming 
Heart,” when he redresses his fictitious painter as: “most poor-spirited of men! / had thy 
cold pencil kissed her pen / Thou couldst not so unkindly err / To show us this faint shade 
for her” (ll. 19-22).  Crashaw’s accusation that the painter of such a poor image has only 
a “cold pencil” at his disposal is suggestive, especially given its proximity to Teresa’s 
humoral inversion from female frost to manly flame in line 24.  The underlying assertion, 
it seems, is that the fictional artist, in direct comparison to Crashaw, composes from a 
female disposition.  His pencil is too cold to properly image a Saint as fiery as Teresa; 
Crashaw’s pencil and the poet who employs it, on the other hand, are suggestively 
figured as effective and as scorchinlyg hot as Teresa’s darts. 
 As Crashaw attempts to direct our attention away from Teresa’s gaze and onto his 
own potent rhetorical might, however, something strange occurs: he claims allegiance 
with the seraphim!  Crashaw’s speaker backpedals from figuring Teresa’s startling 
activity by declaring: “But if it be the frequent fate / Of worst faults to be fortunate; / If 
all’s prescription; and proud wrong / Hearkens not to a humble song; / For all the 
gallantry of him, / Give me the suffering seraphim” (ll. 59- 64).  Given the speaker’s 
great admiration for Teresa, and also the rhetorical work Crashaw has put into investing 
her inversion with liturgical weight, this sudden attention to and affection for the 
seraphim seems an unexpected turn.  Crashaw suggests that if pride and aesthetic 
prescription prevent the reader from being impacted or moved by his “humble song,” 
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then turning their attention from Teresa’s stage-stealing flames to a humble male seraph 
may provide a more aesthetically pleasing devotional subject.  According to our speaker, 
the male seraph’s appeal derives specifically from his “gallantry,” a pointed descriptor 
suggesting a range of meanings: a splendid appearance (2a), bravery or heroic bearing 
(3a), courtliness, or devotion to the female sex (5a), loyalty and devotion to a monarch 
(5b), and finally amorous intercourse with the opposite sex (8a).  A great many of these 
definitions could easily have been applied to Crashaw himself; his description in the 
Legenda Lignea (1652/3) alludes at least to those dealing with the opposite sex, and his 
loyalty to Queen Henrietta Maria certainly would dub him “gallant.”  His aesthetic tastes 
in both church ornamentation and poetry account for his interest in splendid appearance, 
even if not for his person, and these splendors might very well also account for 
Crashaw’s highly suggestive, even amorous poetic engagement with women.   
 In this sudden empathy for the seraph’s position Crashaw invites readers to 
associate the bashful but gallant angel with him, a poet and priest whose devotion to holy 
women was so great that he suffered alienation and persecution for the sake of his gallant 
devotion, a feminine devotion that continues to mark Crashaw’s critical heritage.  
Crashaw entertains this association with the seraph for a mere moment before turning his 
attention back to Teresa, but his gallant words have formed a gorgeous image that erects 
an affecting intersubjectivity between Crashaw, the seraph, and the flaming female saint 
whom neither can quite outshine.  Such an intersubjective construction of the speaker, the 
poet, and poem’s devotional subjects reflects Crashaw’s deliberate linkage of the mind 
and body, both actively engaged in the process of discerning how his rhetorical skill 
commands both liturgical and grammatical attention in his readers.  The cognitive work 
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required to make sense of Crashaw’s imaging then is inherently social, demanding that 
readers consciously “simulate our own minds to understand those of others, particularly 
their interior states, their pleasures and pains, their emotions, and their intentions” (Teske 
766).  In order to properly perceive Crashaw’s complex inversions and transpositions, his 
empathy and intersubjectivity, readers must come to identify the relational model 
Crashaw assembles between the saint and the seraph, but also between themselves and 
the devotional figures he has produced. 
 If John Teske’s assertion that “intersubjectivity is built from felt bodily states” 
(766) is true, and if indeed Crashaw is invested in an intersubjective mode of self-making 
here, then he must figure the relation between the saint, the seraph, and the reader in a 
way that appeals to our sensory and cerebral perceptions, and he does.  This relation is 
fashioned explicitly through Crashaw’s emphasis on bodily states.  As the poem 
continues, Crashaw proceeds to transpose his own position within the inversion, 
removing the ecstatic descriptors he had earlier attributed to Teresa.  Now, the seraphim 
lays claim to “the bravery of all those bright things, / The glowing cheeks, the glistering 
wings; / The rosy hand, the radiant dart” (ll. 65-7), and readers are directed to “Leave her 
alone the flaming heart” (l. 68).  All of the masculine qualities previously attributed to 
Teresa are thus stripped away, revealing only her ardent passion for God as she fully 
transcends her earthly self.  This transformation comes as Teresa moves from shooting 
darts at Crashaw’s readers, to being left with “Not one loose shaft but love’s whole 
quiver” (l. 70).  She transitions from active shooter to the literal receptacle that holds the 
arrows; she still emits divine love, but in a much more reflexive manner, as Crashaw 
contends: 
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  For in love’s field was never found  
  A nobler weapon than a wound. 
  Love’s passives are his activ’st part. 
  The wounded is the wounding heart. 
  O heart! the equal poise of love’s both parts 
  Big alike with wounds and darts.  (ll. 71-76) 
 
Crashaw’s representation of love as a battlefield fraught with both weapons and wounds 
draws on a long tradition extending back through Plato and Ovid.  Where Teresa was 
previously envisioned as the agent of love actively inseminating and procreating in the 
earthly nests of readers’ hearts, she is now presented fully as the victim of God’s love, or 
charitatis victim.  “To be a recipient of the ‘wound of love’ dealt by God, and described 
not only by Teresa but by John of the Cross and Francis de Sales,” writes Sarah 
Covington, “is to be conjoined to the divine while also reminded of the distance of the 
union; one receives the wound of his presence but cannot endure the pain of that presence 
in one’s body—that love—for any length of time” (164).  The result of such an image is a 
profound emphasis on Teresa’s embodiment and the reader’s obligation to interpret this 
ecstatic body appropriately.  Rather than leaving readers alone to confront this 
interpretive pressure, Crashaw comes to our aid, drawing our attention to the paradoxical 
activity and passivity of Teresa’s apostrophized heart.  Teresa’s enflamed heart has 
enlarged and grown “Big alike with wounds and darts” (l. 76), an all too somatic 
description that suggests more than divine presence.  The suggestion is that Teresa’s 
ability to absorb and internalize wounding darts of love has left her pregnant.   
 This profoundly embodied and uniquely female state presents a whole new mode 
of consciousness for Teresa, as it seems her sense of self, as well as her sense of God’s 
love, cannot be separated from her body.  Her “big” body reveals precisely what it also 
conceals, and the fact that she knows and has been known by the divine Other is 
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exhibited by her body; her subjectivity is thus derived through what Antonio Damasio 
describes as “somatic marking” a process wherein the sense of conscious experience is 
explicitly tied to bodily sensation, and cannot be understood without bodily 
perspective.123  In such a relation, the body and the mind are indistinguishable from each 
other, just as Teresa’s activity and passivity are figured in Crashaw’s famous assertion, 
“Love’s passives are his activ’st part” (l. 73), a reflexive positioning that sounds 
remarkably similar to the ultimate description of the relationship between Christ, his 
wounds, and the instruments of those sacred wounds in “On the Wounds of the Lord 
Jesus.”  In this incarnational Passion poem, Crashaw asserts, “The weapon, that he wore, 
he was” (l. 12), thus fashioning Christ’s penetrated body as both active and passive, a 
weapon and a wound.   Teresa’s active passivity is similarly figured in terms of both her 
consciousness of God’s wounding love and also her bodily expression of a love she both 
passively absorbs and also actively incubates in a most visible and visceral manner.  
Crashaw’s figuration of Teresa is decidedly Eucharistic as she takes on the role of a 
communicant whom God resides within in an especially physical manner.  In regard to 
Crashaw’s Eucharistic imagery, Kimberly Johnson suggests, “the reader…must confront 
language whose irreducible physicality works to veil the spiritual principle it represents, a 
poetic strategy that replicates the challenge of discerning Christ’s body through the 
representational veils of bread and wine” (121).  Ryan Netzley similarly argues, 
“Crashaw offers us [readers] a sacramental scenario that relies on indistinction, treating 
the communicant not as the consumer of the Eucharistic elements, but as potentially 
identical to them” (87).  Crashaw’s most liturgical scenes, it seems, are thus cloaked in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 For more on “somatic marking” see Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, 
Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994). 
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indistinction and irreducible physicality that could just as easily veil the divine Other as 
they might invoke Him.  The answer to this dilemma is consciousness of 
intersubjectivity, as it is produced through active reading attuned to both grammatical and 
liturgical interpretive modes.124   
 Crashaw’s suggestive envisioning of Teresa is meant to actively establish our 
understanding not only of her bodily state, but also of our own bodily states as we engage 
in the interpretive work of reading, envisioning, and feeling in response to Crashaw’s 
images.  It is not surprising then that Crashaw’s suggestive rendering of Teresa’s ecstasy 
as both Eucharistic and embodied is followed with yet another reminder of his authorial 
skill, and the negotiation he develops between the cognitive practices required for both 
liturgical and grammatical literacies.  Still addressing Teresa’s apostrophized heart, 
Crashaw directs the heart itself to 
  Live in these conquering leaves; live all the same;  
  And walk through all tongues one triumphant flame. 
  Live here, great heart; and love and die and kill;  
  And bleed and wound; and yield and conquer still.  (ll. 77-80) 
 
The assertion that Teresa’s heart lives within the leaves of Crashaw’s book of poetry 
suggests that he has brought her to life.  He has animated and enflamed the otherwise 
frumpy old woman saint produced by the fictitious painter through a portrayal of Teresa 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 According to Anthony Low, who follows Augustine Baker, Crashaw is an apt 
practitioner of “sensible devotion” or “sensible affection,” which differs from Ignatian 
meditative practices in its lesser emphasis on intellectual apprehension of the meditative 
object.  Rather, as Baker puts it, “sensible devotion” is the result of an “abundance of 
affections in the Heart,” which yields emotional expression.  Low describes this 
devotional mode in Crashaw’s verse in his claim that “There is no lack of intellectual 
activity in his poems, yet the affections seem to flow spontaneously, to require no 
promptings from reason or discursive imagination.”  See Anthony Low, Love’s 
Architecture: Devotional Modes in Seventeenth-Century English Poetry (New York: New 
York UP, 1978), 130-1.  
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centered entirely around the deluge of an incredible outpouring of love that dies, kills, 
bleeds, wounds, yields, and ultimately conquers.  Through Crashaw’s masterful depiction 
Teresa’s spiritual fervor is translated into “all tongues,” a claim that suggests she appeals 
to both the visual and verbal inclinations of her audience.125  The result is a saint who 
may no longer wield the seraphim’s dart, but whose life of “mystic deaths” (l. 83) leaves 
her always walking in a “crowd of loves and martyrdoms” (l. 82) making “wise souls” 
her “love-slain witnesses” (ll. 83-4).  The focus here is less on Teresa and much more on 
the overwhelmingly lethal heat of her heart, which burns so brightly with divine love that 
other souls who observe it are immediately slain by the force of her love.  Readers’ 
understanding of Teresa’s intersubjective relation to the divine Other, and of Teresa 
herself, is a direct result of the somatic markings divine love has produced within her but 
also in the reader’s consciousness of her somatically expressed love marking and 
wounding their own hearts as they read.  If they are “wise souls,” Crashaw instructs, they 
will find themselves both slain by her love and witness to an affective image that is so 
effective it generates crowds of martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves for such love. 126  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 This assertion resembles Crashaw’s depiction of the transnationality of the human soul 
in “An Apology for the Foregoing Hymn,” which follows “A Hymn to Saint Teresa” in 
the Steps to the Temple (1648), but follows both “A Hymn” and “The Flaming Heart” in 
Carmen Deo Nostro (1652).  In “An Apology” Crashaw defends his devotion to Teresa, a 
Roman Catholic and Spanish saint, by declaring: “Souls are not Spaniards too, one 
friendly flood / Of baptism blends them all into a blood” (ll. 15-16).  
126 Crashaw’s epigram “Luke 10: And a certain priest coming that way looked on him 
and passed by” presents an even more explicit commitment to a vision of Christ’s sacred 
wounds as reflexive, as the poem voices Christ admonishing an onlooker who is accused 
of passing by and “handling and turning” his wounds with “an unwounded eye” (l. 2).  
Crashaw’s physical language of “handling and turning” suggests that engaging in such 
sacred seeing without engaging the body and making oneself emotionally available to the 
liturgical scene envisioned divests the scene of its proper sacramentalism.  This is made 
evident in the poem’s ultimate claim that “the calm that cools thine eye does shipwrack 
mine…unmoved to see one wretched, it so make him so” (ll. 3-4).  In this construction 
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Crashaw’s commitment to intersubjectivity becomes most clear in his consistent 
emphasis on the heat of Teresa’s heart, which he directly addresses as “O sweet 
incendiary” (l. 85), a transition that clarifies the metonymic relationship between the 
heart and heat itself while also generating considerable empathy.  Hers is a flaming heart, 
but also a heart that causes others to flame.  This chiastic representation generates 
considerable empathy, as Teresa’s great woundedness produces an empathic exchange, 
wherein the affective experience of Teresa herself is mirrored in the reader, who in turn 
comes to recognize the self through an empathic blurring of selves, bodies, hearts, heat, 
and feelings.127  In this view, “the self and other have no independent existence, no 
intrinsic identity, and our subjectivity is preceded by an intersubjectivity produced by 
empathies running deeply beneath our embodied and interdependent biological lives” 
(Teske 779).  In Crashaw’s depiction of this overheated exchange between a self and 
other comes consciousness of the self that is bred through both intersubjectivity and the 
embodied cognitive processes at work in the act of reading and feeling his devotional 
verse.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Crashaw, voicing Christ, demands not only a gaze into his wounds, but a reflexive 
woundedness in his audience, else they make Christ suffer even more violently by 
suffering alone.  Much like “The Flaming Heart,” this poem demonstrates Crashaw’s 
devotion to intersubjectivity as the primary means to generate and also interpret real 
presence.    
127 Usefully enough, cognitive scientists explain that the feeling of empathy is the direct 
result of involuntary and sensorimotor coupling mediated by “mirror neurons” that are 
active in the perception of intent as well as understanding the emotional and mental states 
of others as mirror neurons simulate similar motions.  See Vittorio Galles, Christian 
Keysers, and Giacomo Rizzolatti, “A Unifying View of the Basis of Social Cognition,” 
Trends in Cognitive Science 8 (2004): 396-403; Giacomo Rizzalati and Laila Craighero, 
“The Mirror-Neuron System,” Annual Review of Neuroscience 27 (2004): 169-92; and 
Marco Iacobini, Mirroring People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).  
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 In the flames that erupt from Teresa’s heart comes a liturgical moment with the 
potential to overwhelm or over-wound the reader with its piercing affect.  Crashaw 
consequently tempers Teresa’s flames by once again drawing our attention to his 
governing role in her production, directing her heart to  
  …show here thy art,  
  Upon this carcass of a hard, cold, heart; 
  Let all thy scattered shafts of light, that play 
  Among the leaves of thy large books of day,  
  Combined against this breast at once break in 
  And take away from me my self and sin, 
  This gracious robbery shall thy bounty be; 
  And my best fortunes such fair spoils of me. (ll. 85-92) 
In Crashaw’s demand that Teresa’s heart, not Teresa herself, show her “art” and begin the 
affective work of breaking open the speaker’s cold heart, Crashaw gestures back to the 
humoral inversion at the poem’s outset that enables Teresa to wield such a potent and 
enflamed heart.  However, this humoral interchange between a cold male and a hot 
woman does much more than give Teresa the male attributes of heat and activity – her 
heat, and the poet’s artful construction of it, initiates the kenotic process of self-emptying 
essential to the spiritual rebirth and renewal that will come with consciousness of the self 
as a devotional subject.  Crashaw’s speaker takes on the passive part by actively inviting 
the piercing and penetrating light emitted from her holy heart, which is figured as an open 
book that comes and turns the dark night of his soul to a blisteringly hot day.  
Consequently, the speaker becomes as hot as she, and the old self is burnt up in fiery zeal 
for God’s love.  Such sacramental imagery might very easily be read as too affective – 
pointing too much to the body and the heightened emotional register required to 
accurately make meaning of this scene – but Crashaw accounts for even this response as 
he points readers back to the idea of fortunate misreading found in the assertion that his 
	  156 
“best fortunes” are found in such “fair spoils of me” (l. 92).  The speaker’s claim to be 
fortunate in his faults derives from the newfound knowledge of self he has gained from 
the painful purging of sin that has commenced with his careful transposition of Teresa as 
the hot and holy agent at the center of Crashaw’s text.  This misreading or transposition is 
the product of Crashaw’s own careful tutorial of his readers and their reading habits, and 
thus Crashaw once again calls any overly enflamed readers to remember their 
grammatical attention, and continue to follow his rule.   
 This gentle reminder of his authorial prerogative, and the reader’s lack of 
interpretive agency, introduces a slew of apostrophic and hyperbolic expressions meant to 
amplify the emotional register of the poem’s conclusion.  Crashaw addresses Teresa 
explicitly now, and no longer directs his attention to her heart alone, exclaiming, “O thou 
undaunted daughter of desires!” (l. 93).  Crashaw then immediately attempts to describe 
such divine desire through a set of ever-increasing comparisons that project the presence 
of a divine Other who responds intimately, emotively, and bodily to Teresa’s intense 
desires: 
  By all thy dow’r of lights and fires; 
  By all the eagle in thee, all the dove; 
  By all thy lives and deaths of love; 
  By thy large draughts of intellectual day, 
  And by thy thirsts of love more large than they; 
  By all thy brim-filled bowls of fierce desire; 
  By thy last morning’s draught of liquid fire (ll. 94-100). 
 
The focus here is on a divine Other who becomes present through the affective work of 
devotion and with the incarnational rhetoric that triangulates between the devotional 
desire voiced in Crashaw’s amplified comparisons, his subject-speaker’s desire to read 
Teresa rightly, and his readers’ desire to interpret the poem both feelingly and 
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thoughtfully.  The final scene in Crashaw’s imagining is that of a wedding, where Teresa 
takes on the part of bride, bringing her hot heart as a dowry to her bridegroom, Christ.  
This highly sensual imagery drawn from Song of Solomon relies heavily upon the 
reader’s passionate involvement with Teresa’s wounds of love brought about by her 
recognition of the intersubjective self, a self-in-relation to an empathic Other who feels 
and desires as passionately as she does.  In the traditional wedding imagery provided by 
Crashaw that figure is certainly the divine Other, but as the comparisons advance it 
becomes evident that a range of others are also present to wound and be wounded by 
Teresa’s flaming heart.  Crashaw’s diction directs the readers to never lose sight of 
themselves in this kenotic process as they are reminded to account for their own 
embodied cognitive practices as they interpret the poem.  Specifically, Crashaw’s 
“draughts of intellectual day” and “thirsts of love more large than they” appeal 
specifically to both grammatical as well as liturgical literacies, and the need for both in 
order for readers to “read right.”  Crashaw’s repeated emphasis on Teresa’s “draughts,” 
which is reiterated in lines 97 and 100, is an interesting choice in that it may well refer to 
the drawing of a bow or sweep of a weapon (10), as Teresa is originally described as 
wielding not only wounding darts but also love’s whole quiver, and thus the diction 
choice reminds readers of Teresa’s intense activity at the poem’s outset as well as her 
status of a Christ-like “man of war.”  “Draught” also suggests the drinking in of 
something either by the mind, soul, or body (16, 17), an interpretation that is assisted by 
Crashaw’s rendering of her love as “thirsts” (l. 98) that overwhelm “brim-fold bowls of 
fierce desire” (l. 99).  Crashaw’s extended description of Teresa’s desire also serves as a 
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draught, however, as the term can also refer to drawing or stretching something out (18), 
as Crashaw certainly does in this final pile of comparisons to describe Teresa’s love.   
 In fact, Crashaw’s interest in Teresa’s draughts functions much more 
convincingly as a reference to the self than a description of her ecstatic state, for Crashaw 
may also be punning on the drawing to which he refers to at the poem’s outset.  
“Draught” can also describe a writing implement’s stroke on a surface (25) or 
representation of figures in work of art (28b).  This final interpretation is reinforced by 
the parenthetical Crashaw embeds in the middle of this important final scene.  As the 
comparisons wind down, and the important intersubjective self-fashioning that comes 
with recognizing and knowing the self-in-relation is underway, Crashaw interrupts the 
kenotic process just as readers might come to fully recognize themselves as active agents 
within the poem’s intersubjective rendering of divine desire:  
  By the full kingdom of that final kiss 
  That seized thy parting soul, and sealed thee his; 
  By all the heav’ns thou hast in him 
  (Fair sister of the seraphim!) 
  By all of him we have in thee; 
  Leave nothing of my self in me.  (ll. 101-06) 
   
The most important, and also most liturgically significant moment of the wedding 
ceremony comes with the final kiss confirming the couple’s spiritual and physical union.  
Crashaw stylizes this crucial sacramental scene with Teresa’s soul departing her body to 
be fully sealed to the divine, but her ecstatic union serves a greater purpose in Crashaw’s 
rendering: it points to us.  Through her union, Crashaw contends, “we” have access to the 
divine Other and can know him as fully as she does, but our desire for him and access to 
him is channeled through Teresa’s desire as Crashaw’s subject-speaker declares “we” 
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have him only “through thee.”128  If we have not come to know ourselves through our 
reading of Teresa’s overwhelming desire, her insatiable thirsts, and her furious heat, then 
we certainly cannot come to know the divine Other.  We must engage in that particular 
sacramental seeing of the self that accommodates both our feelings and our thoughts as 
they interact within the body of the believer.  It seems meaningful then that this is the 
only plural first person pronoun that appears in the entire poem, as Crashaw deliberately 
transitions his speaker from the singular subjective states conveyed through the “you” 
and “me” of his earlier directives to the empathic blurring of subjective boundaries that 
“we” accomplishes.  Crashaw’s subject-speaker thus comes to see himself defined fully 
and completely in relation to an equally human set of others: his readers, with whom he is 
in communion. 
 Crashaw’s commitment to define the self in relation to an other, or more 
accurately a set of others, reveals that the self cannot recognize divine love without 
flowing into an other and seeing the self as part of the Other.  This celebration of 
intersubjectivity manifests most convincingly in Crashaw’s shocking interruption of 
Teresa’s and the readers’ kenosis with the parenthetical: “By all the heav’ns thou hast in 
him / (Fair sister of the seraphim!) / By all of him we have in thee; / Leave nothing of 
myself in me” (ll. 103-6).  The penultimate effect of such a startling interruption at the 
poem’s most sacramentally rich and resonant moment is to remind the reader of Crashaw, 
the poet who has directed our attention away from the seraphim’s powerful central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 In his reading of Thomas Carre’s “Crashawe, the Anagram,” Richard Rambuss 
declares that in the speaker’s homosocial bonding over both Crashaw’s and Carre’s 
mutual Marian devotion, “it is not Jesus who triangulates desire between men, as is often 
the case in such amorous spiritual friendships, but a startlingly eroticized Virgin Mary” 
(“Introduction” lxiii). 
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presence in the originally envisioned painting.  In this final thrust, Crashaw inserts 
himself fully into the space of the poem, defining himself in an intersubjective mode that 
relies on the communion between words and images as well as thoughts and feelings to 
enable the kenotic removal of self that comes with his final lines: “Let me so read thy 
life, that I / Unto all life of mine may die” (ll. 107-08).129  The enjambment in this final 
couplet is revealing: the self or “I” must flow outward in order to die for love of the 
Other.  This image is not nearly as provocatively liquescent as many of his other 
Teresean or Marian poems, but the effect is astoundingly similar in its focus on 
distribution and dissemination of the self through interrelation with an Other.130   
 Crashaw concludes his meditation on Teresa’s flaming heart and the liturgical as 
well as grammatical interpretive modes through which we must approach her image by 
breaking down the borders of the self.  His free acceptance of a boundless self, indeed a 
self who can “see our own hearts beating in the neck of the other” (Teske 781), is far 
from the highly individuated self seeking complete and utter removal from the body that 
Crashaw’s many critics have come to expect from his contemporaries and early modern 
devotional verse at large.  Rather, “The Flaming Heart” reveals what Ryan Netzley has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 The self evacuation enclosed in lines 106-108, which were appended to the poem as 
part of the larger final coda made up of lines 85-108, appear in the Carmen Deo Nostro 
printing and were almost certainly composed after Crashaw’s conversion to Roman 
Catholicism.  For all of his criticism of Crashaw’s excessive emotion, T.S. Eliot describes 
these final lines as the most brilliant of all Crashaw’s canon, declaring them “beyond 
analysis and perfected beyond criticism…the ultimate literary expression of the religious 
feeling of that strange period of sensual religious intensity” that is the Baroque (179-80).   
130 One need only look to “The Weeper,” “The Tear,” or “Sancta Maria Dolorum” for 
more explicit liquefaction that similarly leads Crashaw’s devotional subjects, and by 
association his readers, toward a recognition of a devotional selfhood crafted through 
intersubjectivity.  Likewise, the expressive deluge of blood and water that pours forth 
from Christ’s wounds and plays such a central role in all of Crashaw’s Passion poetry 
functions similarly in its reflexive figuration.   
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termed Crashaw’s commitment to “indistinguishability.”  However correctly Netzley 
identifies Crashaw’s devotion to blending, liquefying, and generally relying on 
indistinction to create and also cover immanence within his poetics, Netzley ultimately 
argues that in Crashaw there is “no invitation for readerly participation; no 
performativity” (Reading Desire 104) as Crashaw’s verse “drives us just to be present, 
without all of the learning and action and self-distinction that pedagogy implies” (Netzely 
105).  “The Flaming Heart,” I would contend, offers a sharp contrast to this claim, as 
Crashaw’s indistinction relies almost entirely on blurring gendered literacy modes as well 
as gendered bodies in the ultimate pedagogical act: teaching selflessly.  Crashaw’s 
investment in reminding readers of his presence, offering instruction to them, and then 
purposefully blending into the shared experience of kenotic self discovery that comes 
through the intersubjective architecture of love allows the poet Richard Crashaw, like 
Thomas Traherne’s divine Other, to occupy the space of “both and neither.”    
 Given the intersubjective self-fashioning that occurs in this exchange between 
Crashaw, Teresa, and his readers throughout the poem, the suggestion that the poet 
himself takes on the very hermaphroditic or at least trans status attributed to Teresa 
throughout the poem cannot be surprising.  Rather, this construction functions as the 
ultimate gesture toward a self that is defined through intersubjectivity and the reflexive 
relationship that reveals blurry devotional boundaries between bodies, selves, and others.  
As such, it seems fitting that recent Crashavian criticism has moved away from the 
masculine versus feminine binary that once characterized critical reception of Crashaw’s 
verse; instead, critics have recently proffered affirmations of Crashaw’s authorial and 
cultural androgyny that manifests in a “devotional cosmopolitanism that values ecstatic 
	  162 
religious experience over national or doctrinal difference” (Rambuss “Crashaw and the 
Metaphysical Shudder 261).131  This larger trend treating Crashaw’s entire canon as 
“androgynous” butts up against Susan Stewart’s reading of “The Flaming Heart” in 
which she claims that the complex and gendered power dynamics within the poem reveal 
a “complex transvestitism of power that is completely in line with Counter-Reformation 
dictates about the reception of holy images” (184).132  However accurate Stewart’s 
rendering of the relationship between gender transposition and power in “The Flaming 
Heart” may be, her ultimate argumentative thrust positions all of Crashaw’s amplified 
rhetoric squarely within the Baroque rather than metaphysical poetic tradition.  Like 
Crashaw’s seemingly feminine excess, this distinction has done a great deal to support 
Crashaw’s critical rendering as “foreign” and “other” to the masculine and English voices 
of metaphysical verse. 
   Much as Crashaw’s interest in gender transpositions have facilitated critical 
revisal of this baroque poet, Richard Rambuss notes that “the fervent ecumenism of 
Crashaw’s Teresa poems also accords with the revisionary, expansive notion of a 
‘universal Baroque’ recently put forward by Peter Davidson” (“Introduction” lxxiii).  For 
Davidson, the Baroque indicates a flexible set of symbolic and international conventions 
that discursively override “all the allegiances of religious confession or nationality which 
have come to seem, since the turn of the century, unavoidable descriptors of a cultural 
endeavor” (qtd. in Rambuss “Introduction” lxxiii).  Rambuss thus encourages a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 For the “androgynous” qualities of Crashaw’s verse see, Eugene Cunnar, “Crashaw’s 
‘Sancta Maria Dolorum’”; Paul A. Parrish, “The Feminizing of Power”; Sandra K. 
Fischer, “Crashaw, Ste. Teresa, and the Icon of Mystical Ravishment”; and finally, 
Mueller, “Women among the Metaphysicals.”  
132 See Stewart, Poetry and the Fate of the Senses (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002). 
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reconsideration of Richard Crashaw not only as “Herbert’s second,” as he was styled in 
his own time, but also as a “baroque experimentalist, part of an early modern Anglo-
Catholic avant-garde” invested in intentionally blurring the confessional distinctions that 
have formed the scaffolding for a great deal of Crashavian criticism (Rambuss 
“Introduction” xxxii).  Such a re-visioning does much more than simply recuperate 
Crashaw to the High Church Anglicanism of the Laudian reforms, as Graham Parry sees 
Crashaw’s experimentalism and ecumenism. 133  Rather, Crashaw’s agile deployment of a 
“universal Baroque” reveals neither an exclusively liturgical nor an exclusively 
grammatical Crashaw, but a poet who demands that his readers engage and invest in the 
sometimes-fraught interplay between these interpretive modes and the confessional 
affiliations they gesture to.   
 In this vein, Rambuss has recently sought to reframe his influential and persuasive 
approach to Crashaw’s inhabiting of, rather than merely metaphoric gestures toward, the 
tropes of sacred eroticism and the language of a passionate and desiring body in his 
devotional verse, noting that his past work on Crashaw “ may have underplayed the 
intellectual qualities of his poetry in its relish for the poetry’s visceral, protean 
physicality” (“Crashaw and the Metaphysical Shudder” 266).  As Rambuss goes on to 
point out, Crashaw may well be a poet who celebrates “surfaces, forms, decoration, 
sensations, ritual texts, and objects” (267) as opposed to the deep interiority critics have 
long celebrated in Donne and Herbert, but it seems an appropriate time for critics to also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Graham Parry describes Crashaw as a poet “most intimately caught up in the high 
Laudian phase of worship” (140) with a “readiness to enlarge the devotional territory of 
the English Church by appropriating subjects that were conventionally regarded as 
Catholic property” (141).  See, Glory, Laud and Honour: The Arts of the Anglican 
Counter-Reformation (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2006). 
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“recognize the opulence and amplification of Crashaw’s poetry as an intellectual, even 
academic performance (and pleasure) [which] is not to say that it is not also devout.  This 
is a literary practice of piety and intellect” (266).  Crashaw’s concerted emphasis on 
enacting both grammatical and liturgical literacies in readers of “The Flaming Heart” 
directly supports such a revised view of Crashaw’s verse as both appealing to High 
Anglican as well as Roman Catholic and recusant sentiments.  Crashaw’s verse should 
thus be considered, and critically accepted as “both and neither.”  
  As I have argued above, Crashaw may initially compel readers of “The Flaming 
Heart” to be ruled by him, and he may work diligently to remind them of his instructive 
and artistic contributions to the efficacy of their reading practices, but the self-distinction 
that comes with a unilateral pedagogical agenda gives way in “The Flaming Heart” as 
Crashaw’s speaker ultimately figures himself in an active state of agape, selfless in love 
of the other that is constructed through active engagement with how others come to know 
and feel love themselves.  By the time we reach Crashaw’s final demand to “Let me so 
read thy life, that I / Unto all life of mine may die” (ll. 107-8), Crashaw’s subject-speaker 
can only be defined intersubjectively, as an “I” that defines the reader just as much as the 
poem’s speaker.  Just as Crashaw deliberately collapses the seraphim’s and Teresa’s 
affective states into each other throughout the course of the poem, Crashaw constructs an 
architecture of loving intersubjectivity wherein his speaker and his reader become 
conscious of selfhood through their relation to each other, the divine Other, and the 
ecstatic otherness of Teresa’s flaming heart.  Crashaw’s deliberate appeal to the thoughts 
and feelings that respond to both liturgical and grammatical interpretive modes not only 
reveals but revels in a self-in-relation, who comes into being through desire for an Other.  
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Rather than distinguishing his verse as stemming from either a continental and foreign or 
English and native devotional tradition, as either masculine or feminine, Crashaw’s 
careful envisioning of how both thoughts and feelings interact with bodies and belief in 
his liturgically rich yet intellectually driven incarnational poetics reveals a commitment 
to blurring a great many boundaries all for the sake of real and true devotion to a divine 
Other whom we come to know ourselves through.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DISABLING THE GAZE: RECONCILING MILTON’S BLINDNESS WITH A 
MONIST VISION OF DEVOTIONAL DESIRE 
 
The blind, mad, lame, crippled, and unusually embodied have fired the imagination and 
underwritten the metaphors of classic Western literature. From Sophocles to Toni 
Morrison, disability confers distinction on protagonists and drives narrative. 
       —Rosemarie Garland-Thompson134 
Man is a living being, intrinsically and properly one and individual. He is not double or 
separable: not, as is commonly thought, produced from and composed of two distinct and 
different elements, soul and body. On the contrary, the whole man is soul, and the soul 
man: a body, in other words, or individual substance: animated, sensitive, and rational  
       —John Milton, Christian Doctrine135 
 
The above epigraph from John Milton is generally taken to be the most assertive 
statement of the poet’s monism, or the belief in “the inseparability of matter and spirit, 
body and soul.”136  The preceding epigraph from a prominent 21st-century Disability 
Studies scholar appears at first glance to have very little to do with John Milton and even 
less to do with a belief system grounded in merging the immaterial and material aspects 
of the self.  However, in the great pantheon of blind bards and disabled heroes Garland-
Thompson gestures to, John Milton looms large. Not only did Milton feature a number of 
blind narrators and characters in his poetry, but at the age of 43 Milton’s previously 
diminishing eyesight gave way to total blindness, and the internationally recognized poet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Rosemarie Garland-Thompson, “Disability and Representation,” PMLA 120.2 (2005): 
522-27 (523). 
135 Don M. Wolfe, ed., The Complete Prose Works of John Milton, 8 vols., (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1953-82), 6:318.  
136 William Kerrigan, The Sacred Complex: On the Psychogenesis of Paradise Lost 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983), 220. 
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and polemicist found himself enveloped in darkness.137  Milton’s physical disability was 
far from lost on enemies eager to declare his blindness “a direct punishment from God” 
(Lewalski Life 407) and thus proof of his political heresy.138  
 This chapter will assert that the monist vision of an indivisible body and spirit at 
the heart of Paradise Lost directly engages with Milton’s own identity as an unsighted 
person.  The monism that underpins Milton’s great epic enables angels, devils, and 
mankind to share both narrative and physical space, but it is the persistently dualist 
ontologies of Satan and his cohort that ultimately prove Milton’s deep commitment to 
monism.139  In his rejection of dualist ontologies that attempt to separate the soul from the 
body, Milton offers up the possibility of a hidden wholeness, or as he comes to call it in 
Book 12 a “paradise within” (line 587), that is available to each and every human being, 
regardless of physical impairment.  This vision of wholeness, I argue, is supported in part 
by a staged encounter between sighted readers and an unsighted author who constantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 According to John Aubrey, Milton’s vision began to decline swiftly while composing 
A Second Defense of the English People (1651), with one of his eyes failing altogether 
before the text was complete; his other eye failed, leaving him completely blind, early in 
the spring of 1652 (Jones 230). Milton himself describes first becoming conscious of 
diminishing eyesight in the mid 1640s, ten years prior to extensively describing his 
degenerating sight to his friend the Athenian scholar, diplomat, and zealous proponent of 
Greek liberty, Leonard Philaras. Milton’s 1654 letter to Philaras provides the most 
authoritative description of his descent into blindness, as he is responding to his friend’s 
request for such a report to pass along to the French physician François Thévenin in the 
hopes of successful treatment. In the letter, however, Milton sounds distinctly less than 
hopeful about the prospect of altering his condition. See William Kerrigan, John 
Rumrich, and Stephen Fallon, eds., The Essential Prose of John Milton (New York: 
Modern Library, 2013), especially 17-18. 
138 Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious 
Lyric (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1979).   
139 Stephen Fallon makes this convincing argument in Milton Among the Philosophers: 
Poetry and Materialism in Seventeenth-Century England (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
UP, 1991).  See chapters 6-7 especially.  
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portrays blindness as sliding between the metaphoric and material reality.  The joint 
presence of physical disability and metaphoric enlightenment places tremendous pressure 
on readers of Paradise Lost to engage in the interpretive work of deciphering truth from 
trope.  But for Milton, I will argue, the lines between the immaterial and material are 
always blurry.  In the process of this interpretive work Milton forces readers to become 
acutely aware of the unreliability of sightedness as the means of perceiving truth.  
Ultimately, the persistent intrusion of the literal onto the allegorical trains readers to 
accept the epistemological collapse between seeing and knowing that allows Milton to 
recast his marginalized position as an unsighted person by pointedly destabilizing the 
ableist epistemologies that view the godly body as the able body.  
 In doing so, Milton reveals the prosthetic power of Paradise Lost to materialize a 
monist vision of immanent divine presence that infuses able and disabled bodies alike.  I 
thus posit the prosthetic power of Paradise Lost to upset the rigid dichotomies between 
material and immaterial, ability and disability, and also poetry and lived reality by 
offering readers a devotional subjectivity that neither rejects nor removes from the 
disabled body. 
 
Staring at the Blind  
To say that Milton’s blindness had an impact on his later poetry is neither revolutionary 
nor terribly interesting.  Eleanor Gertrude Brown, Marjorie Hope Nicolson, William 
Kerrigan, Angelica Duran, Jennifer Sherman Roberts, and William John Silverman, 
among others, have all discussed Milton’s poetic production in direct relation to the 
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cultural and medical contexts of his disability.140  Given that Milton lived and wrote in a 
world where sightedness occupied not only the dominant cultural position, but also 
carried considerable spiritual signification, it is no surprise to find that Milton’s 
blindness, and that of his narrator, operates as an explicit theme in a poem that is quite 
literally saturated with gazes.141  God, Satan, Adam, and Eve all explore and assess their 
surroundings visually, and the landscape itself issues “answering looks” (4.464).  Even 
the most inattentive of readers would be hard-pressed to conclude Paradise Lost without 
becoming conscious of the eye’s incredible power to shape our sense of the world and 
also our place within it.   
 Since sight was, and largely continues to be, understood as the most predominant 
of human senses, the event of Milton’s blindness met with considerable contemporary 
response.  The prospect of a blind prophet was ripe for signification, and the “classic 
double-sided trope of blindness as both a sign of perceptual or ethical inadequacy and a 
mystical gift” (Mintz “Dalilah’s Touch” 151) was quickly deployed by friends and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Eleanor Gertrude Brown, Milton’s Blindness (New York: Columbia UP, 1934); 
Marjorie Hope Nicolson, “Milton and the Telescope,” ELH 2.1 (1935): 1-32; Nicolson, 
“The Telescope and Imagination,” Modern Philology 32.3 (1935): 233-260; Kerrigan, 
Sacred Complex; Jennifer Sherman Roberts, “Getting an Earful: The Place and Process of 
Hearing in Early Modern England,” diss. U of Minnesota, 2007; Angelica Duran, “The 
Blind Bard, According to John Milton and His Contemporaries,” Mosaic 46.3 (2013): 
141-57; William John Silverman, “Seeing While Blind: Disability, Theories of Vision, 
and Milton’s Poetry,” diss. Florida State University, 2011. 
141 Franklin R. Baruch’s “Milton's Blindness: The Conscious and Unconscious Patterns 
of Autobiography” also argues that Milton’s experience of blindness is closely integrated 
into his poetry as “an interaction of mutual needs, with Milton’s requirements both as a 
poet and as an emotionally wounded, sensitive man in perfect symbiotic union” (26). 
While identifying Milton’s blindness as a crucial component of Milton’s poetic self 
representation, Baruch, however, fails to fully account for the ways in which Milton’s 
status as not just a blind, but a disabled person, drives his representation of vision in 
Paradise Lost. See Baruch, ELH 42.1 (1975): 26-37. 
	  170 
enemies alike.  Given the unavoidable public performance of Milton’s disability, this first 
section will outline contemporary responses to Milton’s blindness and also the ways in 
which Paradise Lost was seen as closely connected to Milton’s disability.  This 
foundation is necessary to illustrate the ways in which Milton develops a disability 
subjectivity in Paradise Lost that actively confronts ableist positions that often interpret 
disability as something out of place and in need of correction.   
 Partisan vitriol was quick to figure Milton’s disability as indicative of both 
misguided political opinions, and undeniable evidence of divine judgment—an external 
signifier that if a prophet at all, the prophet in support of revolution and regicide was as 
false as the Pharisees.142  In No Blind Guides (1660), for example, Robert L’Estrange 
viciously adapts Matthew 15:14 to warn the English populace against Milton’s political 
guidance via the rather pointed claim that “If the Blinde lead the Blinde, Both shall fall 
into the Ditch” (No Blind Guides 1).  In the same year and in a similar manner The 
Censure of the Rota celebrated the demise of Milton’s beloved Protectorate by 
lambasting him for having “scribbled [his] eyes out” for “little or no purpose” (4).143  In 
response, Milton embraced the relation between the material state of his body and the 
inner workings of his soul by actively refuting the image of a god-forsaken blind man.  In 
The Second Defense of the English People (1654), for example, Milton offers the 
alternate image of a devoted servant to the state who lost his sight pursuing two godly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 For a more far-reaching account of how Milton’s detractors characterized his 
blindness in popular print than I provide here, see Duran, “The Blind Bard,” esp. 152-54. 
143 The censure of the Rota upon Mr Miltons book, entituled, The ready and easie way to 
establish a free common-wealth (1660). The tract is a royalist burlesque ascribed to the 
republican James Harrington in a way designed to mock both Milton and Harrington. 
Roger L'Estrange, No blinde guides, in answer to a seditious pamphlet of J. Milton's 
intituled Brief notes upon a late sermon (1660). 
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callings: duty and liberty.  When Milton’s detractors styled his blindness as a physical 
manifestation of an internal lack, Milton could respond by formulating his blindness as 
the product of an excessive devotion that, while physically inconvenient, was more than 
compensated for with prophetic insight.   
 To support such a perspective, Milton could and did draw from a litany of 
“ancient bards and wise men” composed of philosophers, poets, statesmen, theologians, 
and biblical figures who, though blind, were “recompensed with far more potent gifts” 
(Second Defense 1080).144  Milton’s rhetorical ability, he vehemently argued, was not 
impinged in the least by his lack of eyesight, an assertion supported by governmental 
provision of amanuenses and assistants so that he might continue on in his role as 
Secretary of Foreign Tongues (1649-60) well after his eyesight abandoned him 
altogether.145  In fact, in the years after the Restoration (1660), when Milton’s star ought 
to have seemed the most dim, he could lay claim to a number of eager young pupils like 
Thomas Ellwood and Cyriack Skinner as evidence of sustained intellectual and poetic 
vigor, if not his continued celebrity.  Milton’s self-representation was, according to David 
Loewenstein, a brilliant blend of “personal drama” with an “epic vision of history” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 For a thorough treatment of the Greek mythology surrounding blindness and insight 
see Françoise Létoublon, “To See or Not to See: Blind People and Blindness in Ancient 
Greek Myths,” in Light and Darkness in Ancient Greek Myth and Religion, eds. 
Menelaos Christopoulos, Efimia D. Karakantza, and Olga Levaniouk, Greek Studies: 
Interdisciplinary Approaches (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). On the Christian 
tradition see Chad Hartstock, Biblical Interpretation Series: Sight and Blindness in Luke-
Acts: The Use of Physical Features in Characterization (Boston: Brill, 2007); and Moshe 
Barasch, Blindness: The History of a Mental Image in Western Thought (New York: 
Routledge, 2001). 
145 For a more detailed account of the onset of Milton’s blindness, see Gordon Campbell 
and Thomas N. Corns, eds., John Milton: Life, Work, and Thought (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford UP, 2008), 211-13. 
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(Milton and the Drama of History 171).146  Indeed, the image of Milton as loyal subject 
sacrificing his vision for the sake of the “grand old cause” was so provocative that it 
invited political adversaries to view his blindness as “fair game” for “insults [that] 
utilized the same categories in describing his blindness as did Milton himself” (Duran 
“The Blind Bard” 151).  Milton was too public and too divisive of a figure for his 
disability to simply exist—it demanded a story (Bérubé 570).147  Milton understood this 
truth all too well, as the event of his blindness elicited a great many stories, and Paradise 
Lost provided an opportunity to control that narrative as best he could.  
 Milton’s identity as a disabled person is so intimately tied to Paradise Lost that 
his friend and fellow poet, Andrew Marvell, makes Milton’s blindness the focus of his 
introductory poem celebrating the second printing of Paradise Lost.  Much like the poem 
it is meant to introduce, “On Mr. Milton’s Paradise Lost” relentlessly calls attention to 
the poet’s blindness as Andrew Marvell struggles to interpret his friend’s physical 
condition in relation to the selfsame archetypal constructions of disability Milton himself 
had to respond to.  In the following analysis, I would like to draw attention to the ways in 
which Marvell’s prefatory poem plays with culturally ambivalent representations of 
blindness to present Milton’s disabled body as the real exhibit worthy of sustained 
observation in Paradise Lost.  In doing so, I demonstrate the complex ways in which 
longstanding disability scripts ricochet between Milton’s own disability performance, 
communal judgments and expectations, and ultimately our own readerly experience of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 David Loewenstein, Milton and the Drama of History: Historical Vision, Iconoclasm, 
and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1990). 
147 This particular claim regarding Milton’s unique circumstances adapts Michael 
Bérubé’s larger claim that all disability demands a story.  For more on disability as an 
impetus to narrative see Bérubé, “Disability and Narrative,” PMLA 120.2 (2005): 568-76. 
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Paradise Lost.  
 In Marvell’s encomiastic poem, Milton’s blindness looms large, casting a spectral 
shadow over both the occasional poem and the epic it introduces. Marvell frames “On 
Mr. Milton’s Paradise Lost” almost entirely around the dichotomy between sight and 
sightedness.  Marvell himself assumes the role of both spectator and critic, as the opening 
lines suggest:  
  When I beheld the poet blind, yet bold, 
  In slender book his vast design unfold, 
  Messiah crowned, God’s reconciled decree, 
  Rebelling angels, the Forbidden Tree, 
  Heav’n, Hell, Earth, Chaos, all; the argument 
  Held me a while, misdoubting his intent 
  That he would ruin (for I saw him strong) 
  The sacred truth to fable and old song, 
  (So Samson groped the temple's posts in spite)  
  The world o’erwhelming to revenge his sight. (lines 1-10)148 
 
From the poem’s outset, Marvell presents himself as a reader with misdoubts about the 
very project of Milton’s great epic.  The poem's concern initially centers on the tension 
between Milton’s rhetorical strength overwhelming its biblical subject and transposing 
the sacred into no more than fiction, a work of art rather than faith.  However, it is worth 
noting that Marvell’s backhanded compliment praising Milton’s poetic might is grounded 
in an overt reminder of the poet’s physical disability.  The coordinating conjunction “yet” 
in Marvell’s initial description of Milton as a “poet blind, yet bold” (l. 1) situates 
Milton’s poetic vigor as an unexpected surprise, given his blindness.  Marvell’s speaker 
appears shocked by Milton’s surprising lack of inability, and this opening attention to 
blindness as anything but disabling suggests that readers too will find themselves 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Andrew Marvell, The Complete Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Nigel Smith, rev. ed. 
(Harlow, England and New York: Pearson, 2007).  For more on the influences and 
composition of Marvell’s prefatory poem, see pp. 180-2.  
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surprised by not only Milton’s dexterity in verse but also the vast design of Paradise Lost 
itself.  These feelings of surprise turn to near-alarm in line nine’s parenthetical aside 
comparing the blind bard to the equally blind biblical hero Samson.149  Judith Scherer 
Herz reads this comparison as an opportunity for Marvell to cast himself as a “double 
spectator” of both Samson Agonistes and also Paradise Lost, claiming that the 
parenthetical itself positions Samson the character and also the play that bears his name 
as “a synonym for its creator” (245).150  We are to read Milton and Samson as 
interchangeable by virtue of their shared disability.151  In Herz’s reading, Marvell’s 
comparison echoes the bard’s own anxiety at the heart of Samson: that he just may be an 
embittered blind man void of sufficient divine inspiration to match the task at hand, but 
emboldened by recognition of divine disfavor and a taste for vengeance against his 
enemies (245).  Marvell’s allusion certainly invites readers to consider the author of 
Paradise Lost in direct relation to the blind Israelite hero of the accompanying text, but 
the weight of this comparison lies in the set of parentheticals that juxtapose Milton’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Nigel Smith notes that Marvell’s reference to Samson in relation to Milton is the first 
in a tradition of critical association between Milton and Samson. See Smith, 183, n. 9. 
150 Judith Scherer Herz, “Milton and Marvell: The Poet as Fit Reader,” Modern Language 
Quarterly 39.3 (1978): 239-63.  
151 In contrast, Eleanor Gertrude Brown’s seminal work Milton’s Blindness, which she 
approaches from her own position as an unsighted individual, disputes any direct 
correlation between Samson and Milton for the reason that Samson readily associates his 
blindness with punishment for his sins while Milton vociferously rejects identifying his 
blindness with either sin or punishment. See Milton’s Blindness (1934; New York: 
Octagon, 1968). Stephen Fallon similarly asserts that while the depiction of blindness in 
Samson Agonistes is informed by Milton’s own “intimate and bitter experience” we are 
not to read Samson as an analogue for Milton himself. See Milton’s Peculiar Grace: Self-
representation and Authority (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2007), 252. 
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intellectual strength and the physical strength with which Samson enacts his revenge.152  
It is notable that the comparison to Samson, whose blindness could easily be read as a 
punishment for his sins, echoes royalist critiques of Milton’s disability (McWilliams 
164).153  In making such a comparison, Marvell positions Milton’s blindness, rather than 
the poem he is meant to introduce, as the real focus of readerly attention; readers are 
bluntly invited to consider whether Milton’s blindness signifies sin or prophetic insight, 
the product of God’s good grace. 
 To that end, the epistemology supporting the entire poem revolves upon 
sightedness as the premier means of acquiring knowledge.  Marvell pointedly declares 
that he “beheld” Milton’s verse and “saw him strong” (ll. 1,7), thus positioning himself as 
a sighted critic of Milton’s poem.154  What is more, Marvell’s first line, “When I beheld 
the poet blind, yet bold” may deliberately echo Milton’s own first line in “Sonnet 19,” 
wherein a blind Milton reflects back on his sighted days: “When I consider how my light 
is spent” (l. 1).155  Exchanging consideration, a verb that suggests a process of prolonged 
thought, with beholding, which suggests an immediate sensory witnessing rather than an 
internal process of cogitation, underscores Marvell’s sightedness as well as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Nigel Smith also glosses lines 6-10 as expressing concern over the possibility that 
Milton intentionally taints Christianity with the intrusion of classical myth as an act of 
revenge for the divine punishment of blindness. See Smith, 183. 
153 John McWilliams, “Marvell and Milton’s Literary Friendship Reconsidered,” SEL 
46.1 The English Renaissance (2006): 155-77. 
154 Nigel Smith also notes Marvell deploying similar phrasing in a letter to Milton 
discussing his Defensio Secunda in June of 1654: “When I consider how equally it turns 
and rises with so many figures.”  See Smith, 182. 
155 There is debate regarding the numbering of Milton’s sonnets.  I take my numbering 
from William, Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen Fallon, eds., The Complete Poetry 
and Essential Prose of John Milton (New York: Modern Library, 2007). 
	  176 
preeminence of visual sight as a more facile means of acquiring understanding.  In doing 
so, Marvell directly juxtaposes his mode of meaning making against the blind figures of 
Samson and Milton who must rely on the lesser senses of touch and sound to make sense 
of their worlds.  Marvell’s description of Samson “groping” the temple’s pillars makes 
these comparisons all the more clear.  In The Transposer Rehears’d (1673), for instance, 
Milton’s detractor Samuel Butler describes the “blind author of Paradise Lost” beginning 
Book 3 “groping for a beam of Light” (orig. cited in Smith, 183).  When Marvell 
compares Milton to Samson, and then describes Samson as groping his way through the 
world, he obliquely gestures to the long-standing tradition of linking blindness with 
sensuality, a relation that comes to fuller fruition in the speaker’s subsequent concern 
over the blind poet losing his artistic course when wandering in such a “wide field” 
(l.13).  The transposition of touch for sight as the primary mode of apprehending the 
world led to popular medieval and early modern stereotypes of the blind as being fixated 
on groping, reaching, and altogether consumed with a range of desirous touches that put 
their sensual natures on exhibit (Classen 52).156  Marvell’s comparison to Samson thus 
posits that Milton’s poetry may be an act of revenge, an angry attempt at compensating 
for the loss of his sight.  Marvell simply proffers this potential interpretation, tucking 
away the implicit comparison between Samson’s blind groping and the possibility of his 
friend’s sensual nature in a parenthetical that insulates himself from such an accusation.  
However, the comparison between Milton and Samson, a biblical figure whose blindness 
is directly linked to his sensual appetites, certainly encourages readers to approach an 
epic so ambitious as Paradise Lost with a watchful eye set on discerning whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Constance Classen, The Deepest Sense: A Cultural History of Touch (Urbana, 
Chicago, & Springfield: U of Illinois P, 2012). 
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Milton’s poem is a product of heavenly muses singing into Milton’s discerning ear or if it 
is perhaps a product of more corporal concerns. 
 This explicit attention to Milton’s blindness continues throughout the poem, 
where in the second stanza Marvell shifts abruptly from his initial trepidation over the 
blind bard’s motivations to considerable praise: 
  Yet as I read, soon growing less severe, 
  I liked his project, the success did fear; 
  Through that wide field how he his way should find 
  O'er which lame faith leads understanding blind; 
  Lest he perplexed the things he would explain, 
  And what was easy he should render vain.  (ll. 11-16) 
While this brief second stanza transitions away from the profoundly negative image of 
Milton as a violent revenger, Marvell’s concern over the nature of Milton’s inspiration 
persists.  He wonders if this poetic task is driven by personal vanity rather than divine 
inspiration.  Marvell’s earlier worries over the suitability of Milton’s project may have 
dissipated as he continues to read and more fully comes to “see” and thus apprehend 
Milton’s narrative agenda, but his fascination with Milton’s blindness implies a much 
deeper sense of apprehension at the prospect of Milton’s success.  This unease finds form 
in Marvell’s imagined scene of navigation, where the blind man easily traverses the most 
challenging poetic grounds without any apparent stumbling or assistance.  Milton’s sound 
navigation disturbs popular assumptions about the blind, assumptions that Marvell is 
quick to remind us of with the subsequent images of “lame faith” leading “understanding 
blind” through the perplexing wilderness of divine verse.157  The semicolon in line 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 The image of the faithful Edgar leading a physically blinded Gloucester in King Lear 
comes immediately to mind.  Edgar’s disguise as the mad beggar Poor Tom would have 
classified him amongst the indigent whose lack of financial worth made them the social 
equivalent of the “lame” beggars traditionally supported through charitable giving of the 
godly community.  For more on the relation between disabled persons and the 
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fourteen conjoins two oppositional images of disability: first, we see a dexterous blind 
man easily navigating the field in front of him, and secondly, Marvell presents the 
contrary image of a blind man who means to complete an easy task, but makes it so 
difficult it is rendered worthless.  Both of these oppositional images gesture back to 
Marvell’s initial concern over whether Milton’s project might ultimately prove an 
exercise in artistic skill rather than authentic devotion.  The artistically gifted blind man 
makes quick work of the challenges presented by the incredible narrative range presented 
to him.  However, in his ambition to provide readers with greater understanding by way 
of his imaginative rendering of the sacred, Marvell suggests that he might risk perplexing 
readers for whom simple faith suffices.  In either case, Marvell’s repeated waffling 
between concern and praise and then back again is facilitated entirely by the images of 
disability the poem has thus far relied upon.  What is clear, however, is how Marvell’s 
representation of disability reminds readers of the expected limitations of blindness.  
Whether uniquely gifted or struggling in vain, in either case we are confronted with a 
body that lacks the sense most associated with understanding.  In Marvell’s construction, 
Milton’s body is an abnormal body, and as such it cannot pass without narration and 
interpretation (Cousser 457).158  
 Curiously enough, the image of a blinded Milton struggling in vain to perform a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
impoverished in early modern England see Linda Woodbridge, Vagrancy, Homelessness, 
and English Renaissance Literature (Urbana and Chicago: U of Illinois P, 2001), esp. pp. 
23-27. 
158 Speaking of disabled bodies, Thomas G. Couser asserts, “the unmarked case – the 
‘normal’ body – can pas without narration” whereas “the scar, the limp, the missing limb, 
or the obvious prosthesis – calls for a story” (457): see “Disability, Life Narrative, and 
Representation,” in The Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard Davis (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 456-59. 
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task that a sighted person would presumably execute with greater ease bears a shadowy 
resemblance to a story told by one of Milton’s contemporary critics, Pierre du Moulin.  In 
this recounted fantasy vision, du Moulin gleefully looks on 
  in silence, and not without a soft chuckle, at seeing my bantling laid at  
  another man’s door, and the blind and furious Milton fighting and slashing 
  the air, like the hoodwinked horse-combatants in the old circle, not  
  knowing by whom he was struck and whom he struck in return.  
  (orig. cited in Masson 220)159  
 
Du Moulin’s desire to look on as Milton plays the blind buffoon struggling to make sense 
of his surroundings suggests a very particular kind of gaze.  He does not want to 
passively observe Milton; rather, du Moulin fantasizes about humiliating Milton through 
a gaze that aggressively frames the gifted author as entirely lacking understanding, a man 
confused enough to mistake du Moulin’s “bantling” or bastard child for someone else’s. 
The “bantling” du Moulin refers to can only be Regii Sanguinis Clamor Ad Coelum 
Adversus Parricidas Anglicanos (1652), a public critique of Milton’s support of regicide 
that was authored by du Moulin, but misattributed to Alexander More, whom Milton 
mercilessly skewered in his rebuttal.  Milton’s forceful response to Regii Sanguinis, and 
du Moulin’s subsequently imagined scene deriding Milton’s ability to comprehend the 
world around him, demonstrates that “even the literary endeavors of the blind…could be 
recast as physical comedy unintentionally performed by those who, because sightless, 
know not what they do” (Classen 55).  Du Moulin knew full well that Milton was a 
worthy intellectual opponent, but his blindness offers the opportunity for an accusation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 David Masson, The Life of John Milton: Narrated in Connexion with the Political, 
Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of His Time, vol. 5 (London: Macmillan, 1877). For 
more on the relationship between Pierre du Moulin, see Martin Dzelzainis, “Milton, Peter 
du Moulin and the Authorship of Regii Sanguinis Clamor Ad Coelum Adversus 
Parricidas Anglicanos (1652),” Notes and Queries 60.4 (2013): 537-8. 
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that would have otherwise been completely unfounded.  If Milton was subject to 
accusations of immorality and comic imbecility on account of his blindness, one would 
think that a poem written by a friend to introduce and celebrate a significant poetic 
achievement would categorically reject any association of blindness with such negative 
stereotypes.  Marvell’s poem, however, does not.  
 Instead, Marvell conscientiously places a series of disability scripts before 
readers’ eyes.  Throughout the poem readers are treated to a parade of familiar disability 
tropes: the “obsessive avenger” intent on exacting revenge on those whom he deems 
responsible for his impairment; the “comic misadventurer” whose disabled body operates 
as the locus of comedic violence that is initiated in viewing the disabled body in action; 
and finally, as the poem begins to feel more authentically encomiastic, we meet the 
“inspirational overcomer” who somehow manages to surmount the limitations and 
pathology of their abnormal body.160  It is interesting to note, that as Marvell transitions 
from negative to positive disability scripts he turns our readerly gaze away from Milton’s 
blindness and onto himself.  He admits feelings of jealousy (l. 18) when reading and 
recognizing “that no room is here for writers left, / But to detect their ignorance or theft” 
(ll. 29-30).161  With Paradise Lost, Milton has covered every poetic topic conceivable, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 The labels for these disability stereotypes are not my own invention, but are largely 
paraphrased from the following sources: Paul Longmore, “Screening Stereotypes: Images 
of Disabled People in Television and Motion Pictures,” Social Policy 16 (1985): 31-7; 
David Hevey, The Creatures Time Forgot: Photography and Disability Imagery (New 
York: Routledge, 1992); Martin Norden, The Cinema of Isolation: A History of Physical 
Disability in the Movies (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1994); and finally, Carrie Sandahl 
and Philip Auslander, “Introduction: Disability Studies in Commotion with Performance 
Studies” in Bodies in Commotion: Disability and Performance (Ann Arbor: U of 
Michigan P, 2005), 1-12. 
161 Nigel Smith glosses Marvell’s explicit declaration of jealousy in line 18 as referring to 
concern over Dryden’s “less skillful hand” (l. 19) adapting Paradise Lost into a stage 
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and Marvell’s admission of professional envy and even anxiety over this fact, frees him 
to praise the “gravity and ease” (l. 36) with which Milton sings.  Eventually Marvell 
appears to overcome his jealousy by figuring Milton as a fantastic bird of paradise 
soaring far above regular “human flight” (ll. 37-40).  In this portrayal, Milton requires 
neither touch nor sight; his verse, and vicariously Milton himself, “never flags, but 
always keeps on wing” (l. 40).  Such an imaginative comparison provides a significant 
transition from the sensual and sensory-impaired Samson groping his way towards 
revenge.  In sharp contrast, Milton is here described as a bird capable of transcending 
earthly matters altogether.162 
 After such ample praise, Marvell turns briefly back to wonder at Milton’s 
astounding and undeniable ability.  He does so by posing questions both personal and 
professional: “Where couldst thou words of such a compass find? / When furnish such a 
vast expanse of mind?” (ll. 41-2).  Marvell’s questions account for both space (where) 
and time (when).  He wonders when and where Milton could have furnished his mind 
with both the words and images capable of creating a poem set against such an expansive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
production and thus ruining it (Smith, 183).  This is certainly the immediate context of ll. 
18-22, but I would contend that while ll. 29-30 extend Marvell’s concern over Dryden’s 
adaptation, they do not disqualify Marvell from the community of writers overshadowed 
by the poetic genius and grand scale of Paradise Lost.  In fact, as a fellow writer who was 
publicly associated with Milton it is hard to imagine that Marvell would not feel some 
anxiety of influence in relation to Milton.  I borrow the idea of such anxiety, of course, 
from Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry 2nd edn. (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 1997). 
162 Angelica Duran reads this “positive bird imagery” as directly countering animal 
imagery deployed by Milton’s adversaries that describe him as beast-like or invoke 
“negative snake imagery.” She also notes that Milton invokes the same avian imagery in 
the invocations of Books 1, 3, 7, and 9 of Paradise Lost, and he gradually adapts the 
imagery surrounding the titular character in Samson Agonistes from animals that walk to 
those who soar (“The Blind Bard” 152-3). 
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interstellar backdrop, and his answer appears in a final simile meant to firmly shape our 
consideration of the “blind, yet bold” poet.  Marvell declares: “Just heaven thee, like 
Tiresias, to requite, / Rewards with prophecy the loss of sight” (ll. 43-4).  The final 
comparison between Milton and the great blind seer of antiquity remaps the initial 
Samson comparison entirely.  Marvell initially presents Milton as an avenging artist 
using Paradise Lost and the poetic fame that would surely come from such a feat as 
payback against his enemies, particularly those who publicly attributed his blindness to a 
sinful or sensual nature.  In Marvell’s last depiction, however, Milton is, like Tiresias, 
“requited” for the loss of his sight with the gift of prophecy.  The poetry isn’t payback 
against God; it is payment from Him for the devotion and service that ultimately cost 
Milton his sight.  This is by far the most complimentary image of Milton’s blindness in 
the entire poem, and as such it appears to serve its congratulatory purpose.  However, it 
also helps to clarify why Marvell would place blindness and all of its negative 
associations at the forefront of our readerly attention in a poem meant to praise a man he 
claimed as a friend.  The verb “to requite,” means to repay something owed, but it can 
also mean to retaliate or avenge (OED 1a, 2a).  Ultimately, Marvell issues praise for 
Milton’s poetic accomplishments, but he cannot relinquish the seductive association 
between Milton and Samson, two avengers whose blindness can either be interpreted as a 
marker of divine favor and exceptionality or punishment and rejection. 
 Despite these sometimes-contradictory images of Milton’s blindness, what is 
readily apparent in “On Mr. Milton’s Paradise Lost” is that Andrew Marvell reads and 
responds to Paradise Lost from the dominant position of the sighted community.  As 
such, Marvell anxiously projects a set of relatively stale disability scripts onto his friend’s 
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disabled body.  Such prescriptive scripts are, as Bree Hadley argues, “designed not to tell 
us what it means to be disabled, but, rather, what it means to be able” (126).163  Marvell is 
discomfited by Milton’s absolute otherness precisely because his blindness supposedly 
reveals his soul writ large.  As a result of his incredible talents, the blind John Milton fits 
into only one of two available disability categories: the divinely punished sinner seeking 
vengeance against both God and the godly, or the divinely inspired prophet whose 
blindness unlocks otherworldly talents.  Deploying these conventional scripts throughout 
the poem, and often in direct opposition to each other, reveals disability’s potential to 
disturb socially constructed bodily norms as well as the popular conviction that seeing is 
knowing.  Marvell sees Milton, but he cannot know precisely what it is he sees.  As a 
result, he attempts to position himself as the all-seeing spectator within the space of his 
poem, but ultimately the unknowability of Milton’s disability thwarts him to such an 
extent that he is only ever able to depict blindness as an incredible lack, either in the form 
of a single physical disability or a multi-layered instantiation where lack of grace 
manifests in physical impairment.  The formulation of blindness as lack accentuates 
Marvell’s own position as a whole, able-bodied member of the sighted community.  As a 
result of his own commitment to visual efficacy, Marvell struggles with the illegibility of 
the disabled body.  To counteract the unknowability of Milton’s body and blindness, 
Marvell presents himself as a true “double spectator,” not just of Samson Agonistes and 
Paradise Lost, but also of the relationship between Milton’s body and soul. And he 
invites readers of Paradise Lost to do the same. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Bree Hadley, “(Dia)logics of Difference Disability, Performance and Spectatorship in 
Liz Crow’s Resistance on the Plinth,” Performance Research 16.2 (2011): 124-31. 
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The Blind Bard Stares Back, or Milton Crips Paradise Lost 
In an earlier chapter I described Thomas Traherne’s confident construction of a 
devotional subjectivity that positioned himself as an exhibit desiring the gaze of a 
transcendental spectator who also desires to look at him.  When John Milton sits down to 
write Paradise Lost, however, his position as an exhibit subject to a range of interested 
gazes has already been decided for him.  Like the entire created world, he is the object 
not only of God’s divine gaze but also of a national and international community of 
spectators intent on interpreting his blindness as evidence of God’s judgment.  Thanks to 
Marvell’s deliberate invocation of popular disability scripts to frame the second printing 
of Paradise Lost, readers from the second edition onward are encouraged to approach the 
poem as conscientious spectators ready to judge Milton’s soul by deciding which 
narrative of disability they prefer to project onto his blindness.   
 He will be either sinner or supercrip, and in this sense his access to the able-
bodied and godly community rides entirely on the prosthetic capacity of Paradise Lost to 
supplement the lack and limitations of Milton’s supposedly deviant body.  Given his 
options, Milton understandably invokes a supercrip persona in Paradise Lost, but in 
addition to positioning his disability as positive in nature, Milton utilizes the prosthetic 
potential of Paradise Lost to remap the rules of bodily normalcy altogether.  Just as a 
medical prosthesis “occupies and occludes a disturbing middle ground, disrupting the 
clear mediation of subject and object” (White 173), Paradise Lost similarly blurs the 
boundaries between blind narrator and blind poet, effectively inserting the material reality 
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of Milton’s blindness into the otherwise metaphoric plain of Paradise Lost.164   
 The initial invocation in Book 1 both draws readerly gazes to Milton’s blindness 
and also styles Milton’s blind speaker in the position of a supercrip by positively 
rendering his visual impairment as a vehicle for divine light.  Milton’s speaker implores 
the heavenly muses to give him the ability to “assert eternal providence, / And justify the 
ways of God to men” (1.25-6).165  This initial figuration grounds the epic to come in a 
general desire to explain and make sense of the human condition, a desire not uncommon 
amongst epic narrators.  However, the speaker’s accompanying request to “illumine” that 
which is dark within him (1.22-3) moves relatively quickly from interest in the general 
human condition to the specific and immediate condition of a narrator who suffers from 
blindness, and as such exhibits an unusual relationship with the divine that grants insight 
otherwise unavailable to the able-bodied.166  The speaker is a supercrip, as evinced by the 
disparity between his insufficient earthly sight and all-encompassing divine sight.  The 
speaker’s physical disability is pointedly developed in the accompanying directive for the 
muses to “Say first, for Heav’n hides nothing from thy view / Nor the deep tract of Hell, 
say first what cause / Moved our grand parents…” (1.27-9).  Given the language of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Allon White, Carnival, Hysteria, and Writing: Collected Essays and Autobiography 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993).   
165 This and all subsequent references to Paradise Lost are taken from William Kerrigan, 
John Rumrich, and Stephen Fallon, eds., The Complete Poetry and Essential Prose of 
John Milton (New York: Modern Library, 2007). 
166 According to Jan Grue, one of the most defining characteristics of a supercrip 
narrative is the “rationalization and legitimization of impairments as positive attributes” 
(205). In “The Problem of the Supercrip: Representation and Misrepresentation of 
Disability,” in Disability Research Today: International Perspectives, ed. Tom 
Shakespeare (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 204-18.  
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illumination undergirding the speaker’s request for both knowledge and ability, the 
immediate and repeated directives to “say first” stand out in their reliance on sound over 
sight.  While Milton acknowledges the necessity of transcendental sight to his project, his 
speaker does not desire to be shown a vision as Adam is granted in Book 11; instead, he 
both articulates and desires speech as the preferred mode of communicating knowledge.  
Prophetic insight might be the focus of this first invocation, but the emphasis on sound 
over sight stresses the reality of the speaker’s physical condition as a blind man while 
also setting the stage for an explicit engagement with the physical reality of blindness 
throughout the poem.  At the very least, this initial construction of meaning-making as an 
activity grounded in the sensorium reminds readers of Milton’s own sensory limitations, 
their interpretive responsibility to decipher the meaning of his blindness, and also the 
poet’s interest in mediating that act of interpretation.  Paradise Lost is the space where all 
of these desires meet.  
 The distinction between blindness as a narrative trope signifying divine 
exceptionality and blindness as an actual physical condition are quickly muddled by the 
poem’s early concentration on satanic vision.  For instance, immediately after Milton 
presents a physically blind but spiritually enlightened narrator in Book 1 we meet the 
opposite in the form of a sighted but apostate angel assessing his newly fallen position: 
  for now the thought  
  Both of lost happiness and lasting pain 
  Torments him; round he throws his baleful eyes  
  That witnessed huge affliction and dismay  
  Mixed with obdurate pride and steadfast hate:  
  At once as far as angles ken he views  
  The dismal situation waste and wild, 
  A dungeon horrible, on all sides round  
  As one great furnace flamed, yet from those flames  
  No light, but rather darkness visible  
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  Served only to discover sights of woe,  
  Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace  
  And rest can never dwell, hope never comes  
  That comes to all (1.54-67). 
Readers take on Satan’s perspective, following the gaze of “baleful eyes” that 
haphazardly dart about acquiring visual data that leads to better comprehension of his 
physical situation.  As Satan begins to discern the hellish landscape his vision is 
described in terms of extramission, where light from within the eye must be projected 
outward in order for sight to occur.  William John Silverman reads this figuration as 
reminiscent of the Greek philosopher Plotinus’s description of extramission wherein he 
argues, “That huge illumination… pouring outwards comes at last to the extreme bourne 
of its light and dwindles to darkness; this darkness, now lying there beneath, the soul sees 
and by seeing brings to shape” (orig. cited in Silverman 22).  Silverman notes that the 
darkness described by Plotinus “sounds like the object of vision, and the description of 
seeing by the darkness at the edge of the light points toward Milton’s ‘darkness visible’” 
(22).  Indeed, Satan’s first vision of Hell directs readers to consider not just the imagined 
scene before them, but the very mechanics of vision.  
  Milton’s emphasis on extramissive vision complicates the nature of light and 
darkness as they are introduced from the outset of the poem.  The speaker’s earlier 
request to have his internal darkness illuminated (1.22-3) appears to operate 
symbolically, as he expresses a desire to alter an internalized metaphoric blindness of the 
soul that is both personal and also understood to be shared to some extent by all 
postlapsarian people.  However, this purely symbolic reading is immediately subverted 
by the concepts of extramission that inform Satan’s sight.  Milton’s description of Satan 
subjected to a darkened dungeon punctuated by a flaming furnace that emits no light of 
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its own reads uneasily like a description of real physical blindness where the same eye 
that once discharged streams of light is now left impotent, catching shadowy reflections 
with no inner furnace to produce its own flames.  Satan’s active extramissive eye 
demands that readers of Paradise Lost account for physiological blindness as much as the 
metaphoric.  Readers are prompted “to resist,” as Stephen Hequembourg claims, “the 
temptation to read metaphorically what Milton is insisting can be understood as literally 
and physically true” (2).  The fit reader will be able to trace how this collapse into the 
literal upends the either/or constructions that set external/internal, physical/spiritual and 
sighted/blind in opposition to each other.  In Milton’s construction, the metaphoric slides 
into the literal and then back again, a narrative strategy that motivates readers to abandon 
interpretive strategies and epistemological systems that rely on such insufficient 
dichotomies altogether.  
 To further this aim, the description of Satan viewing “as angels ken” (1.60) 
heightens the interpretive pressure placed on readers trying to discern whether Milton’s 
intention is for them to think about literal or metaphoric light and sight.  “Ken” variously 
describes a range of sight (OED 2a), the capacity to see (3), and also mental perception or 
recognition (4b).  Readers are asked to follow Satan’s gaze and take stock of the 
“darkness visible,” but a visual range is a slippery and imprecise measurement of distance 
that is only further complicated by the fact that we are meant to consider the scope of 
angelic sight.  Exactly how far is the average angel’s visual range, and can a 
postlapsarian reader really make sense of this?  Milton’s attention to issues of sight and 
sightedness invites an epistemological relation between seeing and knowing, but this 
relation is immediately undercut by the indistinct nature of visual measurements and also 
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the mutability of physical sight itself.  Readers are directed to assess and understand the 
world visually.  Milton’s layering of metaphoric and physical descriptors of vision, 
however, encourages them to take note of how subjective and unreliable these visual 
assessments are.   
 There is, perhaps, no better example of the eye’s undependable nature than the 
infernal similes Milton uses to ground the spatial dimensions of his poetic universe.  The 
first of these similes demonstrates the visual challenge Milton erects for readers quite 
nicely.  Satan is described as having his “head uplift above the wave, and eyes / That 
sparkling blazed, his other parts besides / Prone on the flood, extended long and large / 
Lay floating many a rood” (1.193-6).  In the setup of the simile to come, Satan’s eyes are 
the only active bodily element; all of his other parts lie “prone,” in either a physically 
stationary position or a state of mental readiness (OED 2).  In either case, Satan assesses 
the world visually first and foremost, and so too do readers who once again find 
themselves confronted with vague visual cues to ground the imagined scene.  Satan is 
“long and large,” and he takes up “many a rood,” a variable unit of length measuring 
approximately five to eight yards and primarily used to appraise property lines (OED 
6A).  With such vague descriptive prompts, it is no wonder that T.S. Eliot famously 
accused Milton of lacking “visual imagination” and writing “English like a dead 
language” (158, 159).  Eliot even went so far as to claim that Milton was largely 
responsible for the “disassociation of sensibility” in much of the poetry from the 1600’s 
onward (173).167  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 To be fair, Eliot brands Dryden as sharing in this unwelcome legacy with Milton. 
Eliot’s accusation, while certainly bombastic, has met with general critical dismissal, and 
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 Milton’s reliance on archetypal imagery has similarly lent itself to the suggestion 
that his verse lacks lively visual detail.168  In this instance the challenge to more precisely 
pinpoint the size and scope of Milton’s Satan increases with the infernal simile listing a 
number of mythical monsters to compare Satan against.  The archfiend is described as 
being:  
  … in bulk as huge  
  As whom the fables name of monstrous size,  
  Titanian, or Earth-born, that warred on Jove,  
  Briareos or Typhon, whom the den  
  By ancient Tarsus held, or that sea beast  
  Leviathan, which God of all his works 
  Created hugest that swim th’ ocean stream (1.196-202). 
The stack of comparisons certainly serves the poem’s epic vision, but it does very little to 
provide readers with a clearer sense of what exactly it is we are meant to see and 
understand.  The speaker relies on amplification as each additional monster is meant to 
magnify the intended sense of awe and horror at the sight of such a devil.  The recurring 
correlating conjunction “or” that strings the whole sequence together, however, 
complicates the intended amplification.  “Or” modifies the images previously listed by 
offering additional, even varying perspectives.  Given the classic and biblical provenance 
of these monsters, the scale, though obviously quite large, is difficult to pin down.  
Precisely how big is the “hugest” (1.202) creature in all of God’s creation?  Rather than 
strengthening the set of correspondences presented by Milton’s speaker, they grow 
increasingly hazy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Eliot himself revises this severe judgment in his second essay on Milton.  See: T.S. Eliot, 
On Poetry and Poets (1943; New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2009).  
168 William Riley Parker, Milton: A Biography, ed. Gordon Campbell, 2nd edn., 2 vols. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 1.594. 
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 According to Steven Hequembourg, Milton’s the sense of spatial scale brought 
about by the infernal similes are often characterized by the “frequent addition of a third-
person human perspective” that reinforces Milton’s refusal to simply “allow metaphors to 
die off into literalness,” but instead provides a “context in which they are resurrected into 
a new literal life – a space in which metaphors, like everything else that exists in a monist 
materialist cosmos, take place” (8-9).  This alternate perspective that gives shape and 
substance to the symbolic realm comes to bear in this particular passage when Milton 
describes how sailors often mistake a slumbering Leviathan for an island that offers 
secure mooring for a safe night’s rest on the open sea (1.204-8).  The sailor’s visual 
failure to distinguish safe harbor from a dangerous sea monster invites readers, here at the 
very outset of Paradise Lost, to begin the challenging interpretive work of turning away 
from unreliable, and very often actively deceptive, external signifiers that tempt us with 
their seemingly easy analysis.  Even properly functioning eyes, Milton deftly reminds us, 
can still deceive.  The epic simile comparing the great-deceiver Satan to the specious 
image of an island that is actually a dangerous sea-beast simultaneously encourages 
active reading practices while also emphasizing how physical sight is an unreliable 
mechanism for knowledge. The image of Leviathan is thus rich and resonant with 
symbolism.  The epic comparison turns our gaze away from Satan onto a sea monster 
who is described variously in the Bible as the recipient of God’s punishment and also 
symbolic of God’s creative power.169  Just as Milton is either a sinner or supercrip, 
readers are presented with the choice to interpret Leviathan as either a monster or an 
image of God’s incredible power.  This either/or scenario offers Milton an opportunity to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 See Isaiah 27:1 and Job 41 respectively. 
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adapt the binary disability scripts available to him by offering a third, perhaps less 
obvious interpretation brought about by the sailor’s third party perspective.  The vague 
visual cues surrounding Leviathan encourage readers to consider their aptitude for seeing 
and truly knowing.  Leviathan may have a monstrous outside, but Milton has given 
readers good reason to doubt visual efficacy.  As a result, Leviathan could very well be a 
blurry mix of both positive and negative images, the horrendous monster and also the 
ultimate sign of God’s creative force.  In crossing these interpretive boundaries, Milton 
invites readers might do away with the dualism altogether.   
 The monist rejection of dualism inherent in Milton’s portrayal of satanic vision 
becomes even more apparent with Stephen Fallon’s suggestion that Satan’s entrance to 
the poem as Leviathan alludes to Thomas Hobbes’s opus of the same name.170  The 
lumbering weight of Satan’s immensity, remarks Fallon, underscores Milton’s departure 
from the quasi-Cartesian dualism embraced by Hobbes (Fallon 207).  Indeed, Satan and 
his cohort of fallen angels tempt readers into committing the sin of separating the spirit 
from the flesh entirely, of viewing the self as either/or rather than both/and.  Milton’s 
early emphasis on Satan’s excellent physical vision establishes this temptation, as Satan 
appears to perceive things exactly as they are.  For example, Satan’s visual assessment of 
Beëlzebub’s fallen and altered exterior as seeming entirely distinct “from him, who in the 
happy realms of light / Clothed with transcendent brightness didst outshine” functions as 
a synecdochic description of the entire horde (1.85-6).  While Satan recognizes their 
physical transformation, and even acknowledges how he too has “changed in outward 
luster” (1.97), he rejects this physical reality as an authentic representation of identity.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers, especially 206-22. 
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Instead, he proffers a wholly internal and immaterial notion of true selfhood, declaring 
for himself “A mind not to be changed by place or time” (1.253).171  Satan goes on to use 
this construction of selfhood to express the ultimate freedom of the mind to exist as “its 
own place” (1.254), and therein lays the temptation.  
 Satan might claim that he is “still the same” (1.256) as he was in heaven, but to 
the fit reader fully ensconced in the postlapsarian world and with foreknowledge of 
biblical history, he is ontologically out of touch.  Satan’s ontological misperception is 
most evident when he first encounters his daughter and former lover Sin, along with their 
offspring Death. Shocked at their horrific appearance and recoiling against the sight of 
Sin’s “double-formed” body, Satan proclaims: “I know thee not, nor ever saw till now / 
Sight more detestable than him and thee” (2.741, 744-5).  While this is the newly fallen 
Satan’s first encounter with Death, he claims to have no prior knowledge of Sin.  Even 
without Milton’s subsequent explanation of Sin’s spontaneous eruption from Satan’s 
head, thus materializing his wicked thoughts, the godly reader knows full well that Sin is 
Satan’s bedfellow.  The sights Satan finds so utterly detestable in the narrative present of 
the poem are in fact, as Sin herself shortly reveals, the product of his own immoral 
thoughts and deeds.  Sin is quite literally a physical manifestation of Satan’s interior.  
Recognizing her father’s and former lover’s rejection, Sin addresses Satan’s failure to see 
beyond her physical form when she wonders aloud, “…and do I seem / Now in thine eye 
so foul, once deemed so fair / In Heav’n” (2.747-9, my emphasis).  Hers is a question not 
of identity, but of perspective.  Sin knows who she is and what she was, as evinced when 
she describes both her external and internal condition at birth as being so “Likest to thee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Stephen Fallon identifies this construction of the satanic self as Cartesian in nature: 
see Milton Among the Philosophers, 203-4. 
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in shape and count’nance bright” (2.756).  In fact, upon first seeing her in Heaven, Satan 
himself could not help but find “Thyself in me thy perfect image viewing” (2.764).  Sin’s 
origin story once again emphasizes the relationship between seeing and knowing in its 
attention to the disparity between what Satan sees and believes to know right now and 
what he previously saw and knew prior to his fall from grace.  In the present context of 
the poem, however, Satan fails to recognize the truth so readily perceptible to readers: 
this double-formed foul woman who births mewling hellhounds continues to be a perfect 
mirror image of his truest self (2.741).  Fallen readers who are already familiar with the 
realities of sin, death, and Satan’s handiwork in the postlapsarian world have a much 
firmer grasp of Satan’s identity than he appears to.  Satan, in contrast, is caught up in 
what seems, not in what is so.172         
 Despite temporary recognition of his own transformation, Satan embraces willful 
misrecognition of his essential nature throughout the remainder of Paradise Lost.  In his 
efforts to tempt Adam and Eve, he both styles himself and believes himself to be a 
liberating force offering freedom from the yoke of ignorance.  Occupying the privileged 
position of all-knowing and all-seeing spectator in the poem, Milton’s fit reader observes 
that Satan’s image of self is just that, an imagined construction of selfhood divorced from 
the reality of his fallen physical condition.  Through the astounding power of rhetoric, 
Satan fashions a “fixed core self, imagined to be located in the mind,” but readers know 
this to be a false construction (Lewiecki-Wilson 157).173  Not only has Sin shown us what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 William John Silverman offers a thorough account of the ways in which the verb “to 
seem” influences Milton’s sensory landscape (149-58). 
173 Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, “Rethinking Rhetoric through Mental Disabilities,” 
Rhetoric Review 22.2 (2003): 156-67. 
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Satan truly is, but readers know from earthly experience that it is not so easy to entirely 
separate the material from the immaterial aspects of the self.  Satan’s crucial misreading 
of self is accommodated entirely by a rejection of the interrelation between body and 
mind, which in turn serves as a powerful, if implicit, assertion of the indivisibility of 
these elements.  Milton’s monism thus appears in soft and subtle reminders that fallen 
readers cannot authentically know or understand themselves if they ignore the reality of 
living in fallen, sinful, and imperfect bodies.  If they reject this truth they risk falling into 
the same dualist misapprehension of the self that Satan does.   
 Of the many temptations Satan presents in Paradise Lost, the most paramount to 
readers is thus the temptation to dismiss the fallen body altogether.  Milton’s early and 
consistent emphasis on sightedness as an unstable mechanism for knowledge reminds 
readers that some degree of visual impairment is a legitimate reality for most 
postlapsarian peoples.174  Satan’s misreading of the relation between his material and 
immaterial states thus serves Milton’s larger agenda of drawing readerly attention to the 
ways in which the fallen and imperfect body requires interpretation rather than complete 
dismissal.  However tempting the retreat inward to an entirely immaterial concept of the 
self might be to a politically disenfranchised and disabled poet, Milton meticulously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 To be sure, Milton’s blindness left him unequivocally aware that physical sight was 
not a reliable constant, but he was far from alone in that understanding. Edward 
Wheatley’s ground-breaking study Stumbling Blocks before the Blind: Medieval 
Constructions of Disability (Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 2010) asserts that “varying 
degrees of visual impairments must have been so widespread as to be unremarkable, 
especially before the Italian invention of eyeglasses for the nearsighted in the 1280s and 
for farsightedness in about 1450” (8). Additionally, Stuart Clark and William John 
Silverman both convincingly demonstrate that the early modern era saw a vigorous 
debate about the nature and reliability of vision that expanded out from the medical field 
and into natural philosophy: see Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern 
European Culture (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007).  
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crafts a world where material realities intrude upon the immaterial and metaphoric.  For 
Milton, to deny the material altogether is to fall into satanic self-deception.  In his 
deployment of blindness as both a trope and also a physical reality, Milton’s verse thus 
fashions the disabled body as a spectacle to gaze upon, but it also trains readers to discern 
a hidden wholeness that resides within, but not apart from the body itself. 
  
Prolepsis and Prosthesis 
For Milton, immanence broods in the collapse between the allegorical and the real, but it 
falls on readers to meaningfully engage in the practice of spiritual reading to recognize 
that when Milton slides between these two realms something sacramental occurs.  In his 
intertwining of literal and figurative blindness, Milton certainly plays the part of the 
supercrip, but his supercrip persona does not appear to be interested in overcoming or 
transcending the disabled body.  In all of his poetic and public representations of his 
personal blindness Milton never requests divine restoration of his lost sight.  After all, 
such a request could be interpreted as recognition that his disability is in fact divine 
punishment.  For instance, in “Sonnet 19” Milton’s blind speaker comes close to 
questioning God’s reason for inflicting the blindness that leaves him “in this dark world” 
(l. 2) having been “light denied” (l. 7).  Immediately, though, “patience to prevent / that 
murmur soon replies” (ll. 8-9) and swiftly attenuates the speaker’s frustration by 
reminding him to “bear his mild yoke” (l. 11).  Milton alludes to the frustration of living 
with disability, but ultimately he concludes the sonnet with the now famous image of a 
blind poet who serves God best by patiently standing and waiting.  Milton 
conscientiously styles himself as a willing recipient of God’s loving rod, as in Sonnet 22, 
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when he firmly declares, “Yet I argue not / Against Heaven’s hand or will, nor bate a jot / 
Of heart and hope, but still bear up and steer / Right onward” (11. 6-9).  Following An 
Collins in her refusal to ignore the lived reality of disability, Milton compels readers to 
stare at his disabled body, and in doing so engage in the same type of devotional 
spectatorship and sacramental seeing that Crashaw and Traherne also ask of their readers.  
This interplay between the real and the metaphoric, as Hequembourg suggests, will take 
place “not so much on the page as in the mind of the fit reader” (8).  In Paradise Lost, 
Milton positions his disabled body as the object of both God’s divine gaze and also the 
vessel through which readers come to see and then know devotional desire.  But in order 
to see and know the sacred within them, readers must first acknowledge the mutability of 
physical vision, then close it off, and finally come to see not just the poem in front of 
them but their truest and most faith-filled selves reflected back in the process of the 
interpretive work required of spiritual reading. 
 The sense of an immanent divine presence within readers of Paradise Lost is 
largely produced by Milton’s persistent use of prolepsis and analepsis to actively merge 
the diegetic time-space of the poem with the actual world occupied by both Milton and 
his readers.175  This merger of space and time invests Milton’s poetic utterance with real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Milton’s penchant for disturbing the temporal space of his poetry with prolepsis has 
met with a fair amount of critical attention. David Quint identifies prolepsis as a crucial 
feature in “The Nativity Ode.” Marshall Grossman and Charles Huttar both describe the 
proleptic vision of Paradise Regained, and most recently Ryan Netzley has convincingly 
demonstrated the proleptic production of sacramental immanence in Paradise Lost and 
also Paradise Regained. See Quint, “Expectation and Prematurity in Milton’s ‘Nativity 
Ode,’” Modern Philology 97 (1999): 195-219; Grossman, ‘“In Pensive trance, and 
anguish, and ecstatic fit’: Milton on the Passion,” in A Fine Tuning: Studies of the 
Religious Poetry of Herbert and Milton, ed. Mary A. Maleski (Binghamtpon, NY: 
Medieval & Renaissance Texts Studies, 1989); Huttar, “C. S. Lewis, T. S. Eliot, and the 
Milton Legacy: ‘The Nativity Ode’ Revisited,” Texas Studies in Literature and Language 
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meaning, as his descriptions of blindness form a threshold between the literal and the 
imagined.  In the present contexts of his poem, Milton’s blindness should have no 
bearing, but it does—it is insistently present, and readers are ever reminded to take stock 
of their blind narrator, their blind author, and their interpretive task at hand.  This 
presence is most evident in Book 3, when Milton’s most metaphoric invocation of light 
collides with the most autobiographical and intimate portrayal of his blindness in all of 
his poetry.  The invocation begins with Milton’s speaker summoning a “holy light” that is 
either “offspring of Heav’n first-born, / Or of th’ Eternal coeternal beam” (3.1-2).  In this 
initial construction, the light might be physical, the first created element in the universe, 
or God Himself.176  Milton’s speaker readily acknowledges the difficulty of expressing 
God’s nature by requesting that he goes “unblamed” for the failure of language to 
properly relay divine truth (3.3).  To account for the lack inherent in fallen speech, Milton 
turns to the metaphoric to describe such a dazzling, uncreated and unapproachable light.  
Declaring that “God is light” (3.3), Milton seems to position the entire passage as 
operating on the figurative level alone, but this purely metaphoric realm of divine 
presence is quickly disturbed by the intrusion of a disabled body that cannot detect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44. 3 (2002): 324-48; and Netzley, Reading Desire and the Eucharist in Early Modern 
Religious Poetry (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2011).   
176 Some of the most influential arguments debating the nature of this light, particularly 
the extent to which the distinction Milton apparently draws reflects his theological 
Arianism, are as follows: Maurice Kelley, This Great Argument: A Study of Milton’s “De 
Doctrina Christiana” as a Gloss upon “Paradise Lost” (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1941) 
claims that the proem to the third book of Paradise Lost is an invocation “to light in a 
physical sense” 95-6; in “‘Hail Holy Light’ and Divine Time in Paradise,” JEGP 68 
(1969): 45-56, Albert Cirillo argues that light is meant only "as the traditional metaphor 
for the higher, nonphysical light” (51); and William Hunter, C.A. Patrides, and J.H. 
Adamson collectively claim that this light is meant to symbolically represent Christ in 
Bright Essence (Salt Lake City: U of Utah P, 1971), 55-6, 66-8, 72-77, and 149-51. 
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physical light.  God’s interminable divine light is figured as the “vital lamp” of the sun 
that penetrates all of creation, but fails to revisit “these eyes, that roll in vain / To find thy 
piercing ray” (3.22-4).  This abrupt transposition from the purely immaterial and spiritual 
realm of God’s presence to Milton’s literal circumstances demands readerly attention as 
they are called to do more than passively observe the temporal disruption affected by 
such an autobiographical insertion.  
 The transition between divine metaphoric light and Milton’s actual inability to 
discern physical light is accomplished via a dizzying set of temporal shifts.  In the present 
space of Book 3, Milton’s speaker addresses divine light as being immanently present, 
proclaiming, “Thee I revisit now” (3.13, emphasis added).  Rather than staying in the 
present frame, however, Milton’s speaker immediately flashes back to the previous two 
books where he was 
  Taught by the Heav’nly Muse to venture down  
  The dark descent, and up to reascend,  
  Though hard and rare: Thee I revisit safe,  
  And feel thy sov’reign vital lamp; but thou 
  Revisit’st not these eyes…  (3.19-23) 
The temporal structure of this passage is dizzying: he descends into the darkness of 
“eternal Night” (3.18), re-ascends, and is thus able to re-visit a God who is described as 
pure light.  The speaker’s analeptic reflection on his sojourn through darkness appears to 
deeply trouble him, as line 19’s enjambment contrasts sharply against the sense of relief 
that accompanies the firmly end-stopped images of re-ascending and re-visiting a realm 
of divine light.  This sense of relief is but momentary, however, as the speaker’s sensory 
awareness of God’s emanating light is intruded upon by the recognition that while the 
speaker now revisits God, He will not re-visit “these eyes” (3.23).  Milton’s emphatic 
repetition of the prefix –re in this passage triangulates between the narrative past, the 
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narrative present, and Milton’s own insurmountable visual impairment.177  In rhetorical 
terms, the prefix –re does more than simply enable an assessment of current light and 
previous darkness—it serves as a prosthesis that supplements the sensation of lack the 
speaker expresses in his analeptic gaze backward.   
 The temporal disruption accommodated by the prosthetized text provides Milton 
with space to depict a present blindness that is difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
from his narrator’s.  The pre-biblical and prelapsarian past of the narrative moment 
collapses into the postlapsarian present, as Milton’s blindness, which occupies a narrative 
future, is presented as though it has already occurred.  “These eyes, that roll in vain” 
expresses a present progressive action, seemingly endless and ongoing, but the present 
sense is modified with the past-tense construction of the following declaration, “So thick 
a drop serene hath quenched their orbs, / Or dim suffusion veiled” (3.25-6).  By using 
contemporary medical terminology to describe complete and total blindness as a foregone 
conclusion, Milton places the physical reality of a disabled body at the forefront of 
readerly attention.  What is more, the slide between literal and real is further heightened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Milton makes a similar rhetorical move in Sonnet 23 when his poetic speaker first 
expresses joy at seeing his recently deceased wife appear to him through the “fancied 
sight” (l. 10) of a dream vision, but then despairingly invokes the reality of blindness 
when, upon waking, finds that “she fled, and day brought back my night” (l. 14).  
Milton’s speaker could certainly be describing his sensation of loss and suffering as a 
metaphoric “night.”  However, it is difficult to read this poem as purely metaphoric, 
given that even the dream vision prevents total, unmediated sight of the deceased spouse; 
she appears with her face veiled.  Having gone completely blind in 1652, Milton, like the 
speaker of Sonnet 23, could have only ever hope to see his second wife, Katherine 
Woodcock, through the veil of his imagination.  As in the poem, “full sight of 
her…without restraint” (l. 8), could only ever come with their reunion in Heaven.  For 
more on the disability subjectivity at the heart of Sonnet 23 see Sara Van Den Berg, “Full 
Sight, Fancied Sight, and Touch: Milton’s Sonnet 23 and Molyneux’s Question,” Ben 
Jonson Journal 16.1-2 (May 2009) 16-32. 
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when we consider that this is the selfsame diagnosis Milton references to describe his 
own blindness.  
 The immediacy of Milton’s blindness in Paradise Lost is startling, particularly at 
the exact moment that readers transition from observing Satan traversing the infernal and 
chaotic landscapes of Books 1-2 to first witnessing the transcendental gaze of God in 
Book 3.  The proleptic presence of Milton’s blindness places interpretive pressure on 
readers precisely because, as Ryan Netzley asserts, prolepsis “forces us to reimagine the 
activity of reading” by “negat[ing] its own temporal figurative pointing: treating events in 
the future as if they had already happened translates, at the level of interpretation, into the 
somewhat odd notion that the figurative, future meaning—the issue of an interpretive 
procedure—has already occurred as well” (165-6).  This is certainly true for the events 
narrated in Paradise Lost.  Readers already know how the essential points of the story at 
the heart of Christianity will unfold: Adam and Eve will sin; Satan will be punished; and 
God will offer the possibility for redemption in the form of Christ’s loving sacrifice.178  
To some extent, however, Milton’s proleptic flash-forward indicates that his blindness 
has also already been interpreted, and the prosthetized text Paradise Lost simply provides 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Stanley Fish’s study of reader-response in Surprised by Sin, 2nd ed. (London: 
MacMillan, 1997) focuses almost exclusively on the ways in which Milton, via the 
archangel Michael, teaches Adam the art of interpretive reading.  Likewise, Sharon 
Achinstein’s work on the relation between political activism and reading in the 
seventeenth-century also focuses largely on Adam’s education: see Milton and the 
Revolutionary Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994).  David Ainsworth, in 
contrast, focuses entirely on the ways in which Milton’s later works, and particularly the 
later books of Paradise Lost reveal an interest in teaching the spiritual reading practices 
incumbent on the godly in seventeenth-century England.  See Ainsworth, Milton and the 
Spiritual Reader: Reading and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2008).	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material evidence that Milton is a supercrip, and readers need only complete the 
interpretive work set out for them to fully discern this. 
 The result is Milton himself entering the poem as a very real third-party human 
perspective who invests the poetic language with real meaning, as is appropriate in a 
monist and vitalist universe where the words produced by godly authors and interpreted 
by fit readers are just as weighty as body and souls.  In this way, Milton’s poetic strategy 
to merge the allegoric and the real becomes evident, as Steven Hequemborg elaborates,  
  The two-term formula, “A is like B,” is a flat line: A is real, present,  
  acting in the poem before our eyes, while B is not. Milton's “A is like B as 
  seen by C” changes the shape of things. Three points create narrative  
  space; analogy becomes story, and the third term makes all three seem to  
  exist equally, interdependently…. The reader is constantly surprised by  
  space - as the outlines of the seemingly immaterial become clearer and  
  condense into physical objects. (9-10)179 
 
In the contexts of Book 3’s proem, the “A is like B as seen by C” formula is modified as 
readers see blindness as it is seen by both Milton’s imagined narrator but also Milton 
himself.  This slippage between the world of the poem and the world of Milton and his 
readers continues as Milton persistently juxtaposes his supercrip persona with the reality 
of living with physical blindness.  First, readers are presented with the supercrip whose 
poetic gifts are supercharged by his physical disability.  “Smit with love of sacred song” 
(3.29), Milton’s narrator imagines himself walking in shady groves with immortal muses 
and visiting with the blind prophets of old who are “equaled with me in fate, / So were I 
equaled with them in renown” (3.34).  He imagines himself a nocturnal bird ensconced in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Ultimately, Hequemborg argues that Milton’s slippage between literal and metaphoric 
is an essential component of his monist cosmos, where everything has material weight 
metaphors fade into the literal. 
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a darkness made bearable by his own sacred songs that are capable of reaching out of his 
personal darkness via the light of divine inspiration.  The darkness facilitates superior 
song, and thus propels the speaker toward his true fate: renown equal to the great seers of 
Greek mythology.  In this supercrip construction, Milton invites readers to consider not 
just his speaker’s access to divine light, but how divine light is available both then and 
now, in the body of the text and also his own.  Milton’s slippage between the metaphoric 
and the literal demonstrates the supplemental power of language to alter a disabled body 
that could otherwise be deemed lacking. 
 The isolating effects of real, physical blindness, however, swiftly mitigate this 
sense of achievement.  Despite his ability to sing, Milton’s narrator still laments his 
inability to physically see:  
  But cloud instead, and ever-during dark 
  Surrounds me, from the cheerful ways of men  
  Cut off, and for the book of knowledge fair  
  Presented with a universal blank  
  Of Nature’s works to me expunged and razed, 
  And wisdom at one entrance quite shut out. (3.45-50)  
The emotional weight of this passage falls on feelings of being cut off and ultimately shut 
out from both the world of godly men and also the world God has created for mankind. 
Following the popular epistemological construction of seeing as knowing, the speaker 
bemoans his inability to read and interpret the world around him for signs of God’s 
presence.  The speaker’s pain at being removed from the material world foreshadows a 
fallen Adam’s anxiety that leaving Eden means he will be deprived of the sight of God.  
Adam thus worries, 
  This most afflicts me, that departing hence, 
  As from his face I shall be hid, deprived 
  His blessed count’nance; here, I could frequent, 
  With worship, place by place where he vouchsafed 
	  204 
  Presence Divine…. 
  In yonder nether World where shall I seek  
  His bright appearances, or footsteps trace? (11.315-19, 328-9) 
Adam, like the fallen speaker, is concerned with physical sight.  In this moment of 
sudden knowledge of what it really means to be fallen, “the reader,” David Ainsworth 
asserts, “has superior knowledge to Adam, having presumably been forced to seek God in 
that ‘nether World’ for a lifetime” (103).  Adam, like Milton’s despondent narrator, feels 
fully human in this moment.  Both recognize the importance of seeing as the primary 
mode of acquiring knowledge, and both recognize God’s infusing and immanent presence 
in the Book of Nature, but both must turn to find inward what they previously looked for 
without.  
 While Adam receives the assistance of the archangel Michael to clear his fallen 
sight long enough to properly see visions of a fallen but ultimately hopeful world to 
come, Milton and his narrator use the prosthetic power of the devotional text to confirm 
the divine desire and also immanent presence that fuels their poetic vision.  Immediately 
following reminders of the despair and isolation that often accompany his disability, 
Milton concludes the proem with the following assertion:  
  So much the rather thou celestial light    
  Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers  
  Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence  
  Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell  
  Of things invisible to mortal sight. (3.51-5) 
In this most crucial moment, where Milton reasserts and claims for himself the ability to 
see solely through spiritual eyes and sing a heavenly song, readers are once again 
confronted with the material intruding upon what seems to be wholly immaterial.  The 
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language of divine purgatives is both bodily and also fully connects this scene with that 
in Book 11 when Adam also learns to see with his inward eyes.  In this scene,  
  Michael from Adam’s eyes the film removed 
  Which that false fruit that promised clearer sight 
  Had bred; then purged with euphrasy and rue  
  The visual nerve, for he had much to see; 
  And from the Well of Life three drops instilled. 
  So deep the power of these ingredients pierced, 
  Even to the inmost seat of mental sight, 
  That Adam now enforced to close his eyes, 
  Sunk down and all his spirits became intranced. (11.412-20) 
In the following visions that make up all of Book 11, Adam learns that divine presence is 
accessible in the fallen world, but only to those who submit to the perpetual work of 
spiritual interpretation.  In order to “discover within himself the hand of God,” Adam 
must “learn to interpret the world spiritually” (Ainsworth 103).  However, Milton’s 
description of Michael’s divine purgative as primarily working on the visual nerve and 
being composed two medicinal herbs used in Milton’s time to treat visual impairments 
injects the real, the material, and the imperfect reality of fallen bodies into the epic 
convention of a god clearing mortal sight.   
 My point in comparing Adam’s eye-clearing with Milton’s ultimate desire to “see 
and tell / Of things invisible to mortal sight” (3.54-5) is to emphasize that while Milton 
might craft a speaker capable of soaring between heaven and earth, he is also invested in 
adapting the disability scripts he inherited from his culture.  Metaphors of disability have 
long been employed to provide a “tangible body” to textual abstractions (Mitchell and 
Snyder 56).  The world of Paradise Lost is certainly abstract, but the eye’s mutable 
nature and the physical reality of blindness that undergird much of Milton’s universe 
remind readers of material truths that cannot be denied.  Fallen bodies are not perfect—
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bodies break and sight fails, but as we see in both the visions of Book 11 and also our 
own postlapsarian experience this does not mean that God abandons us.180  The supercrip 
persona Milton develops in Book 3 is, like Adam, fallen and broken, but not damned 
precisely because Milton’s narrator is deeply conscious of the indivisibility of body and 
soul.  While he might struggle with the realities of the body, ultimately he knows that 
there is “a paradise within,” a place of weight and substance, that can be accessed by 
devotional desire properly attuned to reading the relationship between body and soul. 
Milton’s insistent autobiographical references blending truth and trope make it difficult to 
read blindness as either wholly literal or wholly figurative in Paradise Lost.  This poetic 
strategy assures readers that Milton himself does not suffer from satanic self-deception—
when confronting his blindness, he does not retreat into an immaterial realm of the mind, 
but sees his body and soul as intimately joined and available for viewing via the 
prosthetized pages before us.  As a result of Milton’s proleptic presence in the poem, it 
becomes possible to interpret blindness as both a textual abstraction and also a “tangible 
body” precisely because Milton’s disabled body oscillates between lingering in the 
background and forcefully inserting itself into the reader’s purview.  The sacramental 
seeing Milton thus invites readers to engage in does not deny the disabled body; Paradise 
Lost is not a poem interested in transcendence.  Instead, the disability subjectivity 
embedded at the heart of Paradise Lost reveals the fleshiness of metaphor to reveal a 
hidden wholeness encased in the prosthetic power of the devotional text. 
 	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 For Adam’s first vision of disease and deformity see 11.471-96.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Incarnational Technology: Putting the Prosthesis to Work  
in Early Modern Devotion 
 
 
If our artifacts do not act on us, there is no point in having made them. We make material 
artifacts in order to interiorize them: we make things so that they will in turn remake us, 
revising the interior of embodied consciousness. 
      —Elaine Scarry181 
 
 
In the epigraph above, Elaine Scarry suggests that in the process of producing the various 
things that populate our world, our sense of self is reconstituted.  The very artifacts that 
we bring into being, in turn, re-create and refashion the way we see our selves as 
ourselves.  Indeed, as I sit here at my desk typing on my laptop and humming along to a 
personalized playlist of music streaming from a cellular phone that rarely leaves my side, 
I am distinctly aware of technology’s capacity to shape the way I experience and see 
myself in the world.  What is more, with the range of fitness applications provided by 
wearable technology that track, among other things, heart rate, calories burnt in a day, 
and sleeping patterns, I can achieve something close to Thomas Traherne’s dream of 
peering into the numinous recesses of my own body.  These “auxiliary organs,” as Freud 
would call them, certainly do appear to have transformed postmodern humans into “a 
kind of prosthetic God” (44).  However, far from generating ontological wholeness, as 
Freud and Scarry both point out, these artifacts demand stringent and near-constant 
reconsideration of the self.  In this process of seemingly ceaseless reconstruction, 
subjective wholeness seems an almost impossible ideal. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Elaine Scarry, “The Merging of Bodies and Artifacts in the Social Contract,” in 
Culture on the Brink: Ideologies of Technology, ed. Gretchen Bender and Timothy 
Druckrey (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1994), 97. 
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Throughout this dissertation I have proffered the claim that early modern 
devotional texts operate as prosthetic devices whereby the technology of the text provides 
the framework upon which the material and immaterial collide to formulate a necessarily 
complicated, but perhaps more authentic, vision of the self.  Insofar as prostheses are 
material artifacts actively engaged in a reconstitution of the individuals who employ 
them, Scarry’s assertion about the embodied but also internal relationship between human 
beings and the things we produce holds true.  Early modern devotional texts are 
undoubtedly engaged in this process of re-creation.  For men and women living and 
writing in post-Reformation England, devotional writing provides a medium through 
which they might begin the process of recreating the self by “theoriz[ing] how the 
relationships between divine and mundane worlds are registered at the level of affect” 
(Kuchar Poetry of Religious Sorrow 2).  The prosthetized devotional text thus 
materializes a vigorous and unresolved set of exchanges between the immaterial/spiritual 
aspects of self and the reality of material/bodily existence in a postlapsarian world.  As I 
demonstrate by providing a range of devotional voices writing from various social 
positions, early modern devotional texts, like prostheses themselves, sometimes fail to 
achieve but are always striving toward holism.   
In order to parse out the tricky interpretive work occasioned by the prosthetized 
devotional text, I have focused a great deal on the body of the text and also the ways in 
which bodies are represented within devotional texts.  In this attention to the material 
relations between the bodies that produce devotional writing and the embodied work of 
devotion, I hope to have demonstrated the presencing power of religious verse to cross 
binary constructions of the self by materializing the immaterial realms of spirit, desire, 
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and divinity.  To the extent that religious verse is interested in constructing and ultimately 
converting spiritual desire into divine presence, language achieves materiality in its 
devotional contexts.  For authors as confessionally and politically divergent as John 
Milton, Richard Crashaw, Thomas Traherne, and An Collins, poetic utterance, especially 
sacramental or incarnational speech, has the power to reconstitute fallen bodies into 
celestial flesh.  Each author examined in this dissertation uses somatic expression as a 
conduit to access the divine, but in doing so confronts the problem that the very bodies 
where faith and belief are written are both the subjects and objects of earthly desire—
particularly, the state’s desire for control, stability, and silence.  When placed in 
conversation with each other, these texts articulate a set of competing desires over how 
the devotional body is figured, both in print and in person, as each of these authors 
attempt to use the language of the body to access a desired, but distant God, while a 
proximate state/church reads embodied devotional language as potentially dangerous.182 
  The confounding amalgam of spiritual desire and material presence presented by 
early modern devotional texts make legible a pervasive interest in embodying both 
appropriate and authentic devotional reading and writing practices.  By drawing attention 
to the various ways somatic speech interacts with and also shapes devotional subjectivity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 In making such a claim, I cannot help but think of Peggy Samuels’ “Labor in the 
chambers: Paradise Regained and the Discourse of Quiet,” Milton Studies 36 (1998): 
153-176.  In her nuanced reading of Arminian cleric Benjamin Laney’s 1665 crown-
sponsored sermon conjoining political as well as religious quiet with godliness, Samuels 
suggests that Laney’s insistence on public quiet is an effective attempt to “close the 
borders” (166) between the public and private realms and thus govern the devotional 
labor at work in each sphere. This interest in disciplining and governing the devotional 
body both at home and abroad is underscored by Thomas Edwards’ immensely popular 
heresiography Gangraena, or a Catalogue and Discovery of many Errours, Heresies, 
Blasphemies and Pernicious Practices of the Secretaries of this Time (1646) wherein 
Edwards expresses outrage that men were not whipped for their devotional errors.  
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this project demonstrates how seventeenth-century authors use the prosthetized 
devotional text to transverse contemporary constructions of embodied states like 
disability and gender within socially acceptable frameworks.  By applying current 
Disability Studies perspectives to early modern devotional verse authored by both able-
bodied and disabled individuals I attempt to meaningfully engage with David Mitchell’s 
and Sharon Snyder’s call to develop “a new historicism of disability representations” 
(Narrative 25).  My attention to the prosthetic impulse of early modern devotional 
writing is, in this context, necessarily incomplete, as the process of devotional self-
fashioning and subjective re-creation is never fixed, just as the prosthesis itself defies 
fixed categories of identification.   
 This project only begins to articulate the ways in which disabled or non-
normatively gendered bodies are themselves cultural artifacts embodied within the 
discursive aesthetics of early modern devotional writing.  These bodies require recovery.  
When disabled poets like An Collins and John Milton actively invite readers to gaze on 
and even celebrate their disabled bodies, or when Thomas Traherne and Richard Crashaw 
construct sacramentally rich relationships with a hermaphroditic Christ figure that 
actively contravenes the largely phallocentric discourses of seventeenth-century devotion, 
literary critics must engage in ethical reading practices that account for the ubiquity of 
ableist perspectives, then and now.  My interest in bringing together disability discourses 
and the “turn to religion” in early modern literary criticism thus initiates an excavation of 
the ways in which the prosthetized devotional text not only exposes, but also actively 
substantiates and corporealizes the intersectional relation between bodies, belief, and the 
construction of the self in early modern England. 
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